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Abstract
Researchers have been fighting malicious behavior on the Internet for several
decades. The arms race is far from being close to an end, but this PhD work
is intended to be another step towards the goal of making the Internet a safer
place. My PhD has focused on measuring, predicting, and detecting malicious
behavior on the Internet; we focused our efforts towards three different paths:
establishing causality relations into malicious actions, predicting the actions
taken by an attacker, and detecting malicious software. This work tried to un-
derstand the causes of malicious behavior in different scenarios (sandboxing,
web browsing), by applying a novel statistical framework and statistical tests
to determine what triggers malware. We also used deep learning algorithms to
predict what actions an attacker would perform, with the goal of anticipating
and countering the attacker’s moves. Moreover, we worked on malware de-
tection for Android, by modeling sequences of API with Markov Chains and
applying machine learning algorithms to classify benign and malicious apps.
The methodology, design, and results of our research are relevant state of the
art in the field; we will go through the different contributions that we worked
on during my PhD to explain the design choices, the statistical methods and
the takeaways characterizing them. We will show how these systems have an
impact on current tools development and future research trends.

Impact of this Work
This dissertation is focusing on three different aspects to tackle malicious be-
havior on the Internet from different angles.
A first technical chapter focused on extracting malicious behavior and
measuring it through causal relationships. This section starts with a rather
theoretical contribution related to how to apply the causality framework in
the field and a first attempt of practical application as part of the second
work. The philosophy behind this part is to change the sandboxing phase of
malware analysis: we often study what malware samples are doing by letting
them run in a safe environment. In these works we show that sandboxing can
induce the malware samples in doing something different, injecting specific
actions to trigger the samples to show their complete behavior. The last paper
related to this chapter, the system called Ex-Ray, is a proper application of
the framework. It is showing how to automatically detect extensions that may
leak the browser history. We used a sandboxing infrastructure and refined the
experimental methodology to apply the causality framework. Academics have
asked more details about the idea that we truly believe can start a different
way of approaching the sandboxing analysis.
The second technical chapter is about Tiresias, a system used to predict
multi-step attacks that can be flagged as security events. With respect to
the previous part, where the impact can be found in the future scenarios of
analyzing malware and on the possible academic directions in the topic, this
system has a straightforward practical development. Tiresias was developed in
collaboration with Symantec researchers that were aiming to find new solutions
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to be deployed on their security systems. From an academic point of view,
this work is, among others, trying to shift the attention from working only on
detection of malicious activities, to prediction of these events, to ultimately
prevent them from happening or mitigating their effects. This is a new trend
where relevant works are growing and the publication of this paper to such an
important venue as Computer and Communication Systems (CCS) 2018 may
boost the trend. Tiresias has been particularly appreciated by the Information
Security community as it has been one of the finalists for the applied research
of the year in the Cyber Security Awareness Week (CSAW) Europe 2018.
The last technical chapter is related to Android Malware Detection. We
created a system called MaMaDroid, exploring the opportunities of using
Markov Chains to model sequences of API Calls. MaMaDroid is based on
static analysis and has been tested over one of the largest Android malware
datasets used in research, analyzing how samples change over time and the
robustness of the system to the challenges faced by this type of detection
systems. From an academic point of view, the importance of these works is
already noticeable: the firstMaMaDroid Camera Ready version went online
the 16/12/2016 on arxiv and, in two years, the paper reached 55 citations.
Moreover, MaMaDroid has been one of the applied research competition
finalists, finishing 2nd in CSAW Europe 2017.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The aim of this dissertation is to explore the application of statistics to the mal-
ware world. While the use of statistical techniques, such as Machine Learning,
is not novel, we accurately adapted these techniques to approach new prob-
lems. Moreover, we applied statistical tests for preliminary detailed analysis
that have never before been used in this field. Nevertheless, we do not limit
the use of statistics to detecting malicious samples, we also apply them to es-
tablish causality relationships and predict what can be the following malicious
action.
1.1 The Malware World
History. Internet has its roots back in the 1960s, when the ARPA and
ARPANET projects were financed by the United States Department of De-
fense [5]. It started with the idea of communicating easily among different
networks of research institutions, military corps, and companies. Its goal was
to be a facilitator and catalyst of ideas and documents exchanges, but security
was not a requirement in its creation. Antivirus software and other security
systems, as well as the current encryption algorithms have been created to
satisfy this requirement. The first malicious software (malware) was a virus,
created in 1982 [6]. The name has its origins in biology, where a virus is in-
fecting a body and self replicating into its cells. In informatics, a virus is a
file able to self replicate into other files when triggered into a computer. This
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name and definition have been officially used for the first time by Fred Co-
hen in 1985 [7]. From this first sample, the development of malware families
increased dramatically and the aims and threats of different samples became
extremely varied.
Sir Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web (commonly known
as WWW) in October 1990 and the first website1 [8] went online on the 6th
August 1991. This moment has been the turning point in the history of the
Internet that quickly became as we know it now. These dramatic changes
affected everything around the Internet as from a tool for a chosen elite, it
became a resource for everyone. The economic value of the Internet increased
exponentially when new services, such as e-commerce, were created, sensitive
information started to be stored in online servers, and the entire communi-
cation and telecommunication world was revolutionized. This new scenario
changed the malware world as well: until the 1990s hackers who wanted to
show off their skills or operated for their personal interests created malware
samples. Since this revolution happened, even the malware ecosystem became
a delivered service. People started to pay hackers to write malicious code for
them or to deliver their own contents through the infected networks controlled
by these cybercriminals. This escalation brought to the creation of more than
57 million new malware samples in the third quarter of 2017 [9], complex
and dangerous attacks targeting specific victims, and proper cyberwars among
countries as, for instance, the events during the US elections show [10].
Current Days. Nowadays the information security community is facing sev-
eral challenges. The threats are different and malicious software is only one of
the fronts the community has to face. The efforts to contrast attacks related
to malicious software led to the creation of many defense layers as explained in
Section 2.2, but the spectrum of the possible attacks has been enlarged by the
opportunities that clever minds have found to perpetrate these attacks. Nowa-
days, for instance, there are botnets [11], droppers [12], ransomware [13], and
1http://info.cern.ch/hypertext/WWW/TheProject.html
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information stealers [14]. Botnets are networks of infected computers wait-
ing for instructions for possible attacks, droppers are malware samples that
are asking to a Command and Control (C&C) Server for another malicious
sample. Ransomware samples encrypt the hard disk of the infected PC and
ask for a ransom to (maybe) decrypt it. Information stealers are particular
pieces of code that are storing sensitive information (credit cards data, login
credentials, etc etc) from the infected PC and sending it to a remote server.
In the last years a new kind of attacks emerged: targeted attacks, exploit-
ing specific vulnerabilities that the attackers know are present in a certain
system of a specific victim. The Stuxnet [15] case is one of the most famous
destructive examples where a malicious software infected Iranian nuclear plants
to destroy their centrifuges. Another clear example of how powerful and dan-
gerous malware samples are nowadays is the series of ransomware campaigns
carried out in the last two years. The most famous examples are WannaCry
and NotPetya; the first one infected 200,000 PCs in over 150 countries, gener-
ating revenues for hundreds of thousands of dollars to the hackers and losses
to infected companies for more than 4 billions [16]. NotPetya is a ransomware
that targeted mainly Ukrainian computers in what has been declared by CIA
to be an attack from the Russian secret services [17]. In this scenario of sev-
eral and varied threats the arms race between defenders and cybercriminals is
continuously evolving.
1.2 Statistics and Learning Algorithms
According to the Oxford dictionary of statistical terms, “statistics is the study
of the collection, analysis, interpretation, presentation, and organization of
data.” From this broad definition, in the information security field, the inter-
pretation and presentation topics have been taken for defensive and offensive
actions as I will explain in Section 2. Statistical methods allow to analyze
if the collected data is biased or to get some insights on the dataset. It can
happen through the dataset representation or through some specific tests such
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as Chi Square test, ANOVA, or Cramer Von Mises Test. These tests are used
to extract some information on the experimental datasets we collect, allowing
some preliminary considerations.
An important part of the statistical methods (and extremely relevant to
this thesis) used in the information security field is the set of Machine Learning
algorithms, including the Deep Learning ones, a peculiar subset of the Machine
Learning algorithms. These methods operate the classification of samples into
defined labels, giving a numerical evaluation of the results, such as Accuracy,
Precision, and Recall. In our case the classified samples could be pieces of
code that we want to recognize, while the label we want to assign as a result
of the classification could be “malware” or “benign.” This procedure can be
done in two ways: (a) by using known samples to elaborate decision rules and,
according to these rules, to label the unknown sample (supervised machine
learning classification), or (b) by detecting anomalies from an initial samples
population and raising alarms when anomalies are identified (anomaly detec-
tion systems). Current defensive systems implement their security procedures
based on these approaches.
1.3 The Rationale Behind this Work
As just mentioned, statistical methods are broadly used in security systems
(e.g., anomaly detection systems); however, this application is not as wide and
efficient as it could be. For instance, most people receive at least one spam
e-mail a day, containing a malicious URL or attached file and, most of the
time, these malicious components are not detected and blocked. The efforts
of private companies and the research community are continuous, but the
adversaries are leading in this arms race: they find a new way to perpetrate an
attack and, only after, the community finds a countermeasure for the specific
problem. For instance, when the first ransomware samples were created, there
was no existent defense able to identify their activities as our community was
not able to identify possible new threats in the future.
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This research work has the aim of elaborating systems that are (a) re-
silient to time evolution or other factors that affect their implementation in
the wild (to reasonable extents), and that (b) identify interesting relationships
in malware operations or the detection of advanced threats communications.
These goals are not the only focus of work: the accurate use of descriptive
statistics and, in some cases, tests that have been used in fields different from
information security, are important factors of novelty of this work. We decided
to
1.4 Side Projects I Contributed to During my
PhD
During my PhD I did not work only on the technical contributions explained
in this thesis. While working on the core ideas of my PhD I have had the
opportunity to work on other projects and collaborate with other researchers.
The first project I will talk about is related to the use of the same prin-
ciples we designed and used in MaMaDroid, but using dynamic analysis to
extract the sequences. The system is a sister of MaMaDroid and for this
reason it is called AuntieDroid [18]. AuntieDroid is using different apps
stimulators: humans (through CHIMP [19]) and monkeys (automated inputs
for dynamic analysis). The project analyzed the advantages of using an hy-
brid system that brings together the decisions made by MaMaDroid and
AuntieDroid.
The sandboxing infrastructure was shared with part of Jeremiah Onao-
lapo’s PhD work. He used it for [20, 21] where I also helped with statistical
testing.
Finally, my research work covered some topics related to the social net-
works world. I am part of the iDrama Lab2, studying fringe communities
behavior as part of the ENCASE H2020 European project. I participated to
one of the projects (available on arxiv and currently under submission [22]);
2https://idrama.science/
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we studied a way to identify which videos could be object of coordinated hate
attacks from these fringe communities. Another wonderful team work was the
study of the profile name reuse phenomenon on Twitter where we studied how
it is possible to misuse the handles that have been abandoned by other Twitter
users [23, 24].
1.5 Contributions Statement
This thesis is composed by works in which I collaborated with other PhD
students. I, therefore, state my contributions that will be explained and shown
in this document.
Causality in Malware Activities Chapter. Chapter 3 is constituted by
the works on causality in malicious activity. The methodology [25] and the
work applied to network activity [26] are coauthored with Jeremiah Onaolapo.
Jeremiah and I worked together on the sandboxing infrastructure with which
I started working on the causality topic. The same infrastructure that have
been used for Jeremiah’s works on gmail honeyaccounts [20, 21] and, in its basic
structure, the sandbox have been used for [27]. While the sandbox is a shared
work between me and Jeremiah, the causality methodology and its application
to the network traces themselves are contributions of mine, supervised by Dr
Stringhini for the experimental parts and the writing and supervised by Dr
Ross on the statistical framework implementation.
Chapter 3 includes another work as application of this methodology: Ex-
ray [28]. The sandboxing system was created by the first author, Michael
Weissbacher. In [28] we applied linear regression to the data to be able to
apply the causality framework already used in the previously cited works;
the application of linear regression and the causality framework have been
my contributions. Dr Stringhini, Dr Suarez-Tangil, Dr Robertson, and Prof
Kirda helped in the writing phase while supervising and periodically checking
the experimental phase, giving suggestions on potential changes in the design
choices.
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Prediction of Security Alarms. Chapter 4 presents our work on predic-
tion of security alarms. It is describing the work on TIRESIAS, the system
created in collaboration with researchers from Symantec Research Labs. Yun
Shen, first author and Symantec researcher, owned the database and the neural
network architecture. Designing the test and the benchmarks and analyzing
thoroughly the results and TIRESIAS characteristics has been my main con-
tribution to the work. It results in producing the crucial sections of the work
and the evaluation of its impact and practicable employment. Pierre-Antoine
Vervier analyzed the case studies while Dr Stringhini closely supervised the
work and contributed to the paper writing.
Android Malware Detection. Chapter 5 presents the works over the detec-
tion of Android Malware using static analysis and Markov Chain models. Its
first work is the MaMaDroid NDSS article [29] where the architecture and its
detection performances based on static analysis are presented; an evolution of
this work is presented in [30]. Lucky Onwuzurike is the PhD student I collabo-
rated with on these works. He developed all the parts related to static analysis
and the extraction of the sequences of API calls. My contribution has been
the idea, design, coding, and implementation of the Markov Chain models on
the sequences of API calls, the design of the classifiers using Machine Learn-
ing algorithms and the evaluation framework for [29]. Lucky used the scripts
from [29] in [30], while eliminating a bug on the code abstraction. He selected
the datasets for the evaluation while I helped with the results interpretation
and the writing. The literature review of these papers has been the contri-
bution of Dr Andriotis. Dr Ross supervised me when designing the Markov
Chains, while Dr Stringhini and Dr De Cristofaro supervised the experimental
phases and helped writing.
1.6 The Document Outline
This document is divided as follows. Section 2 is a detailed literature review of
the explained topics and used tools of the following sections; Section 3 is about
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the works on causality models in malware activities. Section 4 is describing
the work on predicting security alarms using deep learning models. Section 5
is related to the Android malware detection systems applying Markov Chains
to model the behavior of the examined apps. These technical chapters are
followed by a global discussion on the work of this thesis (Section 6). There
is a specific section dedicated to the ethical issues of my research (Section 7).
The conclusions and final remarks (Section 8) completes this document.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter we are going to explain the several papers that are foundation or
in relation with the ones that compose this dissertation. We will first analyze
the malware environment and how it evolved. This will be followed by the
system of defenses implemented by the security community. As the statistical
methods are a crucial part of the works we published, there will be a section
related to the theories and algorithms applied before going through the works
that are related to the specific fields covered by the dissertation work.
2.1 Malware Behavior
In Chapter 1 we briefly drew a history of Internet and malware. We established
that one of the reasons why the arms race between cybercriminals and the
security community is so complicated is the fact that security has never been
a primary requirement since computers and the Internet were invented. We
have also given a hint on how much profit can be done by cybercriminals,
mainly due to the fact that we continuously store valuable information on the
Internet, control expensive machinery and goods through remote machines,
without having enough defenses to prevent systems breaches.
Breaches can have different characteristics and can consist in (a) hackers
manually entering a system unauthorized as well as (b) large scale infections
through malicious software. While the first case was the most common in the
early days, it became less used now: hacking a system may not be profitable as
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it is not always possible to reach valuable information or assets; moreover, it
is not an approach scalable to operations involving a high number of systems.
Malware infections have caused more relevant issues in the recent period.
They can be extremely diverse and can be used for very different purposes;
moreover, in some cases malware usage does not require particular skills. For
instance, it is now possible to rent botnets portions as-a-service and different
botnets collaborate in the same attacking campaigns, as shown in [31]. The
attacker renting the botnet does not need technical instructions as they do not
manage the botnet. On the other hand, there are very skilled attackers able to
create very complex pieces of code to penetrate specific systems and operate
stealthy multi-step attacks effectively. Cybercriminals are a variegate set of
people: there are still the enthusiast hackers trying to show off their skills like
in the 80s and the 90s, but there are also hackers that are using these skills to
pursue organizations goals, from cyberactivists like Anonymous (some of these
associations are even defined cyberterrorists in some cases) to organized crime
groups and state actors.
The variety of possible attacks, targets, and skills require systems able to
evaluate a large variety of threats and not focusing on single issues. Moreover,
as mentioned in the introduction, there are several malware families, sharing
only partially their goals and, in some cases, pieces of code. We mentioned
some of the most important families nowadays, but we did not talk about what
the behavior of malware is. This word is used in many different context, from
what code is used, which functions and which language, to which communi-
cations are operated. On a higher level, behavior is sometimes defined by the
actions logged by the infected machines or by the network security systems.
The behavior definition does not depend only on the malware sample, but on
where and in which way we desire to describe the behavior.
In this dissertation we talk about behavior on different levels, in Section
3 we approach the behavior description through the network traffic, looking at
whether the malicious sample is going to react differently to the stimulation
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received by the environment. Section 4 describes the behavior, the malicious
actions, through the events logged by the Intrusion Prevention Systems, while
in Section 5 we define behavior as the sequences of API calls that are charac-
terizing each sample actions.
2.2 Defense Systems
This Section will go through the defense systems by using two white papers
from Hutchins et al. [32, 3]. The first one presents the Cyber Kill Chain and the
second one its applications. The papers go through how attacks work, their
different phases and how they can be countered, depending on the defense
systems involved.
According to these works, the attacks involve 7 phases:
1. Reconaissance: crawling and scanning on the Internet, looking for pos-
sible targets
2. Weaponization: preparation of the payload to use
3. Delivery: transmission of the weapon to the target (email attachments,
websites etc etc)
4. Exploitation: exploiting the useful vulnerabilities on the target
5. Installation: installation of elements in the victim system allowing the
attacker to enter the system in any moment
6. Command and Control: establishing a system of communications includ-
ing a C&C server and its communication protocol
7. Actions on Objectives: the intruders can now act against their final
targets, whether the target is the victim system itself or another machine
in or outside the network
As we will explain, these attacks can be countered in different ways and
using different tools. [3] considers 5 of the 6 actions suggested in [32] because
“Destroy” does not have any defensive tool in any of the attack phases.
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Phase Detect Deny Disrupt Degrade Deceive
Reconnaissance Web Analytics Firewall
ACL
Weaponization NIDS NIPS
Delivery Vigilant User Proxy Filter In-line AV Queueing
Exploitation HIDS Patch DEP
Installation HIDS “chroot” jail AV
C&C NIDS Firewall NIPS Tarpit DNS redirect
ACL
Actions on Audit log Quality of Honeypot
Objectives Service
Table 2.1: Table explaining the possible actions and tools depending on the at-
tacking phase in [3]
2.2.1 Intervention Actions and Areas
The attacking phases can be countered in different ways, depending on the
defence and the position of this tool. The works from Hutchins et al. [32] iden-
tified 5 different counter actions (Table 2.1): Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade,
and Deceive.
“Detect” consists into discovering what is happening, proactively (before
it happens), online (when it happens), offline (after it happened).
“Deny” is not allowing the action the attacker has to do as part of the
specific phase of the chain.
“Disrupt” is interrupting the operation as, while it is happening, it looks
suspicious and is blocked by the defensive tool.
“Degrade” consists in those actions that slow down and, as consequence,
make less effective the attack operation.
“Deceive” consists in making the attacker or its tools believe they are
reaching their goal while the environment they are interacting with is a fake
one, controlled by the cybersecurity experts and//or their tools.
The table shows several possible defense tools. However, some of these
tools can act against more than one attacker phase and, depending on the
phase, they may operate more than one counter action. This is due to the fact
that the defensive tools control many aspects of our Internet communications,
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they are positioned in different intervention areas and some of these areas are
involved in more than one attacking phase.
Company networks are often divided in many subnetworks, according to
the kind of machines that are contained in the networks, the administrators
implement different levels of defenses. Defenses can be placed at a network level
(both on the perimeter and inside the network) as well as on host machines.
Each defense can identify several types of attacks and does not prevent from
the utilization of other defenses on the same area.
Domestic networks are much smaller and present less defensive tools.
They often have a firewall implemented on the network router and, hopefully,
host based antivirus software (in some cases it includes a host based firewall).
In recent years, the beginning of the smartphone era made mobiles much
more similar to computers. However, the software distribution has a com-
pletely different mechanism: instead of going to the vendor website, there are
markets managing and selling the apps. It opened a new area of interven-
tion: the markets often have resources to do security checks and preventing
malicious apps from being available to the public. However, some markets are
much less effective than others in preventing the malicious apps distribution
(in several cases even the main ones failed in this task). Computer software is
moving in the same direction as people start relying on online stores to find
software for their machines. This situation opens a new area of intervention
where powerful resources can do complicated checks over, but at the same time
it opens a new vector for the delivery attacking phase.
2.2.2 Defensive Tools
In Table 2.1 many defensive tools are mentioned as possible countermeasures
to the attacking phases. Some of them operate on the connections done, like
firewalls, IDS, and IPS (whether network or host based), the different types of
AV analyze the files code and operations, while other parts monitor and log
the events that are happening to recognize suspicious events and apply rules
that would limit the attack efficiency.
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Honeypots (in some applications they are called sandboxes, but they share
the same kind of structure) are a completely different defense from the previous
ones: they do not act on the actual traffic a part from a specific kind of attacks.
It’s a trap, where attackers can find what they believe is the aim of their
attacks and be observed by the security administrators or, in some cases, the
law enforcement.
2.3 Statistical Methods
In this section we go trough the different theories and methods used in the
works presented in the dissertation. The first section explains all the theo-
ries, definitions, methodologies, and algorithms used in the causality works.
The second section details the different algorithms used among when applying
machine learning or deep learning to solve classification challenges.
2.3.1 Correlation and Causation
Correlation is the association of variables through statistical tests that can
measure quantitatively the relationship among variables [33]. With respect
to correlation, causation takes into account the nature of the relationship be-
tween variables. Causation is established by a priori knowledge or experimen-
tal ground that can assess direct cause of a certain factor (variable) over the
variation in others [33].
There is an old saying, widely accepted, stating that “correlation does
not imply causation.” One of the empirical reasons supporting the concept are
spurious correlations: correlations that are not due to any relationship between
the two variables. One of the clearest examples of spurious correlations is
probably the one between the number of people who drowned by falling into a
pool in a year and the movies Nicolas Cage appeared in [34]. Correlation does
not imply causation because, as defined earlier, the mere numbers do not take
into account context. For instance, two variables may be correlated because
their variations have a common cause, rather than one variable’s variations are
causing the other one to change [35].
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2.3.1.1 Counterfactual Analysis Causality
The first time the concept of causality has been explored was in 1748, when
David Hume defined the concept of causation and a first definition using a
counterfactual example [36]. In Hume’s work this concept is evaluated on
the philosophical point of view, from this work many different definitions have
been formulated, with minimal variations depending on the field of application,
including statistical formalizations like the one we will use in this work from
Lewis [37] who gave a statistical definition of causality through “counterfactual
analysis”. The idea is to make a minimal modification to the variables set and
observe if the outcome changes or not; if it happens, it is possible to determine
whether there is a dependency relation between the changing variable and the
outcome.
Other causality models can be found in the literature. The most known is
probably Pearl’s causality model [38]; Pearl assesses causality by using graphs
and Bayesian networks. Notwithstanding the importance of Pearl’s work, we
decided to rely on a simpler model, as the system did not require formalizations
as complicated as Pearl’s model.
2.3.2 Machine Learning and Deep Learning Algorithms
This Section explains the different algorithms used in the works that are part
of this thesis. To introduce Machine Learning, its concepts and to explain K-
Nearest Neighbors we will refer to “Pattern Recognition” from Duda et al. [1].
As the first version of this book has been written in 1973, we will use different
sources for Random Forests ( [39] and [2]) and Tiresias’ deep learning core
engine ( [40]).
2.3.2.1 What is Machine Learning?
Machine Learning (ML) is a family of mechanisms and algorithms that is used
to classify data samples based on patterns. Such a broad definition allows to
think to ML applications on several fields; many of those are not even barely
related to Information Security as this is a fairly recent field and machine
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learning algorithms have been invented and applied many years before the
application to Information Security.
ML algorithms are divided in two main families: supervised and unsuper-
vised. Even though the phases of ML procedures are applied to both families,
the remaining part of this section will be dedicated to supervised algorithms
as there is not unsupervised algorithms implementation in the work that is
part of this thesis. The difference between the two families is that, while the
supervised algorithms use a set of known samples (training set) to elaborate
the decision model and a set of unknown samples (test set) to evaluate it,
unsupervised learning operates clustering operations on the dataset without a
priori knowledge of the dataset used to elaborate any model. It is then possible
to check whether the decision taken by the algorithm on the test samples is
correct or not.
ML is not only about algorithms applied to classify samples, but consists
in several phases: sensing, segmentation, feature extraction, classification, and
post-processing.
Sensing is the data collection phase: given a problem, we collect data that
can be used to find out a solution to the problem.
Segmentation is related to processing data, evaluating if there are, even-
tually, incomplete records, and prepare the raw data to the features extraction.
Feature extraction is the crucial phase yielding “a representation that
makes the job of the classifier trivial.” [1] In other words the feature extractor
is a system able to take data and transform it into a new representation, keep-
ing, evaluating, measuring, andor transforming the (combination of) variables
needed by the classifier. When the feature extraction phase is efficient, the
classification phase is much easier; a classifier would have a much more com-
plicated work if a set of features that is not good in representing the differences
between samples of two different classes is used.
Classification is the phase where ML algorithms are applied. In this phase
the set of features representing the samples of the dataset are used to take
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decisions. The classification phase is evaluating whether a data sample could
be part of a class or another one.
In the post processing phase it is possible to evaluate several aspects of
the classification such as error rate or decisions confidence values. According to
the constraints a system may have, while preserving validity characteristics, it
is possible to modify parameters that affect the model decision making process
and tune it to reach the efficiency system requirements.
The classification and post processing phases are intertwined by this op-
portunity of tuning the parameters. This operation is particularly delicate as it
is important to not add any bias or incur into overfitting. To avoid any mistake
of this kind, ML practitioners often use validation methods. Common valida-
tion methods that will be used in the following sections of the dissertation are
m-fold Cross Validation and the use of a validation set.
M-fold cross validation consists in the division of the samples into m
different groups. M-1 folds are used for the training set and the remaining one
is used as test set. The folds are then rotated m times in order to have each
fold as test set once. If post processing is used to tune parameters with this
validation method, it is necessary to use two different groups of data, the first
one for tuning and the second one for evaluating.
The validation set use is more straightforward in these phases’ division:
we first use the trained model to classify the validation set and we tune the
model until we reach the efficiency results needed. Once the parameters set is
defined, we classify the test set to evaluate the model.
2.3.2.2 Machine Learning Evaluation
Until this moment we decided to use the word efficiency while Accuracy may
sound more sensible; however, Accuracy being one of the main evaluation
parameters, it can be source of confusion. When evaluating an ML algorithm
it is necessary to take into consideration its classification performances as well
as other important characteristics that may clash with the requirements. The
main ones can be considered to be (a) the RAM and CPU usage and (b) the
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training and test time. ML systems often require high RAM and CPU usage,
this may limit the usage of such systems into lightweight devices. We often
use features selection algorithms to limit this issue; however, the usage of such
algorithms may require more time. Time is another important constraint that
may affect both training time and test time. Models’ training often happens
offline, in specialized powerful machines that are designed for such workload;
however, some applications may have restrictions on training offline. Usually,
the crucial time requirement is the classification time on testing samples: when
deployed in real world we need the system to take the decision as fast as
possible. ML algorithms often have a quick classification part (less than a
second), however it is important to evaluate if it is quick enough: a system used
for billions of analysis a day may not be fast enough if every single evaluation
lasts a second. All these characteristics have to be taken into account for
the evaluation as we cannot violate certain constraints while maintaining high
classification performances.
Classification performances are evaluated through several parameters and
are built on whether the evaluated test sample has been labeled correctly or not
by the algorithm. When the decision is taken between two possible outcomes
(classes), we often talk about a positive and a negative class, while when the
decision is taken among different classes, we often talk about the relevant class
(versus all the other ones). For instance, if we evaluate a malware versus benign
classification system, we will use malware as the positive class and benign as
negative class; when doing malware families classification, we will have each
family as a separate class and calculate the classifier performances by taking
each family separate from all the other ones recreating the dichotomy of the
two classes case. When a classifier decision is wrong we use the word “False”,
while when the decision is correct we use the word “True”. Summarized, there
are four possible classifier outcomes:
• True Negative (TN): the classifier correctly decides for the negative class.
• False Negative (FN): the classifier wrongly decides for the negative class.
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• True Positive (TP): the classifier correctly decides for the positive class.
• False Positive (FP): the classifier wrongly decides for the positive class.
According to these outcomes it is possible to calculate the evaluation
metrics. The main ones used are Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and F1-Measure.
Real-world implementations rely on constraints on these metrics (including the
percentage of FP and FN) to understand whether the system is reliable or not.
Accuracy is defined as:
Acc=
TP+TN
TP+FP+TN+FN
Precision is defined as:
Prec=
TP
TP+FP
Recall is defined as:
Rec=
TP
TP+FN
F1-Measure is the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall:
Acc=
2 ·Prec ·Rec
Prec+Rec
Accuracy and F1-Measure are overall metrics: the resulting number sum-
marizes all the aspects of the classification; TP, TN, FP, FN, Precision, and
Recall are metrics that are taking into account only certain aspects of the clas-
sifier decisions. It is often necessary to use an overall metric and information
retrieved from the non overall metrics at the same time to thoroughly evaluate
the classifier performances.
The Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve is another interest-
ing metric of evaluation. Although we decided to not use them in this work,
ROC curves are giving important insights on how a binary classifier works.
The curve is plotted by evaluating the True Positive Rate (TPR) and the
46 Chapter 2. Background and Related Work
False Positive Rate (FPR) on different settings. This metric is extremely use-
ful to evaluate the operational point of systems that should be deployed in
the wild. For instance, a company may want to deploy an anti-spam system
and requires an FPR less than 0.01%. At the same time the TPR cannot fall
below 95%. With a ROC curve it is possible to see which settings of a system
respect such conditions and, therefore, whether that system could be chosen
to be deployed.
2.3.2.3 K-Nearest Neighbors Classifier
The Nearest Neighbors (NN) classifier evaluates which k training samples are
the closest to the evaluated test sample in the features space to assign the label
to the test sample. For instance, imagine that you have a satellite picture of a
field and you know the position of some sunflowers and some roses. You decide
that you will assign the label “sunflower” or the label “rose” to the unknown
flower according to a majority vote among the three closest known flowers. If
among the three closest flowers there are at least two sunflowers, the unknown
flower will be considered a sunflower, otherwise it will be considered a rose.
This is an example of a 3-NN classifier.
More formally, we define as our training set Dn= x1, ...,xn a set of n labeled
samples and x′ ∈ Dn the closest labeled sample to a test point x. Then, the
nearest neighbor rule to classify x is to assign it the label associated with x′.
k-NN may not necessarily apply Euclidean distance or majority vote to
classify samples, however, it is the setting often used as default in its imple-
mentations.The k is a crucial parameter: lower levels of k result in a higher
level of granularity in the decision, however they may be more subject to noise
if there are outliers in the training set. Moreover it is best practice to always
use odd numbers as k: if we implement in the previous example a 2-NN and I
have a sunflower and a rose as the two closest flowers in the field, the classifier
may take a random decision. In case we had a third kind (or more) of flower
labeled in that field, it is still best practice to use an odd k as most of the
areas in the field will still be populated by only two species.
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Figure 2.1: Decision tree example from [1].
2.3.2.4 Random Forests
Random Forests is a classifier using trees to take classification decisions. It is
one of the newest ML techniques and it is proven to be particularly effective,
without overfitting nor introducing biases. Breiman [39] is considered the
author of this algorithm even though the final version is using previous work
not only from this author [41, 42, 43, 44].
Decision Trees. Decision trees are the classifiers on which Random
Forests is based. A tree (Figure 2.1) is a set of nodes corresponding to questions
which answers are mutually exclusive but include all possible answers. The
answers lead to new nodes with questions on different features until a label is
assigned. Once the model is developed, the label assignment for an unknown
sample is extremely fast: it consists only in a series of comparisons between the
features values of the sample and those used to decide which path to follow.
CART. CART stands for “Classification And Regression Trees” [45] and
is one of the most common methodologies to create a decision tree. As de-
scribed in [1], CART poses 6 questions to build the tree:
1. Should the properties be restricted to binary-valued or allowed to be
multivalued? That is, how many decision outcomes or splits will there
be at a node?
2. Which property should be tested at a node?
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3. When should a node be declared a leaf?
4. If the tree becomes “too large,” how can it be made smaller and simpler,
that is, pruned?
5. If a leaf node is impure, how should the category label be assigned?
6. How should missing data be handled?
When implementing Random Forests using off-the-shelf libraries like the
Python Scikit-learn one1, these are parameters that we can set and modify
depending on the system requirements.
Random Forests takes a number of decision trees set by the user and trains
them to take decisions according to the training samples. Moreover, each tree
will be assigned a limited number of features to build its model. To increase its
efficiency, Random Forests models add noise to estimate which features are the
most important ones and find out the model that best separates the classes.
Breiman [39] shows that, because of the Law of Large Numbers, Random
Forests cannot overfit and the randomness mechanism allows high regression
and classification accuracy.
2.3.2.5 Deep Learning
Deep learning algorithms are a specific family of algorithms able to extract the
model from sequences of data, thus basically, avoiding the features extraction
phase and the human decisions related to its design. They are based on Neural
Networks as well as some ML algorithms. The name is due to the fact that
Artificial Neural Networks are an interconnected set of nodes, like neurons in
the brain. Neural networks are organized in layers (Figure 2.2 from [2]) that
are fully connected: each node of a layer is connected to all the nodes of the
following layer.
The first layer is the input layer and takes as input the sequences of data.
The last layer is called output layer and the quantity of nodes depends strictly
1https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.ensemble.
RandomForestClassifier.html
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Figure 2.2: Neural network example from [2].
on the amount of possible outcomes. If the outcome is a decision between being
a benign or a malicious sample in malware classification, only one neuron node
is needed. Depending on whether its output is less or more than 0.5, we will
assign a label rather than the other to the tested sample.
In the middle, between the input and the output layer, there are the
hidden layers (two in Figure 2.2). The hidden layers are designed by deciding
the number of layers and the number of nodes per layer, depending on the
user’s decisions.
All the layers apply different decision rules. During the training phase,
the decisions made by each node are then compared with a target vector to
understand which weights to attribute to different nodes.
In Tiresias, we relied on a specific type of Neural Networks: the Recurrent
Neural Networks. The RNNs are using a feedback mechanism that adapts the
weights while classifying. This mechanism has been found particularly useful
when predicting series of events as it tunes the weights depending on the
predicted events.
Among them, we used the implementation with Long Short Term Memory
(LSTM) array of cells [40]. An LSTM cell has an input gate, a forget gate,
and an output gate. The input gate is used to add new information in the cell
(such as a new event in time series prediction), the forget gate is used to take
out of the cell input data that is not useful to the cell prediction engine, and
the output gate is used to send out a specific prediction. The activation of
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the gates at the beginning of the classification phase depends on the values of
the weights, decided by the algorithm during the training phase. However, the
recurrent neural networks modify the weights in their cells while classifying, by
using the back propagation mechanism. For instance, if the back propagation
feedback is saying that the cells rely too much on short memory (the forget
gate is often active, discarding the older inputs), the system might modify the
weights to activate the forget gate less frequently. As consequence, the input
sequences considered for the output decision will be longer.
2.4 Causality in Malware Traffic
Causality is a complicated phenomenon to assess. As explained in Section
2.3.1, it involves being able to assess a direction (which variable influences the
other ones) to the relation between two elements. The first work we focused on
has been establishing causal relationships between user actions and malicious
activities by malware infecting the machines. To assess these relationships we
analyzed the network traffic.
We assessed causality in these relationships by using counterfactual anal-
ysis as explained in [37]. The outcome is the presence of new connections
operated by the malware and the only thing that is changed is the trigger. If,
among the used triggers, there is one trigger that makes the malware generate
new connections, then in that test, there is a condition of causality between
the trigger and the malware network operations. As we will see later (Section
3.1.5), being in an experimental environment, there are issues related to the
sensitivity of the system and to the noise due to unexpected network connec-
tions. These issues will be addressed through the use of Beta distributions for
the Thompson sampling used in the Bayesian Inference tests.
Although we can use tests to infer correlation, we cannot infer causality
because it does not only establishes the presence of a relation between two
variables, but its direction. But what does this refers to, when talking about
computer science or, more specific, malware research? According to Behi and
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Nolan [46] “In circumstances where extraneous variables have been controlled,
an experiment is said to have internal validity, and the causal relationship
is proven.” As the tests and the environment (Section 3.2.1.2) are fully con-
trolled, we can assess causality where the statistical tests are giving evidence of
correlation between our incoming variable (the operated test) and the outcome
(the presence of triggered conversations).
Correlation and causality topics are widely explored in some fields of com-
puter actions and network communications like services dependency, the most
relevant system papers on this topic are Orion [47] and Rippler [48].
However, the topic we tackle is not the causality between services but
between events and malware activity. Another important point the previous
work analyzed is the malware samples similarity. The number of malware
samples is dramatically increasing every day, but new samples are often using
part of the code of previous ones and, as consequence, the behavior is similar
too. Chakradeo et al. [49] analyzed the phenomenon on mobile malware while
Bitshred [50] speeds up malware identification by taking advantage of malware
triaging. Malware triaging is important with respect to our work because of
the similarities between samples’ network behavior (shown in Sigmal [51]);
moreover, some samples need a trigger event to do certain operations, a prob-
lem tackled by Brumley et al. [52] by automatically analyzing the binaries,
while we are looking to the network level of the phenomenon. This research
analyzed the binaries similarities, but not the network operations caused by
network events.
King et al. assessed causality aspects in malware behavior in an old paper
[53] by studying causality in the attacks of the worm Slapper. With regard to
this work, the differences are in the approach (i.e. we only look for network
communications) and how causality is assessed (i.e. we apply statistical tests).
A more recent work, Zhang et al. [54], is more similar to ours because
it looks to malware communications, but limiting itself to HTTP and DNS
events to detect malicious triggered events; they assessed causality because
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of the detection of the malicious events, but without any test as evidence.
Moreover the mentioned work used its own proof-of-concept malicious samples
that were written by the researchers to act in a predefined way while a real
sample may act differently every time depending on many factors that can
affect its reactions to trigger events. The application of statistics as we did, by
applying the Bayesian inference, allows a much more precise definition of the
correlation between a trigger event and malware operations on the network.
Causality can be assessed because the environment is fully controlled during
the tests.
As explained previously, we applied the Bayesian inference [55] of the
relations between each different test and a certain sequence of labels; there-
after, in order to assess the relation between a test and the sequence, random
sampling [56] over the distributions has been used to see if one of them was
characterizing more the output sequence. This approach is used in other fields
with the same purpose because the randomized sampling applied to a posterior
distribution includes in the evaluation the uncertainty due to the noise that
may affect the experiments [57]. An example of the use of these methods
is Chapelle and Li [58], where the authors used a procedure similar to ours
to evaluate the efficiency of Thompson Sampling mechanism with respect to
more modern algorithms.
2.5 Browser Abuse
This part of the thesis focuses on establishing whether extensions installed in
the browser are leaking or not its history. We used the causal relationships be-
tween the amount of history to leak and the dimensions of payloads exchanged
between the virtual machine and suspicious IPs. To assess these relationships
we analyzed the network traffic and used linear regression.
Like any other web application, browser extensions are third-party code.
However, this software operates with elevated privileges and have access to
APIs that allow access to all content within the browser. Extensions develop-
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ers have been proven to request more permissions than the needed ones, effec-
tively de-sensitivizing users. Heule et al. [59] considered the top 500 Chrome
extensions and noticed that 71% use permissions that, if misused, can leak
private information. They proposed, as solution, an extension design based on
mandatory access control to protect user privacy.
Previous work has found that browser extensions are a relevant issue be-
cause of privacy-violations. It was shown that the quality checks made by
official extension stores do not identify the malicious extensions. Researchers
have manually analyzed extensions and reported the findings in a blog [60] and
Starov et al. studied leaks basing their methodology on keyword search [61].
In contrast, Ex-Ray does not look for particular strings and is not affected
by the extensions protocols.
IBEX [62] is a research framework that verifies access control and data flow
policies of browser extensions through statistical tests. Developers have to au-
thor their extensions in high-level type safe languages; .NET and a JavaScript
subset are supported. Policies are allowing for finer-grained control than con-
temporary permission systems; they are specified in Datalog.
Egele et al. [63] operated a dynamic taint analysis approach using the
QEMU system emulator in order to detect spyware; they focused on Internet
Explorer Browser Helper Objects (BHO). BHOs are relevant as they are clas-
sified as malicious whenever they leak sensitive information in their processes.
The first large-scale dynamic analysis of Chrome browser extensions have
been done by using a system called Hulk [64]. The authors used what they
defined as Honeypages. This technique creates web pages tailored to specific
extensions to trigger malicious behaviors.
Authors that may want to monetize through their extensions. To do so,
they may inject their own advertisements in the browser. Thomas et al. [65]
found that 249 extensions on the Chrome Web Store were substituting the
original ads with their own. The authors identified two drops in their mea-
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surement of ad injection. They correlate to Chrome blocking side loading of
extensions, and introduction of the single purpose rule to the Chrome store.
Websites use several third-party services enabling developers to quickly
add functionalities. The downside is that user privacy is often threatened,
because when websites are including remote source content, the user trust
into a website is delegated. Nickiforakis et al. [66] studied this phenomenon
and highlighted that the behavior is dramatically widespreaded. For instance,
according to this study, Google Analytics was included in 68% of the top 10,000
websites.
There is a vast literature on third-party trackers on websites. Browsing
on seemingly unrelated sites can be observed by third-party trackers and com-
bined into a comprehensive browsing history. Mayer et al. [67] introduced a
measurement platform called FourthParty, analyzing the privacy implications,
technology, and policy perspectives involved by third-party tracking. Roesner
et al. [68] developed defenses based on the client-side to identify malicious
extensions and prevent third-party tracking. Recent work (e.g. [69]) has ana-
lyzed web tracking during the years by using the Internet Archive’s Wayback
Machine. In this work, the authors found that the tracking phenomenon has
steadily increased since 1996 indicating that tracking on the web has never
been as common and aggressive as it is now.
Even though we mainly focused on browsers, they are not the only plat-
forms exploited to leak private data. In PiOS [70], Egele et al. measured
applications from iOS app stores. The applications leaking private user data
were not a large number, however, more than half of the analyzed apps leaked
unique phone identifiers. This information is extremely sensitive and can be
used by third parties to profile users. Similarly, AndroidLeaks [71] evaluates
Android applications by using data-flow analysis to understand whether the
apps leak private information; their dataset consisted in 2,342 applications.
Lever et al. [72] highlight in their malware study how the analysis of network
traffic is a key factor for early detection.
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2.6 Prediction of Malicious Activities
This section illustrates the background and previous work related to [73]. In
this project, we focused on the opportunity of predicting events in real world
situations. Specifically, we designed Tiresias, a system able to predict the
following event given the previous ones. We tested our system on real world
data from Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs) which task was to monitor the
different machines in their network.
To illustrate the complexity of keeping track of events across different ma-
chines, consider the real-world example in Figure 4.1. We show three endpoints
undergoing a coordinated attack to Apache Web servers (see Section 4.1 for
the detailed case study), where {e0, ...,e13} are events involved in this attack
and are highlighted in bold. This coordinated attack consists of three parts:
(i) run reconnaissance tasks if port 80/tcp (HTTP) is open (e.g., e4 is de-
fault credential login, e5 is Web server directory traversal), (ii) trigger a list of
exploits against the Web application framework Struts (e.g., e8 is an exploit
relating to Apache Struts CVE-2017-12611, e11 is an attempt to use Apache
Struts CVE-2017-5638, e13 tries to exploit Apache Struts CVE-2017-9805, etc.)
and (iii) execute a list of exploits against other possible applications running
on the system (e.g., e2 exploits Wordpress arbitrary file download, e9 targets
Joomla local file inclusion vulnerability, etc).
To solve such challenge it is necessary to develop a system that is able
to extrapolate the useful events by analyzing the entire sequences of events.
We based Tiresias on Recurrent Neural Networks as explained in Section
2.6.1 and tested the system over real world data as explained in the following
paragraphs (Section 4.3).
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2.6.1 Security Events Sequences and the Application of
Deep Learning Algorithms
In this section, we broadly reviewed previous literature in both forecasting se-
curity events and deep learning, especially recurrent neural networks (RNNs),
applications in security analytics.
2.6.1.1 Security Event Forecast
System-level security event forecast. Soska et al. [74] proposed a general
approach to predict with high certainty if a given website will become malicious
in the future. The core idea of this study is building a list of features that
best characterize a website, including traffic statistics, filesystem structure,
webpage structure & contents and statistics heuristic of dynamic features (e.g.,
contents). These features are later used to train an ensemble of C4.5 classifiers.
This model is able to achieve operate with 66% true positives and 17% false
positives given one-year data. Bilge et al. [75] proposed a system that analyzes
binary appearance logs of machines to predict which machines are at risk
of infection. The study extracts 89 features from individual machine’s file
appearance logs to produce machine profile, then leverages both supervised
and semi-supervised methods to predict which machines are at risk. In terms
of machine wise infection prediction, RiskTeller can predict 95% of the to-
be-infected machines with only 5% false positives; regarding enterprise-wise
infection prediction, Riskteller can, on average, achieve 61% TPR with 5%
FPR.
Organization-level security event forecast. Liu et al. [76] explored the ef-
fectiveness of forecasting security incidents. This study collected 258 externally
measurable features about an organization’s network covering two main cat-
egories: mismanagement symptoms (e.g., misconfigured DNS) and malicious
activities (e.g., spam, scanning activities originated from this organization’s
network). Based on the data, the study trained and tested a Random Forest
classifier on these features, and are able to achieve with 90% True Positive
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(TP) rate, 10% False Positive (FP) rate and an overall accuracy of 90% in
forecasting security incidents. Liu et al. [77] carried out a follow-up study on
externally observed malicious activities associated with network entities (e.g.,
spam, phishing, malicious attacks). It further proved that when viewed collec-
tively, these malicious activities are stable indicators of the general cleanness of
a network and can be leveraged to build predictive models (e.g., using SVM).
The study extracts three features: intensity, duration, and frequency, from this
activity data. It later trained a SVM model using these features and achieved
reasonably good prediction performance over a forecasting window of a few
months achieving 62% true positive rate with 20% false positive rate.
Cyber-level security event forecast. Sabottke et al. [78] conducted a quan-
titative and qualitative exploration of the vulnerability-related information
disseminated on Twitter. Based on the analytical results, the study designed a
Twitter-based exploit detector, building on top 4 categories of features (Twit-
ter Text, Twitter Statistics, CVSS Information and Database Information),
for early detection of real-world exploits. This classifier achieves precision and
recall higher than 80% for predicting the existence of private proof-of-concept
exploits when only the vulnerabilities disclosed in Microsoft products and by
using Microsoft’s Exploitability Index are considered.
2.6.1.2 Recurrent Neural Network Applications in Security Re-
search
Binary Analysis. Shin et al. [79] leveraged recurrent neural networks (RNN)
to identify functions (e.g., function boundaries, and general function identi-
fication) in binaries. For each training epoch, the RNN model is trained on
N examples (an example refers to a fixed-length sequence of bytes). The au-
thors used one-hot encoding to convert each byte in a given example into a
256-vector, and associated a function start/end indicator with each byte (i.e.,
a 256-vector). Once the model is trained, it effectively serves as a binary clas-
sifier and outputs a decision for that byte as to whether it begins a function or
not. The authors consequently combine the predictions from each model using
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simple heuristic rules to achieve aforementioned function identification tasks.
It is claimed that this system is capable of halving the error rate on six out of
eight benchmarks, and performs comparably on the remaining two. Chua et
al. [80] presents eklavya, a RNN-based engine to recover function types (e.g.,
identifying the number and primitive types of the arguments of a function)
from x86/x64 machine code of a given function without prior knowledge of
the compiler or the instruction set. On the condition that the boundaries of
given functions are known, eklavya developed two primary modules - instruc-
tion embedding module and argument recovery module - to recover argument
counts and types from binaries. The instruction embedding module takes a
stream of functions as input and outputs a 256-vector representation of each
instructions. After the instructions are represented as vectors, argument re-
covery module uses these sequences of vectors as training data and trains four
RNNs for four tasks relating to function types recovery. The authors reported
accuracy of around 84% and 81% for function argument count and type recov-
ery tasks respectively.
Anomaly Detection. Du et al. [81] proposed DeepLog, a deep neural network
model utilizing Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), to learn a system’s log
patterns (e.g., log key patterns and corresponding parameter value patterns)
from normal execution. At its detection stage, DeepLog uses both the log
key and parameter value anomaly detection models to identify abnormal log
entries. Its workflow model provides semantic information for users to diagnose
a detect anomaly. The author reported that DeepLog outperformed other
existing log-based anomaly detection methods achieving a F-measure of 96%
in HDFS data and a F-measure of 98% in OpenStack data.
Password Attack. Melicher et al. [82] used artificial neural networks to
model text passwords’ resistance to guessing attacks and explore how different
architectures and training methods impact neural networks’ guessing effective-
ness. The authors demonstrated that neural networks guessed 70% of 4class8
(2,997 passwords that must contain all four character classes and be at least
2.7. Android Malware and Static Analysis 59
eight characters) passwords by 1015 guesses, while the next best performing
guessing method (Markov models) guesses 57%.
Malware Classification. Pascanu et al. [83] model malware API calls as
a sequence and use a recurrent model trained to predict next API call, and
use the hidden state of the model (that encodes the history of past events)
as the fixed-length feature vector that is given to a separate classifier (logistic
regression or MLP) to classify malware.
The closest work to this paper is DeepLog [81]. However, DeepLog focused
on anomaly detection in regulated environment such as Hadoop and OpenStack
with limited variety of events (e.g., 29 events in Hadoop environment and 40
events in OpenStack). In such a very specific log environment, DeepLog was
able to use a small fraction of normal log entries to train and achieve good
detection results. Our work aims at understanding multi-steps coordinated
attacks in a noisy environment with a wide variety of events (i.e., 4,495 unique
events in our dataset) and prediction in this setup is a far harder problem
comparing to DeepLog. Additionally DeepLog considered an event abnormal
if such event is not with top-g probabilities to appear next. Our work does not
employ this relaxed prediction criteria and focuses on the accurate prediction
of the upcoming security event (out of 4,495 possible events) for a given system.
2.7 Android Malware and Static Analysis
This section of the chapter focuses specifically on the exiting work on Android
malware and static analysis as background that introduces the topics of Section
5.
Mobile Malware is a relatively new phenomenon. In fact, while new com-
puter malware has been created since the 80s as explained earlier, mobile
malware is associated to the rise of smartphones. The smartphones allowed
users to do many different actions through their phones, storing and using sen-
sitive information that attracted cybercriminals. We can date the first mobile
malware samples in 2004, grouping the first mobile malware families in 2009,
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as Maslennikov [84] shows. However, mobile malware samples were not more
than about a thousand samples at the end of 2010 [84]. In the following re-
port [85], Maslennikov shows how the number of samples sky-rocketed in 2011.
In fact, “the total number of threats over just one year increased 6.4 times.
In December 2011 alone we uncovered more new malicious programs targeting
mobile devices than over the entire period between 2004 and 2010.” This trend
has reached even higher numbers. According to the McAfee 2018 Q1 report
on mobile threats [86], in the third quarter of 2017, for the first time in his-
tory, more than 2.5 million new mobile malware samples have been created by
cybercriminals. At the end of the quarter the total of mobile malware samples
was over 20 millions while one year and a half earlier was still less than 10
millions.
2.7.1 Static Analysis, Markov Chains and Malware
Classification
Over the past few years, Android security has attracted a wealth of work by the
research community. In this section, we review (i) program analysis techniques
focusing on general security properties of Android apps, and then (ii) systems
that specifically target malware on Android, with a particular focus on the
ones applying Markov models.
2.7.1.1 Program Analysis
Previous work on program analysis applied to Android security has used both
static and dynamic analysis. With the former, the program’s code is decom-
piled in order to extract features without actually running the program, usually
employing tools such as Dare [87] to obtain Java bytecode. The latter involves
real-time execution of the program, typically in an emulated or protected en-
vironment.
Static analysis techniques include work by Felt et al. [88], who analyze
API calls to identify over-privileged apps, while Kirin [89] is a system that
examines permissions requested by apps to perform a lightweight certifica-
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tion, using a set of security rules that indicate whether or not the security
configuration bundled with the app is safe. RiskRanker [90] aims to identify
zero-day Android malware by assessing potential security risks caused by un-
trusted apps. It sifts through a large number of apps from Android markets
and examines them to detect certain behaviors, such as encryption and dy-
namic code loading, which form malicious patterns and can be used to detect
stealthy malware. Other methods, such as CHEX [91], use data flow analy-
sis to automatically vet Android apps for vulnerabilities. Static analysis has
also been applied to the detection of data leaks and malicious data flows from
Android apps [92, 93, 94, 95].
DroidScope [96] and TaintDroid [97] monitor run-time app behavior in
a protected environment to perform dynamic taint analysis. DroidScope per-
forms dynamic taint analysis at the machine code level, while TaintDroid mon-
itors how third-party apps access or manipulate users’ personal data, aiming
to detect sensitive data leaving the system. However, as it is unrealistic to
deploy dynamic analysis techniques directly on users’ devices, due to the over-
head they introduce, these are typically used offline [98, 99, 100]. ParanoidAn-
droid [101] employs a virtual clone of the smartphone, running in parallel in
the cloud and replaying activities of the device – however, even if minimal
execution traces are actually sent to the cloud, this still takes a non-negligible
toll on battery life.
Recently, hybrid systems like IntelliDroid [102] have also been proposed
that use input generators, producing inputs specific to dynamic analysis tools.
Other work combining static and dynamic analysis include [103, 104, 105, 106].
2.7.1.2 Android Malware Detection
A number of techniques have used signatures for Android malware detection.
NetworkProfiler [107] generates network profiles for Android apps and extracts
fingerprints based on such traces, while work by Canfora et al. [108] obtains
resource-based metrics (CPU, memory, storage, network) to distinguish mal-
ware activity from benign one. Chen et al. [109] extract statistical features,
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such as permissions and API calls, and extend their vectors to add dynamic
behavior-based features. While their experiments show that their solution
outperforms, in terms of accuracy, other antivirus systems, Chen et al. [109]
indicate that the quality of their detection model critically depends on the
availability of representative benign and malicious apps for training. Simi-
larly, ScanMe Mobile [110] uses the Google Cloud Messaging Service (GCM)
to perform static and dynamic analysis on apks found on the device’s SD card.
The sequences of system calls have also been used to detect malware in
both desktop and Android environments. Hofmeyr et al. [111] demonstrate
that short sequences of system calls can be used as a signature to discrim-
inate between normal and abnormal behavior of common UNIX programs.
Signature-based methods, however, can be evaded using polymorphism and
obfuscation, as well as by call re-ordering attacks [112], even though quantita-
tive measures, such as similarity analysis, can be used to address some of these
attacks [113]. MaMaDroid inherits the spirit of these approaches, proposing
a statistical method to model app behavior that is more robust against evasion
attempts.
In the Android context, Canfora et al. [114] use the sequences of three sys-
tem calls (extracted from the execution traces of apps under analysis) to detect
malware. This approach models specific malware families, aiming to identify
additional samples belonging to such families. In contrast, MaMaDroid’s
goal is to detect previously-unseen malware, and we also show that our system
can detect new malware families that even appear years after the system has
been trained. In addition, using strict sequences of system or API calls can
be easily evaded by malware authors who could add unnecessary calls to effec-
tively evade detection. Conversely, MaMaDroid builds a behavioral model
of an Android app, which makes it robust to this type of evasion.
Dynamic analysis has also been applied to detect Android malware by
using predefined scripts of common inputs that will be performed when the
device is running. However, this might be inadequate due to the low probabil-
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ity of triggering malicious behavior, and can be side-stepped by knowledgeable
adversaries, as suggested by Wong and Lie [102]. Other approaches include
random fuzzing [115, 116] and concolic testing [117, 118]. Dynamic analysis
can only detect malicious activities if the code exhibiting malicious behavior
is actually running during the analysis. Moreover, according to Vidas and
Christin [119], mobile malware authors often employ emulation or virtualiza-
tion detection strategies to change malware behavior and eventually evade
detection.
Aiming to complement static and dynamic analysis tools, machine learn-
ing techniques have also been applied to assist Android malware detec-
tion [120]. Droidmat [121] uses API call tracing and manifest files to learn
features for malware detection, while Gascon et al. [122] rely on embedded
call graphs. DroidMiner [123] studies the program logic of sensitive Android/-
Java framework API functions and resources, and detects malicious behavior
patterns. MAST [49] statically analyzes apps using features such as permis-
sions, presence of native code, and intent filters and measures the correlation
between multiple qualitative data. Crowdroid [124] relies on crowdsourcing
to distinguish between malicious and benign apps by monitoring system calls.
AppContext [125] models security-sensitive behavior, such as activation events
or environmental attributes, and uses SVM to classify these behaviors, while
RevealDroid [126] employs supervised learning and obfuscation-resilient meth-
ods targeting API usage and intent actions to identify their families.
Drebin [127] automatically deduces detection patterns and identifies ma-
licious software directly on the device, performing a broad static analysis. This
is achieved by gathering numerous features from the manifest file as well as
the app’s source code (API calls, network addresses, permissions). Malevolent
behavior is reflected in patterns and combinations of extracted features from
the static analysis: for instance, the existence of both SEND_SMS permission
and the android.hardware.telephony component in an app might indicate an
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attempt to send premium SMS messages, and this combination can eventually
constitute a detection pattern.
In Section 5.3.5, we will introduce, and compare MaMaDroid against,
DroidAPIMiner [4]. This system relies on the top-169 API calls that are
used more frequently in the malware than in the benign set, along with data
flow analysis on calls that are frequent in both benign and malicious apps,
but occur up to 6% more in the latter. As shown in our evaluation, using the
most common calls observed during training requires constant retraining, due
to the evolution of both malware and the Android API. On the contrary, Ma-
MaDroid can effectively model both benign and malicious Android apps, and
perform an efficient classification on them. Compared to DroidAPIMiner,
our approach is more resilient to changes in the Android framework than
DroidAPIMiner, resulting in a less frequent need to re-train the classifier.
Overall, compared to state-of-the-art systems like Drebin [127] and
DroidAPIMiner [4], MaMaDroid is more generic and robust as its statis-
tical modeling does not depend on specific app characteristics, but can actually
be run on any app created for any Android API level.
Finally, also related to MaMaDroid are Markov-chain based models for
Android malware detection. Chen et al. [128] dynamically analyze system-
and developer-defined actions from intent messages (used by app components
to communicate with each other at runtime), and probabilistically estimate
whether an app is performing benign or malicious actions at run time, but
obtain low accuracy overall. Canfora et al. [129] use a Hidden Markov model
(HMM) to identify malware samples belonging to previously observed malware
families, whereas, MaMaDroid can detect previously unseen malware, not
relying on specific malware families.
Chapter 3
Causality Assessment in
Malware Activities Using
Counterfactual Analysis
This is the first technical section of the dissertation, as mentioned, it refers
to the works having causality as topic [25, 26, 28]. In this part we analyze
behavior through the reactions of malicious samples to triggers: we simulate
the human actions to determine which actions may trigger which malicious
samples.
3.1 Causality in Malware Traffic
To determine the causal relationship we use counterfactual analysis from Lewis,
as explained in Section 2.3.1. While Mariconti et al. [25] explained the method-
ology behind using counterfactual analysis, in Mariconti et al. [26] there is a
first attempt of reproducing this methodology into a real application: studying
whether it is possible to identify causality relationships between user triggers
and malware actions by looking only at the network connections operated from
the Virtual Machines to other machines. This section takes from the first of
these papers to explain the methodology.
We want to infer the type of a malware sample by learning causality
relations between user actions and the activity performed by the malware
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sample. For this reason, we observe the network packets generated by infected
Virtual Machines (VMs) and apply statistical tests to assess causality. In this
section, we describe our approach in detail.
Each test regarding a trigger and a malware sample follows this proce-
dure: we record the test’s network activity and extract the conversations from
the dump file to label them depending on what generated them. From the
conversation labels we create a chain of labels every time; we repeat the test
to apply Bayesian inference on the chains frequencies of labels assessing if there
are relations between labels and tests.
3.1.1 Approach Formalization
In this section we explain and formalize our approach to the problem. In a
nutshell, our approach takes into account a set of malicious samples and a set
of triggers, and studies if the samples react to the user triggers. Assessing
causality needs a complete procedure in which all the details are taken into
account, therefore we formalized the approach to the experiments and the
different tests. The formalization has to be general and scalable to allow
reproducibility and different levels of analysis such as experiments with an
arbitrary number of malware families and triggers. More formally, we define
a set of malware samples M1, ...,Mi, ...,MK and a set of possible trigger events
N1, ...,N j, ...NL. An experiment consists in running one of the samples Mi in
the presence of each trigger N j, one trigger at a time. This formalization is
extremely scalable, in fact, the approach is valid when changing how many
malware families or possible triggers we use. Moreover, this formalization can
be applied to different malware analysis as the concepts of triggers and malware
families are not context dependent.
3.1.2 Experimental Environment
In this Section we explain the principles on which we have built our envi-
ronment, starting from the sandbox and arriving to all the other phases of
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the methodological framework, showing the challenges and how we practically
solved them.
3.1.3 Sandboxing Background
We set up a virtual environment in which different VMs are configured to run.
The structure is similar to the one created by John et al. [130].
Figure 3.1 shows the configuration of the sandboxing environment that
we needed to implement. The webserver manages the download of malware
by the VMs and the additional content needed for the experiments (e.g. cre-
dentials for the gmail login). Our mailserver is a sinkhole that receives all
the SMTP packets the VMs generate, the router redirects those packets. This
design avoids our VMs from sending spam to the Internet. To allow the con-
nectivity of the virtual network, a router implements rules of network address
translation, redirection of SMTP packets, and bandwidth restrictions, that
will mitigate denial of service attacks performed against public servers from
the VMs. These are only some of the security measures that we applied by
following the guidelines from Rossow et al. [131]. To avoid the detection of
the virtual environment by the malware samples, we followed the suggestions
of the Pafish tool[132]. Pafish is a tool that operates the same kind of checks
malware samples run to understand whether they are in a simulated environ-
ment or not. By following the suggestions given by Pafish it is more likely that
the malicious sample would not understand that it is a sandbox and not a real
environment.
The sandbox has to be secure and efficient: the research environment
must not be a threat to the Internet (security) and it should be able to run as
many samples as possible without being identified and evaded by the malicious
code (efficiency). Most of the suggestions about these two big issues have been
taken by Rossow et al. [131] where the authors tried to explain good practices
to set up secure experimental environments. Some of them have been already
mentioned: the mail redirection (anti spam), the bandwidth restriction (DOS
mitigation), and the use of an account without any real information for the
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Figure 3.1: Sandbox infrastructure: the host machine simulates a network of VMs,
a webserver managing the malware distribution, a mailserver to redi-
rect possible spam campaigns from the infected VMs, and a router
that allows the connection among the different internal machines and
with the Internet world.
log in. Another important limitation has been in lifetime: the VMs are alive
only for 30 minutes in order to avoid any complicate and long attack from the
malware samples to their targets. Due to the sensitivity of this research and
of the experimental environment, we applied and successfully obtained ethics
approval from our institution, under project 6521/001.
The efficiency of the research environment is important as well: malware
tries to understand if it is running in a virtual environment designed to analyze
it, therefore it is important to deceive it. To this end, we set up the VMs to
look as believable as possible, following, among the others, the instructions
given by Pafish, a software designed to identify virtual machines from inside
the virtualized environment. Similarly, to simulate user activity, we set up a
script to open a Firefox browser window, and install a script that periodically
moves the mouse cursor. With these instructions it has been possible to deceive
a large quantity of the samples. Only a few of the Spambot samples have been
able to detect the virtual environment and did not perform any activity. In
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the discussion section we will reason on how it would be possible to improve
the number of malware samples that run in our environment even further.
3.1.4 Sandbox Implementation Details
In Section 3.1.3 we explained the techniques related to the sandboxing ap-
proach.
We prepared three different virtual machines, one for each type of trigger
under scrutiny: one that performs no actions, one that connects to a certain
website (https://amazon.com in our case), and one that is connecting to Gmail
and logging into a fake account. Figure 3.1 shows the configuration used for
the VM that is not performing any user activity. Because of the elementary
configuration of the webserver it was possible to run more than a machine at a
time, with a maximum of 50. The other two kind of VMs and their webservers
have a more complicated structure that does not allow more than one machine
at the same time at the moment.
The VMs are started by scripts in the server, when the virtual environment
is ready, it starts some short scripts to change some important characteristics:
VirtualBox has specific registry keys and values that are detected by malware
samples to evade the sandboxes analysis. After having deleted such values,
for the same reasons, the server general script changes the MAC address. In
fact, also the MAC address is predefined by VirtualBox; the MAC address
is changed to an undetectable one through an algorithm that uses sequential
numbers to track which machine receives which samples and instructions.
Ones the VM is set up, it contacts the webserver to download the instruc-
tions and the malicious sample. According to the instructions, the VM will
execute the malware sample, simulate the human trigger and wait until the
VM is shut off and deleted by the main server script. The main server script
will be managing the creation of the VMs and, in parallel, the deletion of the
ones that reached the maximum lifetime. All the network packets exchanged
by the VMs are recorded by a tcpdump instance and, thanks to the modified
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MAC address, filtered to divide into different pcap files the packets exchanged
by each VM.
3.1.5 Extracting and Labeling Network Conversations
The network dump files collected during our experiments recorded information
on the tests. Packets that have in common the tuple (sourceip, sourceport,
destinationip, destinationport) are a conversation. The conversations is the key
for labeling: we do not need to analyze each packet to identify the malware
actions but we still have all the needed details.
For each test, we extract the conversations and then we label them: we
determine the protocol and which domain is contacted by the VM for each
conversation. Table 3.1 shows the label assigned to the contacted IP addresses
depending on the test we are taking into account. For example, domains that
are always contacted by the VM that runs trigger event 1, regardless of the
specific malware sample that is being tested, are labeled as “event1 Trigger”.
These conversations are independent from malware traffic and we will filter
them out when we will be looking for traffic generated by malware as a possible
response to a user trigger.
We define four possible conversations:
1. Common: those are the conversations the VM performs independently
from malware samples or user trigger actions.
2. Pre-Trigger: those communications are performed by a malware sam-
ple independently from the user trigger action performed by the VM.
The word pre indicates the independence from events happening after a
specific user trigger is issued.
3. Trigger: those conversations are part of a user trigger activity, for exam-
ple the connections generated by visiting a website.
4. Triggered: those conversations that did not appear in any of the pre-
vious labels. In this case, we consider the malware sample operating a
connection as a consequence to a user trigger event.
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We first have to learn which connections belong to the “Common” label:
this is done by test Idle, no malware and no trigger. Those conversations are
the ones the operative system has to operate to establish the communications
and monitor which machine is in the same network as the one of the records.
Those contacted domains and IP addresses will always be contacted in every
test and will not be important for the analysis; for this reason the label is used
only as a filter.
The “Trigger” ones are the labels assigned to the domains contacted by the
VMs when no malware is infecting them: the domains that are not excluded
by the “Common” label are those related to the trigger event. Using the same
logic for “Pre-Trigger”, we can label the domains contacted by the malware
samples when the VM does not operate any particular action.
The “Triggered” label is given to the domains that are contacted during
tests where there are a trigger operation and a malware: this label is given to
the domains that are not already in the previous labels. The label “Triggered”
will be given to those domains (if there is any) that are not already in “Trigger”
and in “Pre-Trigger” labels.
Doing
nothing Trigger 1 ... Trigger L
Not infected Common Trigger ... Trigger
Malware type 1 Pre-Trigger Triggered ... Triggered
... ... ... ... ...
Other Pre-Trigger Triggered ... Triggered
Table 3.1: Encoding of the labels. Domains contacted during tests are labeled fol-
lowing this table. Running VMs without any malware infecting them
allows to find the conversations labeled as “Trigger”, while running
an infected VM in idle is how we assign to the conversations the la-
bel“Pre-Trigger”. When the label to be assigned is “Triggered”, it can
be assigned only if that domain is not already in previous ones.
The labeling phase is the most delicate of this work: we continuously
performed an accurate tuning of the translation of the IP addresses to the
contacted domains because stealthy malware may be unobserved if they were
using the same domains as legitimate traffic or too many “Triggered” labels
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were assigned to contacted domains when the identification of the network is
too precise. This is due to the presence of large IP spaces and the use of
Content Delivery Networks.
3.1.6 Chains of Events
In Figure 3.1 we explained which test was assigning which label to a certain
contacted domain. Apart from the test Idle, the tests without infection were
giving a different trigger label to their contacted domains, while the domains
contacted from tests without trigger are labeled with a pre-trigger label indi-
cating that the samples contact those domains independently from the machine
actions.
The tests where a malware sample runs in a VM that operates a trigger
event label the domains that are not part of pre-trigger and trigger lists as
triggered. This means that each of these tests may have different labels every
time they are repeated, depending also on which samples and the current
settings of the websites that are visited. The main concept of the work is in
this point: every repetition of the test will create a chain of labels given the
events (i.e. the connections) that the host machine will record. Each repetition
will have a correspondent labels chain, therefore every test will have a number
of times where a certain chain is the result while another one related to another
chain.
Every test where there is an infection and an action by the VM can have
two possible outcomes: “PreTrigger-Trigger-Triggered” in case of some new
actions generated by the malware sample and “PreTrigger-Trigger” in case of
a sample that does not react to the trigger. In the next section we explain how
to study the correlation between the test type and the resulting sequences and
why, in case of correlation, we can assess causality.
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3.1.7 Statistical Analysis
We use statistical analysis to assess whether there is a connection between what
happens in the VM and what is observed on the network and, as consequence,
if there is a connection between the VM actions and the malware ones.
After the above labeling procedure has been carried out, the results consist
of the frequencies at which the chains of labels have occurred in the tests. For
each chain, our goal is to estimate the proportion of times it occurs during the
test. This is essentially the task of estimating the proportion parameter θ of
a Binomial(θ ) distribution based on a sequence of binary observations where
the observations are 1 if the sequence occurred, and 0 if it did not occur.
We estimate the proportion parameter using Bayesian inference to allow
all uncertainty about its value to be captured. When performing Bayesian in-
ference for the Binomial distribution, it is usual to use the conjugate Beta(α,β )
distribution as it models the distribution of a binary outcome (in our case, a
specific sequence of events versus all other ones). The α and β parameters in
the prior distribution are chosen to take prior information into account, and
we use the non-informative setting α = β = 0.5. In this case, the posterior
distribution is Beta(α +N,β +M) where N denotes the number of times the
analyzed sequence occurs during the test, and M denotes the number of other
sequences that occurred during repetitions of the test [133].
Once the posterior distribution has been obtained, it is possible to detect
increases in the proportion parameter θ . This can be done by integrating
the joint posterior distribution over the relevant region of space. We use an
approach based on Thompson sampling [56] for this purpose. We sample a
random value from each of the Beta distributions and note which distribution
produced the highest observed value. We repeat this procedure many times and
divide the counts of the highest values by the number of repetitions. After the
normalization we have a probability of correlation of each test for the sequence
analyzed and, as said in [134], because our environment is fully controlled and
managed, it is possible to assess causality between the test with the highest
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probability and the sequence. In case of this strong relation it is possible to
affirm that the malware samples that are part of a certain family are triggered
by a certain action in the real world and operate different actions on the
network because of the trigger.
3.2 Causality Framework Application: Mal-
ware Network Traffic
The goal of our approach is to infer the typology of a malware sample by
learning causality relations between user actions (e.g., logging into a website)
and the activity performed by the malware sample. To this end, we observe
the network activity generated by infected Virtual Machines (VMs) and we
apply statistical tests to assess causality.
3.2.1 Application of the Methodology
An overview of our approach is displayed in Figure 3.2. As already mentioned,
we run a malware sample in a VM in which we execute a simulated user ac-
tivity, called trigger. We then record network traffic generated by the VM and
separate it between traffic that is relative to the user trigger (e.g., the traffic
related to shopping websites), traffic that is generated by the malware sam-
ple before the trigger happens, and traffic that is generated by the malware
sample after the trigger happens. We then extract the occurrences frequency
of a certain activity related to a specific trigger, and perform Bayesian in-
ference to determine correlation between this activity and the corresponding
trigger. As explained, our Bayesian inference process involves extracting Beta
distributions from the data and performing Thompson sampling to assess the
causation probabilities. Note that to reach the confidence required to reli-
ably establish these values we typically repeat each test multiple times. Each
single test regarding a malware sample and a triggering action follows a cer-
tain procedure; first it is recorded using a tcpdump instruction to register the
whole network activity. We extract the conversations from the dump file and
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label them depending on what generated the conversation (malware sample
or trigger event) and why (if malware traffic independent from the trigger,
the trigger, and malware traffic triggered by the VM). By using the labels
attributed to the conversations we create a chain of labels per each repetition
of the test and we apply Bayesian inference on the frequencies of the chains of
labels to assess the relation between them and the tests. The decision of using
a more complicated method such as Bayesian inference instead of a simpler
chi-square test is because chi square only takes into account the proportion
between quantities while Bayesian inference also considers the uncertainty in
the measurements by using randomic sampling [135, 136].
…
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Figure 3.2: Overview of our approach.
3.2.1.1 Employed Dataset
The methodology we explain in Section 3.1.1 can be applied to assess relations
between any user trigger and malware type or operation. We also present an
effective case study based on malware network activity.
More precisely, we ran 20 Zeus samples [137] as Info-stealers, 10 Shopper-
pro and 3 CloudGuard samples as Adware [138], and 20 samples of other
families. The use of a limited quantity of samples is due to different reasons, the
76 Chapter 3. Causality in Malware Activities
most important being that we need active communication between the C&C
server and the malware sample for our experiments. To collect the malware
samples we periodically downloaded the most recent samples from VirusTotal.
Info stealers. These samples typically try to contact a certain number of
C&C Servers to receive instructions about what to do in case of relevant data
to steal (i.e., where to upload the stolen data). When relevant data is stolen,
the malware communicates with different C&C Servers to upload the stolen
information.
Adware. This type of malware operates a few connections to C&C servers
to receive instructions about the hosts to contact when a website containing
advertisements is visualized by the user. When the user navigates to a web-
site containing advertisements, these are substituted by malicious ones. The
sample’s goal is immediately reached: the visualization of the malicious ads
generates money to the malware operator.
Other. This group of malware samples were mainly Spambot samples. The
Spambot samples are operating several different actions: they are contacting
different C&C servers by using HTTP, HTTPS, and proprietary protocols;
after these communication they start sending emails to victims by using the
SMTP protocol. As we mentioned, our mailserver worked as a sinkhole for
these emails.
3.2.1.2 Instantiation of the Experiments
We set up our experiment to take into account malware samples from three
different types and study their relation to two user trigger events. The mal-
ware families that we study are information stealer malware (identified as Inf
in the rest of the paper), adware (Ad), and other malware (Ot), where “other”
includes malware samples that we typically do not expect to be triggered by
user activity (e.g., spambots that send emails regardless of what the owner of
the infected computer does). The trigger events that we used are the naviga-
tion to popular shopping websites (Nav) and the log in event into the Gmail
webmail provider (Log). To correctly label network conversations at the next
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step, we also need to run an infected VM in which no user trigger is executed.
We also identify network traffic generated by the operating system regardless
of user activity and the malware sample infecting the machine; to this end, we
run a not infected VM. We call this test Idle. The combinations of malware
types Mi and user triggers A j used in this paper are summarized in Table 3.2.
Doing
nothing Navigation Logging in
Not infected Idle Nav Log
Info Stealer Inf InfNav InfLog
Adware Ad AdNav AdLog
Other Ot OtNav OtLog
Table 3.2: Summary of our test cases.
3.2.1.3 Extraction and Labeling Network Conversation
The network dump files collected during our experiments contain information
on the IP addresses contacted by the VMs during each of the tests. We define a
conversation as the exchange of packets that have in common the tuple formed
as source IP address, source port (TCP or UDP), destination IP address, and
destination port. Conversations are then used for labeling. This way can be
agnostic to the network payloads themselves.
This phase aims at assigning a “label” to the network conversations ob-
served by a certain experiment. The goal is to identify the conversations that
compose the user trigger first, and we can then label accordingly the malware
activity that happens before and after the trigger.
For each test, we extract the list of network conversations, resolve the
DNS domain associated with the destination IP address, and proceed with
labeling them. More specifically, we assign four different labels to network
conversations:
Common: operating systems such as Linux and Windows perform network
traffic as part of their behavior, regardless of any user activity or program
running on the machine. Examples of this include automated software updates
and synchronization with network shares. To avoid considering this traffic as
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part of other labels, we run our VM without any malware sample or user
trigger (“Idle” test in Table 3.2) and label any observed traffic as common,
filtering it out when elaborating other labels.
Trigger: these conversations are those generated by the VM as part of a
user trigger activity, for example the set of connections generated by visiting
websites. We label conversations as Trigger if they are observed in the tests
when the VM is not infected (marked as “Nav” and “Log” in Table 3.2) and
were not marked as Common in the test “Idle.”
Untriggered: these conversations are performed by a malware sample inde-
pendently from the user trigger action. We use this label for conversations that
are generated by the malware when no user trigger is present (“Inf,” “Ad,” and
“Ot” tests in Table 3.2)
Triggered: these are the most important conversations for this work, because
they are the ones that have the potential to present a correlation with the
user trigger. We mark as Triggered any conversation that happens in a test in
which a user trigger is happening, and that was not previously marked with
any other label.
We first perform the “Idle” tests, followed by the tests in which only
malware or user triggers are present, followed by the ones that combine a
trigger and a malware sample. As we will explain in the next section, the
variability of the set of IP addresses and domains contacted as part of different
trigger activities and by different malware samples forced us to re-run our tests
multiple times. Table 3.3 reports the number of performed runs.
Table 3.4 shows which test assigned which label to a contacted domain.
Apart from the test Idle, the tests without infection were giving a different
trigger label to their contacted domains, while the domains contacted from
tests without trigger are Untriggered ones, indicating that the samples contact
those domains independently from the machine action.
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Test Runs Test Runs Test Runs
Idle 42 Nav 108 Log 30
Inf 114 InfNav 40 InfLog 60
Ad 87 AdNav 73 AdLog 71
Ot 401 OtNav 159 OtLog 157
Table 3.3: Number of repetitions per test.
Doing Logging
nothing Navigation in
Not Navigation Login
infected Common Trigger Trigger
Info Info Stealer
Stealer Untriggered Triggered Triggered
Adware
Adware Untriggered Triggered Triggered
Other
Other Untriggered Triggered Triggered
Table 3.4: Labels encoding per each test.
3.2.1.4 Labeling and Chains Settings
The labeling phase is the most delicate: we continuously performed an accurate
tuning of the translation of IP addresses to the contacted domains because
stealthy malware may be undetected if it uses the same domains as legitimate
traffic. On the other hand, using all the different subdomains may assign
too many “Triggered” labels because the network identification was too fine
grained.
As mentioned, we map IP addresses to domains when labeling network
conversations. This works in most cases, because domains used by malware
are not the ones used by legitimate applications. However, in some cases a
domain can be used by both malware and legitimate traffic. One example of
this is the use of Content Delivery Networks (CDNs). The biggest issue for
our experiments were Amazon and Akamai servers: those address spaces are
extremely wide and are used by a large variety of clients, from Amazon itself
for advertisements on its website to malware samples hosting content to their
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domains. It is not possible nor to simply assign amazonaws.com a specific
label, nor to assign one to the exact IP. Therefore we found a good balance in
using the first two octets of the IP addresses and dividing in eight groups the
third one, giving the corresponding label to each of these subnetworks.
Another problem occurred when a malware sample was contacting many
IP addresses on the same network but not all of them: it happened that the
sample contacted different IP addresses in different test runs. A similar issue
is given by advertisements used by Amazon: it asks to several addresses the
required information and every time a different address can be contacted. For
this reason we ran some of the tests more times than others, increasing the
labeling reliability.
Our approach assigns a label to each network conversation, whether it
happens independently of a user trigger (untriggered), it is part of the trigger
itself, or it happens as a consequence of the user trigger (triggered). We run
each experiment as a combination of user trigger and malware sample, however,
it is composed of multiple activities that generate a multitude of network
conversations. To assess whether the malware running inside a certain VM as
part of an experiment was triggered or not by a user action, we must “label”
the whole experiment as triggered or not. For example, if we observe a new
connection after the VM has logged into a website we can mark the experiment
as “triggered.” Otherwise, if no new activity is generated after the user trigger,
we can mark it as “untriggered.”
To label an entire experiment, we look at the labels assigned to the single
conversations as explained in the previous sections. If any of the conversations
is marked as “triggered” then we label the entire experiment as such. Otherwise
we label the experiment as untriggered.
3.2.2 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate our system. We present the labeling results on
how many tests were triggered by which user triggers. We then describe how
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we extracted Beta distributions from the experiments and how we assessed
causality, providing evidence on the validity of our work.
3.2.2.1 Labeling Results
Triggered Untriggered
Test percentage percentage
InfNav 55% 45%
AdNav 64.4% 35.6%
OtNav 22% 78%
Table 3.5: Labels for the tests in which the VM is navi-
gating to amazon.com.
Triggered Untriggered
Test percentage percentage
InfLog 92.6% 7.4%
AdLog 16.9% 83.1%
OtLog 29.2% 70.8%
Table 3.6: Percentages of the different labels for the tests
with Log VMs.
In Tables 3.5 and 3.6 we show what fraction of tests presented the “Trig-
gered” or “Untriggered” label. Table 3.5 shows quite high values of triggered
Adware samples (64.4%) while info stealers present a lower value (55%). These
tests use the VM that navigates to shopping websites, loading the related ad-
vertisements, and runs the malware sample. Because of the adware modus
operandi, we expect many triggered activities from the adware samples, rather
then from the other malware types. Most of the adware samples are triggered
by the navigation user trigger, however, a relevant number of info stealer sam-
ples seems triggered as well; these labeling errors are ruled out by the statistical
tests. In other words, the statistical tests are able to determine that there is no
causal link between a user navigating to a website and activity by information
stealing malware. On the other hand, it is able to assess that adware is likely
triggered by navigation.
Table 3.6 shows the result of the experiments for the tests in which the
user trigger is a login event on the Gmail website. There is a high fraction
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of triggered Info stealers samples (92%), while only a small quantity of trig-
gered Adware samples are triggered; the Other type reports 29% of its tests
as “Triggered,” but these triggers are ruled out by the statistical tests.
3.2.2.2 Beta Distributions
Figure 3.3: The Beta distributions related to the **Nav tests. The dotted
line is the Beta distribution of InfNav tests, the dashed line
represents the AdNav tests, and the full line represents the
OtNav tests.
Figure 3.4: The Beta distributions related to the **Log tests. The dotted
line is the Beta distribution of InfLog tests, the dashed one
represents the AdLog tests, and the full one represents the
OtLog tests.
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To infer causality through the use of Bayesian inference, the first step is
the creation of the Beta distributions from the results presented in the previous
section. These results are used to draw the a posterior Beta distributions for
each test as (β (NumberO fTriggered+0.5,NumberO fNotTriggered+0.5). The
Beta distributions that we used to model the variables are shown in Figure 3.3
and Figure 3.4. With the Test **Nav (all possible malware types, VM that is
doing navigation) we observe a certain similarity between the curves in shape,
height and position; these similarities are stronger observing only the Test
AdNav and Test OtNav distributions. The distribution for the Test **Log
tests show more differences between distributions; in fact the distributions
are not close and the curve related to the InfLog tests (Info stealer) is much
higher than the others. We can expect that the statistical tests will show a
quite balanced situation between Tests **Nav while Tests **Log will give a
preference in their results.
3.2.2.3 Statistical Evaluation of Causality and Experimental Va-
lidity
We ran Thompson sampling on the Beta distribution 200 times and calculated
the average of the results over 10 repetitions; each result is a value between 0
and 1 that represents the probability of a causal relationship between a test and
its label (“Triggered” or “Untriggered”). This probability takes into account
the uncertainty given by mis-labeling due to the previously-explained issues
therefore a big gap between the highest probability and the second one allows
to assess causality.
In **Nav tests, Test AdNav is dominant. Test InfNav has 0.157 proba-
bility of being the cause of the triggered event among these tests while the
probability of AdNav tests is 0.843. In OtNav tests, the triggered cases are
not relevant. The mis-labeled OtNav tests did not affect the results of the
statistical tests (probability equal to zero). The difference between the highest
probability (the AdNav case) and the second one (InfNav) allows to indicate
that the navigation user trigger caused the Adware network traffic. The statis-
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tical tests for **Log tests have a very clear outcome: the triggered info stealer
actions are caused by the login to Gmail user trigger because the probability
given by the statistical test is 1, while there is no relation between the login
into gmail and the actions of the other malware types (the probability related
to the other tests is zero).
Validity of the experiments. For this work we empirically decided the
number of samples to use, how many times the tests were repeated and how
many observations with random sampling were necessary. We evaluated if
the number of repetitions operated for each test can be considered sufficient.
We repeated the statistical test using different portions of the operated runs
(Figures 3.5 and 3.6). When the **Nav tests were operated, at least 80% of
the repetitions was needed for results to achieve enough confidence as with
using the full set. On the other hand, **Log tests were derived from beta
distributions extremely different, in fact the tests were giving reliable and
stable results already with a small percentage of the runs.
Similarly to the procedure used for the test repetitions, we empirically val-
idate the number of observations used during the Thompson sampling phase:
starting from two observations, arriving to 200, we observed that more than
50 observations are needed to have stable results on **Nav tests (Figure 3.7),
while Figure 3.8 shows that even a minimum amount of observations is enough
with **Log tests because the Beta distributions in this case are extremely dif-
ferent and indicate that InfLog tests have a clear correlation with the user
trigger.
3.2.3 Discussion
In this section we will discuss the results of our framework in assessing the
causality between a user-trigger and network activities performed by malware
samples. As explained since the beginning, this has been the first attempt to
apply this causality framework to the topic of malware analysis.
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Figure 3.5: The causality probabilities of **Nav tests varying the used fraction of
the dataset. The dotted line is related to the InfNav tests, the dashed
line represents AdNav tests, and the full line represents OtNav tests.
When the dataset is more than 80% the three lines become stable.
Figure 3.6: The causality probabilities of **Log tests varying the fraction of used
dataset. The dotted line represents the InfLog tests, the dashed one
represents AdLog tests, and the full line is related to the OtLog tests.
In this case the observations maintain the same values regardless of the
used fraction, because the Beta distributions are extremely different.
3.2.3.1 Labeling Results
The labeling phase presented many challenges due to the several domains con-
tacted by some malware samples and by the VM navigating to shopping web-
sites. Despite our best attempts, whitelisting websites confirmed to be benign
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Figure 3.7: The causality probabilities of Tests**Nav varying the number of obser-
vations. The dotted line is related to Tests InfNav, the dashed line is
Tests AdNav, and the full line is Tests OtNav. When the observations
are more than 50, the three lines maintain the same values.
Figure 3.8: The causality probabilities of Tests**Log varying the number of obser-
vations. The dotted line is related to Tests InfLog, the dashed line is
Tests AdLog, and the full line is Tests OtLog. In this case the observa-
tions maintain always the same values because the beta distributions
are extremely different.
and the granularity tuning cannot completely remove mislabeling mistakes
when large server domains (e.g. amazonaws) were contacted. For example,
tests with Spambots are considered triggered because of two advertisements
domains contacted only during OtNav and OtLog tests.
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3.2.3.2 Results and Validity
We ran statistical tests to assess the relation between the user trigger and one
of the tests. We expected a strong relation between Adware triggered traffic
and the navigation trigger (Test AdNav) and between Info Stealer triggered
tests and the login trigger (Test InfLog). Both relations were clearly assessed,
even if some mislabeling affected the navigation case. To better understand if
this noise influenced the experiments we observed that Test OtNav and Test
OtLog do not present different results (Tables 3.5 and 3.6), while the tables
show different behaviors with Test InfNav and Test InfLog or with Test AdNav
and Test AdLog. These differences indicate that the malware samples are
influenced by the user trigger events; in the case of the login, the significance
of the result was not affected by the noise when we applied Bayesian Inference
while the noise has been more effective in the navigation case, although our
statistical analysis was still able to rule out these mislabeling.
The validity paragraphs (Section 3.2.2.3) show that the experiments are
not biased by an incomplete dataset or a non sufficient number of observations.
Because the validity criteria is respected we can argue that both the statistical
tests indicated a causal dependency between the navigation user trigger and
adware as well as between the login trigger and information stealing malware.
This work can be improved into a fully-fledged detection system. Malware
samples could be run against different user triggers and an alarm could be
raised when a type of malware that is considered of particular risk will be
generated (e.g., an information stealing malware sample that has the capability
of damaging to the company).
By adding a detection system, this methodology can be very effective
in practical and real situations where the system should do limited kind of
connections (as in delicate and with high security systems): the detection
of the anomalous conversation would be immediately correlated to a trigger
event and raise the alarm, a few minutes of sandboxing operations would then
confirm it while the network administrator is already operating on the issue.
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3.2.4 Limitations
The actions that can be detected by the presented system are a large variety
and, because the system is content agnostic, this approach may also detect
attacks through covert channels. The system is limited in detecting those
samples that contact always the same C&C server during different phases of
the attack: an Info Stealer sample that communicates the credentials to the
same C&C server used in the first phase would not result as Triggered and
can be misclassified in a detection system based on this work. At this stage,
we cannot use unknown samples because we cannot infer causality through
unknown samples; with the development of a detection system based on the
causality inference it will be possible to use unknown malware samples.
In its current form, the framework does not take into account information
on when a network flow appears within a test, but only if it appears or not.
Mislabeling could be reduced in the future by using this information.
3.3 Causality Framework Application: Browser
History Leakage
The browser has become the primary interface for interactions with the Inter-
net, from writing emails, to listening to music, to online banking. The shift of
applications from the desktop to the Web has made the browser the de-facto
operating system. To augment this experience browsers offer a powerful in-
terface to access and modify websites. Functionality allows for modification
of HTTP requests and responses, injecting content to websites, or executing
programs as a background activity. This allows for extensions that manage
passwords, remove ads, or store bookmarks in the cloud.
The downside of this powerful interface is that malicious actions at the
extension level can lead to problems across all online activities for a user. Ex-
tensions can be considered as the “most dangerous code in the browser” [59].
Previous research found extensions to inject or replace ads [64, 139, 140], caus-
ing monetary damage to content creators and, in turn, consumers. To detect
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privacy-invasive extensions, previous work used dynamic taint analysis to find
spyware in Internet Explorer Browser Helper Objects (BHOs) [63]. With pre-
vious research in mind, browser vendors can work to restrict malicious exten-
sions.
Google Chrome is considered the state of the art in secure browsing.
Chrome extensions can only be installed through a centralized store, and be-
fore being admitted they have to pass a review process. Users are prompted
for permissions that an extension requests, and can use that information to
decide whether they want to install the extension or not. Furthermore, if an
extension is considered malicious after admission to the store, it can be re-
motely removed from clients. With all these security features in mind, privacy
in Chrome extensions is still an issue.
To study the topic, we developed the first unsupervised system to detect
history stealing browser extensions based on network traffic alone that is also
robust against obfuscation. We then quantified the magnitude of user data
leakage and introduce a scoring system that is used to triage extensions. Pri-
oritized extensions are manually vetted and the resulting labeled dataset is
made available to the research community. In this phase we applied coun-
terfactual analysis to determine whether it was possible to establish a causal
relationship between the leakage of browser history from malicious extensions
and the size of packages exchanged by the extensions with the remote servers
they refer to. We created a machine learning approach to classify extensions
that we use on API call traces generated by an instrumented browser. This
approach reaches 96.43% F-Measure value and the Recall value is constantly
over 99%.
3.3.1 Linear Regression and Causality Background
As for the previous background section, we assessed causality in these rela-
tionships by using counterfactual analysis as explained in [37]. The outcome is
whether the payloads of the packets exchanged fit the linear regression when
the amount of history to leak changes.
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We evaluate every extension by installing it in browsers that have different
amounts of visited websites in their history. We evaluate whether the volume
of packets exchanged with potential C&C IPs follows a linear regression model
dependent on the amount of history in the browser. If the data fits the model,
there is a causality relationship between the amount of history in the browser
and the communications operated by the installed extension. We can therefore
deduce that the extension leaks the browser history.
The methodology fits the concepts explained in 2.3.1.1 about counterfac-
tual analysis and, as we will explain in Section 3.3, it follows the controlled
experiment conditions [134] mentioned earlier.
To evaluate causality relations between the history on the browser and the
network traffic size using counterfactual analysis [37], we apply linear regression
in the first step of Ex-Ray. As described earlier, despite its rather simple
basic idea, counterfactual analysis is a powerful model. In section 3.3 we
will show that the absence of false positives among the extensions that were
not leaking browser history simplified the procedure to determine whether
there is a relation of causality between the amount of bytes exchanged on
the network with specific destinations and being a browser extension leaking
browser history or not. Linear regression [141] is a popular tool to establish
this kind of relationship between two quantifiable variables, for instance, as an
initial step before using machine learning for classification purposes [142], or
as an embedded technique as in SVM [143].
3.3.2 The Environment
In this section we take into account the different factors that have to be consid-
ered when approaching this topic. We start by describing the infrastructure,
we then analyze the types of trackers before finishing by explaining our threat
model.
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Figure 3.9: Extension execution with unique URLs vs. incoming connections to
those URLs from the public Internet. These connections confirm that
leaked browsing history is used by the receivers, often immediately
upon execution.
3.3.2.1 HTTP URL Honeypot
To gain insight into the environment in which trackers operate, we configured
a honeypot. To test whether leaked URLs are accessed after being received
by trackers, we exercised extensions with domain names into which we encode
their unique extension ID. While executing in our container, extensions only
interact with local Web and DNS servers. However, we operate a web server on
the public Internet to monitor client connections for such URLs. As these do-
mains are used uniquely for our experiments, HTTP connections indicate leaks
linkable to extensions. The connection and execution times are displayed in
Figure 3.9. The confirmation that trackers are acting on leaked data motivated
further steps in this work. After excluding VPN and proxy extensions, we re-
ceived incoming connections from 38 extensions out of all Chrome extensions
with more than 1,000 users.
3.3.2.2 Types of Trackers
Chrome offers a powerful interface to extensions, and while it can be used for
useful tools it can also be misused to violate user privacy. There are multiple
ways to collect and exfiltrate browsing history.
Much like trackers that are added to web pages by their authors, ex-
tensions can leak history by adding trackers to the body of web pages. An
example of third-party tracking is the Facebook “Like” button. These can be
92 Chapter 3. Causality in Malware Activities
blocked by extensions such as Ghostery. A more robust solution is sending col-
lected history data via requests of extension background scripts. Such requests
are not subject to interception by other extensions, and cannot be blocked as
tracker objects. Compared to tracking via inserting trackers into pages, better
coverage can be achieved.
To acquire browsing data, extensions can intercept requests made by
websites via the chrome.webRequest API, or poll tabs for the URL using
chrome.tabs. For past browsing behavior, the chrome.history API can be
used. Diverse options to collect data render finding a unified way to identify
tracking extensions challenging.
3.3.2.3 Threat Model
Based on our honeypot results, we assume the following attacker model. In
our scenario the attacker is the owner of, or someone who controls the content
of, browser extensions. We assume many users will install these extensions
with a cursory reading of the extension’s description. While permissions can
restrict the behavior of browser extensions, capturing and exfiltrating history
can be performed with modest permissions that would not raise suspicion. For
instance, the browsing history permission is categorized as low alert by Google.
The goal of our attacker is to indiscriminately capture URLs of pages
visited by the user while the extension is executed. Furthermore, we assume
the adversary collects data with the purpose of analysis or monetization. As
the value of traffic patterns decreases over time, we assume the attacker to be
inclined to leak sooner rather than later, which seems to be confirmed by our
honeypot experiments. A successful attacker would decrease the user’s privacy
as compared to using a browser without the extension in question.
We exclude from our threat model extensions that openly require the
sharing of browsing history as part of their functionality, such as VPNs or on-
line blacklists. Also, we consider leaks purposeful and supposedly accidental
as equal, as we cannot reason well about developer intent. As detecting and
hiding malicious behavior is an arms race, we prefer to be conservative and as-
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sume the attacker could escalate the sophistication of their evasion techniques
in the future.
3.3.3 Ex-Ray Methodology
In this section we describe the design of the approach underlying Ex-Ray.
The counterfactual analysis is an essential part of this methodology. To iden-
tify privacy-violating extensions, we exercise them in multiple stages, varying
the amount of private data supplied to the browser, and in turn to the exten-
sion under test. Based on the type of extension, the traffic usage can change
depending on the number of visited sites. However, the underlying assump-
tion is that benign extension traffic should not be influenced by the size of the
browsing history.
3.3.3.1 Overview
A top level view of Ex-Ray is shown in Figure 3.10. The three main compo-
nents of the system are summarized as follows:
1) Unsupervised learning: We use counterfactual analysis to detect his-
tory stealing extensions based on network traffic. This component is
fully unsupervised and, by definition, prone to misinterpretations.
2) Triage-based analysis: We manually vet the output of our unsuper-
vised system, i.e., we verify which extensions are factually leaking and
which are not. As the manual verification is costly, we rely on a scoring
system that ranks extensions based on how likely they are to be leaking
information to aid the process.
3) Supervised learning: We systematize the identification of suspicious
extensions using supervised learning over the resulting labeled dataset.
This component looks at the behavior of the extension and builds a
model that detects history leaking (i.e., it looks at the API calls made
by the browser extension when executed).
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Figure 3.10: Ex-Ray architectural overview. A classification system combines
unsupervised and supervised methods. After triaging unsupervised
results, a vetted dataset is used to classify extensions based on n-
grams of API calls.
We see different types of tracking used in browser extensions. Some in-
tercept requests and issue additional requests to trackers. Others transfer
aggregated data periodically, while still others insert trackers into every vis-
ited page. An integral part of all trackers is transferring data to an external
server—simply put, this crucial step is what enables trackers to track.
Our work focuses on indiscriminate tracking across all pages. To track, a
history item (hi) generated by the browser will be reported either in isolation or
in aggregate. In either case, the size of history items affects network behavior.
We argue that network data generated by an effective tracker, independently
of protocol and whether plain, encrypted, or otherwise obfuscated has to grow
as a function of history.
We execute extensions in multiple stages with increasing amounts of pri-
vate information. Each hi should contain less information than the following
stage, hi < hi+1. We increase the size of hi in each stage, extending the length
of the testing URLs. For example, example.com/example/index.html in
stage 0, and example.com/example/<500characters>/index.html in stage
10. The expected growth in traffic is h∆. This intuition is confirmed from
Figures 3.11a and 3.11b where the boxplots clearly show that trackers usually
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send more data when there is more history to leak while the amount of data
is constant across the different stages for benign extensions.
For deterministic tracking, the traffic deltas of adjacent measurements
should project an ascending slope. However, the browser history may be sent
compressed in order to send as few bytes as possible and avoid the leak being
visible as plain text in the payload. This operation would reduce the number
of bytes sent while retaining the same amount of information (entropy). Per
information theory, message entropy has an upper bound that cannot be ex-
ceeded. As a consequence, the size of compressed messages is lower-bounded
as a function of the message entropy. For our experiments, we used compres-
sion tools (bzip2, 7zip, xz) to establish a practical lower bound of sent data
for each stage as 289 Bytes, 6.9 KB, 14 KB and 30 KB.
Extensions that use trackers establish connections with each execution.
Consequently, any group of hosts that results in less measurements than the
number of executions will not be considered for further analysis. Examples of
hosts that extensions only connect to occasionally are ads.
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Figure 3.11: Comparison in change of traffic between executions leaking history
and benign extensions. Each bar displays the change of traffic sent
relative to executions with increased history. Sent data projects an
ascending slope based on size of history.
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For this work purposes, we are going to focus on the unsupervised learning
part, where counterfactual analysis is applied.
3.3.3.2 Application of Counterfactual Analysis
The goal of this phase is to model the way in which modifications to the
browsing history influence observed network traffic. Figure 3.11 presented in
the previous section shows that there is a monotonic increase between suc-
cessive stages of privacy-violating extension tests. Extensions that, on the
contrary, are privacy-respecting show no significant difference. One key find-
ing observed during the analysis of the traffic behavior is that privacy-violating
extensions might exhibit non-leaking behavior when connecting to certain do-
mains. Thus, it is important to consider individual flows when building our
model. Additionally, we also observed that in general variations exhibited in
privacy-violating are well-fit by linear regression.
Thus, we use linear regression on each set of flows to estimate the optimal
set of parameters that support the identification of history-leaking extensions.
We aim to establish a causality relation between two variables: (i) the amount
of raw data sent through the network, and (ii) the amount of history leaked
to a given domain. For this, we rely on the counterfactual analysis model by
Lewis [37], where:
The model establishes that, in a fully controlled environment, if
we have tests in which we change only one input variable, and we
observe a change in the output, then the variable and the output
are linked by a relation of causality.
In our case, the input variable is the amount of history, the output is the
number of bytes sent in the different flows, and the tests are run with both
goodware and malware. Our framework allows to evaluate this relationship
by means of different statistical tests, such as Bayesian inference. This is
ideal for situations were there is no deterministic relationship between the
variables, such as in targeted advertisement tracking. Although our framework
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is designed to model these scenarios, in practice, we observed that leaking
extensions behave in a deterministic fashion.
In order to systematically identify the conditions under which the causality
link is established, we run three steps. The first step is performed before
applying linear regression, while the second and third steps are based on the
linear regression parameters.
1. Minimum Intercept. While the extension might communicate to a
domain in all given stages, the content transmitted may not contain a
privacy leak. This step verifies whether the amount of data sent exceeds
a certain threshold. This threshold is set based on the size of the history
compressed as described in Section 3.3.3.1.
2. Minimum Slope. In this work we are primarily interested in extensions
that actively track users. This type of extensions is expected to leak
as much history data as possible from the user. This implies that the
relationship between stages is expected to be linear and have a constant
variance, modulo any sort of attempt at obfuscation. Based on this, we
set a threshold to the slope in order to exclude all those extensions that
do not fully meet these two criteria.
3. Level of Confidence. Depending on the extension, the regression
model fitted might not always follow a strict linear model. We can choose
to apply certain bounds (lower, upper, or both) from a fitted model to
adjust the precision of the output. Choosing bounds that are very close
to the fitted model will give a higher level of confidence in the decision.
On the contrary, a very relaxed model will capture boundary cases at
the cost of introducing false positives.
We define the term flagging policy as the set of parameters used for these
checks. A strict policy is a policy in which parameters select a restricted
area and flag less flows than a relaxed policy which flags many more flows as
suspected of leaking browsing history.
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The notion of confidence described above and the use of the different
policies is precisely what motivates our triage system described next.
3.3.4 Ex-Ray Counterfactual Analysis Evaluation
In this section, we describe the evaluation of Ex-Ray counterfactual analysis.
To allow comprehension we first describe the whole experimantal environment,
but we will focus only on the results related to the components applying the
causality framework core of this chapter.
3.3.4.1 Experimental Setting
An overview of our experimental setup is depicted in Figure 3.12.
Extension Containers. As part of our test environment, we created websites
that allow scaling the size of a web client’s browsing history without otherwise
changing the behavior of the websites. We used local web and DNS servers so
that the browser could connect to our website without sending information to
the public Internet. For each execution, we started the experiment from an
empty cache in a Docker container using an instrumented Chromium binary.
We exercised each extension four times for five minutes each, capturing all
generated network traffic. Capturing traffic on the container level provides a
full picture of each extension’s network interactions.
To reduce measurement noise, we blocked traffic to Google update services
and CRLsets1 via DNS configuration. We also disabled browser features such
as SafeBrowsing and account synchronization.
Considering the maximum URL length of 2,083 characters, we increased
the length of URLs by 500 characters between stages. Other than changing
the length of URLs used, the pages served to the instrumented browsers did
not change between stages. The maximum length of URLs generated by us
is below 1,600, leaving sufficient space for trackers that submit URLs as GET
arguments to do so. For each execution we open 20 pages; thus, if all URLs
1gvt1.com, redirector.gvt1.com, clients1.google.com, clients4.google.com
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Figure 3.12: Ex-Ray extension execution overview.
were transmitted uncompressed we would expect an increase of 10 KB per
stage. We stored DNS information to group IP traffic by hostname.
Extension Dataset. This work focuses on tracking data collected from
browsing behavior that is sent to third parties. As opposed to previous work
on history leaking browser extensions [61], the system aims to detect leaks
regardless of how they are transmitted or collected. We target extensions that
are tracking browser history either through background scripts or modifica-
tion to pages. The main difference between these two approaches is that these
trackers are only present on websites in the wild that opt-in to use them. Users
are now familiar with tools that remove these trackers and the availability of
such tools for free makes them popular. Conversely, tracking in extensions can
cover all websites a user visits, and there is no opt-in mechanism. Furthermore,
no tools are readily available that would warn a user of such behavior or block
it.
Transferring the current host or URL is necessary for certain exten-
sions functionalities – for example, to check against an online blacklist like
adult content filters. However, we found that often extensions don’t have
100 Chapter 3. Causality in Malware Activities
the need of transferring URLs, or could be expected by the extension’s de-
scription, exposing all browsing habits of a user and creating a breach of
privacy. Furthermore, developers often hide the specification of such func-
tionality in an extension’s description. Users are concerned about how their
privacy is impacted [144, 145], without being aware of what a privacy policy
is citesmithhal f2014.
We crawled the Chrome Web Store and downloaded extensions with 1,000
or more installations. For our analysis, we only consider extensions that can
be loaded without crashing. Examples of extensions that could not be loaded
are those with manifest files that cannot be parsed or referencing files that are
missing from the extension packages. This left 10,691 extensions for Ex-Ray
to analyze.
We mainly relied on two approaches to discover extensions:
• Heuristic search. We looked for suspicious hostnames, keywords in
network traffic, and applied heuristics to traffic patterns. Through man-
ual verification we confirmed 100 benign extensions and 53 privacy-
violating extensions. The dataset contains different types of samples,
including aggregate data collection and delivery over HTTP(S) and
HTTP2.
• Honeypot probe. We registered extensions interacting with our hon-
eypot. We verified 38 extensions connecting from the public Internet.
Figure 3.9 shows a map of all incoming connections with respect to the
time we exercised the extension with unique URLs in the history. Ta-
ble 3.7 shows the most installed five malicious extensions with domains
connecting to the honeypot. Connections often appear immediately after
running the extension, but we also detected deferred crawls as well.
We excluded VPN and proxy extensions that redirect traffic through a
remote address as these are not part of our threat model. The connecting
clients performed no malicious activities we could identify in our log files. The
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Extension Name installations Connecting from
Stylish - Custom themes 1,671,326 *.bb.netbynet.ru,
*.moscow.rt.ru,
*.spb.ertelecom.ru
Pop Up Blocker for Chrome 1,151,178 *.aws.kontera.com,
176.15.177.229,
*.bb.netbynet.ru
Desprotetor de Links 251,016 *.aws.kontera.com,
*.moscow.rt.ru,
*.bb.netbynet.ru
(Open Tabs) 97,204 *.dnepro.net,
109.166.71.185,
*.k-telecom.org
Similar Sites 45,053 *.aws.kontera.com,
*.moscow.rt.ru,
*.netbynet.ru
Table 3.7: Top five extensions connecting to our honeypot with highest installation
numbers which are still available in the Chrome Web Store.
hostnames of clients that connected to us varied widely. The most popular one
was kontera.com with 704 connections, followed by AWS endpoints. Inter-
estingly, we received many requests from home broadband connections, such
as *.netbynet.ru, often connecting only once. However, we connected four
graphs of extensions that were contacted from the same hosts. The biggest
graph connected eight extensions with two hosts. The other graphs connected
five, two, and two extensions.
12 of these extensions were removed from the Chrome Web Store before
our experiments concluded.
3.3.4.2 Ex-Ray Counterfactual Analysis Results
Tuning of the Unsupervised Component. The first step of Ex-Ray
consists of applying linear regression for counterfactual analysis. The linear
regression test flags flows if they respect the three parameters explained in Sec-
tion 3.3.3.2. To find the best configuration of these parameters, it is necessary
to evaluate the results on a labeled dataset. We used F-Measure as a compar-
ison metric. The strictest policy checks for a minimum of 5 URLs leaked, a
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2% minimum slope, and 90% accuracy. This policy results in an F-Measure of
96.9% and no false positives.
This result is showing that causality in this case is not dependent from
probabilities. In fact, by having no false positives, it is not necessary to applied
statistical methods as in the previous application because there is certainty
that, when the linear regression is flagging an extension, there is leakage of
browser history.
To obtain better results overall, in our final configuration we used two
less strict configurations and flagged as suspicious all flows flagged in both
engines. As the goal of the final configuration is to find as many malicious
extensions as possible, knowing that the following phases of the system will
refine the false positives cases, it is possible to relax the flagging constraints.
This constraints relaxation is only possible because we have already shown the
causal relationship; without that, it would have been necessary to go through
the statistical models first. Both configurations check for a minimum of 2 URLs
leaked and 2% minimum slope. However, there is a difference in the last check:
while one used 90% accuracy in checking only the lower bound, the other one
used 80% accuracy checking both the upper and lower bound. As such, the
first and the last checks are less strict, but the F-Measure did not decrease
even if a larger area of the feature space can be flagged. The system correctly
flagged more flows as with the stricter configuration, but the flows belonged
to the same extensions already flagged by the previous system.
Labeling Performance. Ex-Ray flagged 212 extensions out of 10,691 as
history leaking using the linear regression on the traffic sent by the exten-
sions. By checking manually, we noticed that not all the extensions flagged
were history leaking. Out of 212 samples, 184 were leaking, 2 were goodware,
and 26 were unclear. It has not been possible to determine if among those
26 extensions there were ones leaking or not. Therefore, to provide a conser-
vative evaluation, we consider Ex-Ray to have 28 benign extensions wrongly
identified as history leaking.
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As mentioned earlier, detection systems can be prone to false negatives.
To measure this for our system, we spot-checked a representative sample of ex-
tensions reported as benign. To establish baseline false negatives we scanned
our pcap files for leaks and reimplemented another system used for brute-
force searching extension traffic for obfuscated strings with a fixed set of algo-
rithms [61]. This system flagged 367 extensions which we used for our dataset.
The false negative samples we subjected to examination numbered 178. These
results lead to a precision of 87%, a recall value equal to 50.13%, and an F1-
Measure value equal to 63.66%. The overall accuracy value is 98.03%. These
values are reached using only the first step of Ex-Ray that is a completely
unsupervised algorithm. These results are further improved by the next phases
of the system that are building on the results of the phase where counterfactual
analysis is used.
3.3.5 Discussion and Limitations
The paper presenting Ex-Ray is using counterfactual analysis as a first step
towards detection. In fact, inferring causality is used to determine whether the
approach is working and after a first unsupervised flagging operation based
on this technique, the system implements other elements to detect with high
accuracy extensions leaking browser history.
The rationale behind our approach is intuitive: if an extension is leaking
browser history, it has to transmit the leaked information. Following this
intuition we set up the environment and decide to model the leakage as a linear
relationship between the amount of history and size of exchanged packets. The
presence of linear relationship corresponds to the Triggered flag in the previous
application, while the absence corresponds to the Untriggered case. Instead of
having different malicious families, in this case we have leaking and non-leaking
extensions.
The experiments have shown how the system was extremely precise and no
non-leaking extension was flagged. This result shows causal relationship with-
out the use of the whole statistical framework. Achieving this result meant
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tuning the different factors that were evaluating the linear regression by tak-
ing into consideration the noise due to the experimental setup, the fallacy of
Internet communications, and the possible benign behaviors to avoid misclas-
sifications. For detection purposes, after having determined causality, we have
relaxed the constraints as possible misclassifications could have been ruled out
by the following system steps.
Evasion of Linear Regression. A system based on linear regression is ex-
ploiting a rather simple habit of trying to communicate in the most immediate
and simplest way. We took into evaluation whether the leakage was happening
through encrypted messages as they would have still respected the linear re-
lationship between size of history and size of the exchanged packets, however,
we did not take into evaluation all other possible evasion methods. Breaking
into several packets is not effective as the system looks at the aggregated quan-
tities, but for instance the malicious extension could try to pad the shortest
messages to mix the length of the packages or using non linear compression
that would result in non linear increase of the size of the payloads. These are
effective evasion examples for the causality step, however Ex-Ray is not a
stand alone system, some of these behaviors would immediately be flagged by
other security systems.
Sandboxing. Malware evasion is a well-explored area and is part of the arms
race between attackers and defenders. Examples of this include fingerprinting
analysis environments or creating more stealthy programs. While no ultimate
solutions exist for these problems, Ex-Ray addresses tracking at a fundamen-
tal level.
Another approach would be to lay dormant and only leak at a later point
in time. However, we have seen with our honeypot experiments that if leaks are
utilized, this often happens immediately. Furthermore, there is an economic
incentive on the part of attackers to obtain and monetize leaked history as
quickly as possible before its value begins to degrade.
Chapter 4
Predicting Security Alarms due
to Malicious Activities Using
Deep Learning Algorithms
This chapter is focusing on the opportunity of predicting which malicious event
may happen next. It is based on the CCS 2018 paper describing the system
called Tiresias [73]. My main tasks in the project have been related to the de-
sign of the experimental setup, deciding which tests to apply, the benchmarks,
and thoroughly analyze the results of all the different evaluations done. It has
been important to understand why Tiresias was particularly efficient, which
factors of the infrastructure were contributing and whether the requirements
related to the possible system deployment were respected.
This chapter is analyzing the opportunity to study sequences of events
flagged by security systems through a system we called Tiresias. The main
difference with the other technical contributions is that, in this case, we are
not recognizing the malicious actions, identifying and extrapolating the behav-
iors, but predicting the actions according to the behaviors observed in previous
sequences. This approach differs from the previous ones because of its proac-
tivity. In the previous section we have measured and studied behavior by
running files in a safe environment, in the next one we will look at the code of
malicious apps to detect malicious ones before they could be on the market.
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Both technical contributions aim to prevent and detect malicious elements,
but in this section we aim to predict what an active malicious actor is going
to do to stop it while perfectly functioning in a real online environment.
Tiresias aims at predicting the actions that are part of attacks to com-
puter systems and networks. The techniques used by adversaries to attack
computer systems and networks have reached an unprecedented sophistica-
tion. Attackers use multiple steps to reach their targets [146, 147] and these
steps are of heterogeneous nature, from sending spearphishing emails contain-
ing malicious attachments [148], to performing drive-by download attacks that
exploit vulnerabilities in Web browsers [149, 150], to privilege escalation ex-
ploits [151]. After the compromise, miscreants can monetize their malware
infections in a number of ways, from remotely controlling the infected com-
puters to stealing sensitive information [152, 153] to encrypting the victim’s
data and holding it hostage [154, 155].
Traditionally, the computer security community has focused on detect-
ing attacks by using a number of statistical techniques [149, 156, 157, 158,
159, 160]. While this is inherently an arms race, detection systems provide
the foundation for network and system defense, and are therefore very im-
portant in the fight against network attacks. More recently, the attention of
the community switched to predicting malicious events. Recent work focused
on predicting whether a data breach would happen [76], whether hosts would
get infected with malware [75], whether a vulnerability would start being ex-
ploited in the wild [78], and whether a website would be compromised in the
future [74]. These approaches learn the attack history from previous events
(e.g., historical compromise data) and use the acquired knowledge to predict
future ones. Being able to predict whether an attack will happen or not can be
useful in a number of ways. This can for example inform law enforcement on
the next target that will be chosen by cybercriminals, enable cyber insurance
underwriters to assess a company’s future security posture, or assist website
administrators to prioritize patching tasks.
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Figure 4.1: Three endpoints undergoing a coordinated attack. {e0, ...,e13} are
events involved in the coordinated attack and highlighted in bold.
4.1 Motivation
We started explaining the motivations for this work in Section 2.6 and contin-
ued explaining it when introducing this chapter; however, we did not describe
in details the challenges related to such problem.
The first challenge that we can immediately notice in Figure 4.1 is that
even though those three endpoints are going through the same type of attack,
there is not an obvious pattern in which a certain event ei would follow or
precede another event e j given ei,e j ∈ {e0, ...,e13}. For example, e12 (Malicious
OGNL Expression Upload) can be followed by e4 (HTTP Apache Tomcat
UTF-8 Dir Traversal) and e13 (Apache Struts CVE-2017-9805) in s1, yet, it is
followed by e7 (Wordpress Arbitrary File Download) and e11 (Apache Struts
CVE-2017-5638) in s2.
The second challenge is that the endpoints may observe other security
events not relating to the coordinated attack. For example, in s3, we can
observe a subsequence {e4,e41, ...,e5,e22,e21,e7} in which e5 is followed by a
number of unrelated events including e41 (WifiCam Authentication Bypass)
before reaching e5. Note that the other noisy events are omitted for the sake
of clarity. Between e5 and e7, there were two other noisy event e22 (Novell
ZENWorks Asset Management) and e21 (ColdFusion Remote Code Exec).
More interestingly, some of these endpoints may potentially observe dif-
ferent attacks from various adversary groups happening at the same time. For
example, we observe {e9,e19,e24,e25,e26,e12} in s1, {e4,e19,e30,e25,e24,e31,e12}
in s2, and {e6,e23,e19,e30,e25,e24,e12} in s3. It is possible that e19 (SMB Vali-
date Provider Callback CVE-2009-3103), e25 (SMB Double Pulsar Ping), and
e24 (Microsoft SMB MS17-010 Disclosure Attempt) could be part of another
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coordinated attack. Facing these challenges, it is desirable to have a predictive
model that is able to understand noisy events, recognize multiple attacks given
different contexts in a given endpoint, and correctly forecast the upcoming se-
curity event. This is a more complex and difficult task than detecting each
malicious event passively.
Problem Formulation. We formalize our security event prediction problem
as follows. A security event e j ∈ E is a timestamped observation recorded at
timestamp j, where E denotes the set of all unique events and |E| denotes the
size of E. A security event sequence observed in an endpoint si is a sequence of
events ordered by their observation time, si = {e(i)1 ,e(i)2 , ...,e(i)n }. We define the
to-be-predicted event as target event, denoted as etgt . Each target event etgt
is associated with a number of already observed security events, denoted as l.
The problem is to learn a sequence prediction function f : {e1,e2, ...,el}→ etgt
that accepts a variable-length input sequence {e1,e2, ...,el} and predicts the
target event etgt for a given system. Note that our problem definition is a
significant departure from previous approaches that accept only fixed-length
input sequences. We believe that a predictive system should be capable of
understanding and making predictions given variable-length event sequences
as the contexts, hence our problem definition is a better formulation inline
with real world scenarios.
4.2 Methodology
In this section we describe the system architecture and the technical details
behind Tiresias.
4.2.1 Architecture Overview
The architecture and workflow of Tiresias is depicted in Figure 4.2. Its
operation consists of four phases: ¶ data collection and preprocessing, ·
model training & validation, ¸ security event prediction, and ¹ prediction
performance monitoring.
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Figure 4.2: Tiresias collects security events from machines that have installed
an intrusion protection product. The sequential events from these
machines are collected, preprocessed and then used to build and vali-
date Tiresias’ predictive model. The optimal model is then used in
operations and its performance is monitored to ensure steadily high
prediction accuracy.
Data collection and preprocessing (¶). Tiresias takes as input a se-
quence of security events generated by endpoints (e.g., computers that in-
stalled a security program). The goal of the data collection and preprocessing
module is to prepare both the training and validation data to build Tiresias’
predictive model. Tiresias then consumes that raw security event data gen-
erated from millions of machines that send back their activity reports. The
collection and preprocessing module reconstructs the security events observed
on a given machine si as a sequence of events ordered by timestamps, in the
format of si = {e(i)1 ,e(i)2 , ...,e(i)n }. The output of the data collection and prepro-
cessing module is D= {s1,s2, ...,sm} where m denotes the number of machines.
Finally, we build the training data DT and validation data DV from D for the
next stage, where DT ∩DV = /0.
Model training and validation. The core of Tiresias consists of the train-
ing of a recurrent neural network with recurrent memory cells (·.a, see Sec-
tion 4.2.2 for technical details about recurrent memory cells). Essentially,
Tiresias specifies a probability distribution of ew+1 possible events given his-
torical observed events {e1, ...,ew}, where w refers to the rollback window size,
by applying an affine transformation to the hidden layer followed by a so f tmax,
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Pr(ew+1|e1:w) = exp(h
w · p j+q j)
∑ j′∈E exp(hw · p j′ +q j′)
(4.1)
where p j is the j-th column of output embedding P ∈ Rm×|V | and q j is
a bias term. Given the training data DT , Tiresias’ training objective is
therefore to minimize the negative log-likelihood L of all the event sequences:
L =−
|DT |
∑
t=1
Pr(et |e1:t−1 : θ) (4.2)
We use the validation data DV to verify if the parameters θ identified during
the training phase can achieve reasonable prediction performance (·.b). It
is important to note that DT and DV come from different machines so as to
verify the general prediction capability of Tiresias on the endpoints that are
not part of the training data.
Security event prediction (¸). Once the model is trained, Tiresias takes
the historical events {e0, ..., ei} as the initial input (i.e., a variable-length input
sequence inline with the real-world scenario) and predicts the probability dis-
tribution of ei+1 given E as Pr[ei+1|e0:i] = {e1 : p1, e2 : p2, ..., e|E| : p|E|}. Our
strategy is to sort Pr[ei+1|e0:i] and choose the event with the maximum prob-
abilistic score. Tiresias then verifies with the actual event sequence whether
ei+1 is the correct prediction. In case of a wrong prediction, Tiresias updates
its contextual information accordingly. Section 4.5 provides a detailed case
study of the security event prediction phase in a real-world scenario.
Prediction performance monitoring (¹). Finally, in an effort to main-
tain the prediction accuracy as high as possible, the prediction performance
monitor tracks and reports the evolution of different metrics, such as the Pre-
cision, Recall, and F1 of the current model. It is possible to elaborate such
metrics on Tiresias’ implementation in the wild as it is immediately possible
to see whether Tiresias predicted the right event. If the predictions preci-
sion is dropping below a certain threshold, the system would automatically
understand that is necessary to retrain the model.
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4.2.2 Recurrent Memory Array
Long short-term memory (LSTM) and variants such as gated recurrent units
(GRU) are the most popular recurrent neural network models for sequential
tasks, such as in character-level language modeling [161]. One common ap-
proach to deal with complex sequential data is using a stacked RNNs architec-
ture. Essentially, stacking RNNs creates a multi-layer feedforward network at
each time-step, i.e., the input to a layer being the output of the previous layer.
In turn, stacking RNNs automatically creates different time scales at differ-
ent levels, and therefore a temporal hierarchy [162]. This approach has been
proven practical and achieving good accuracy in various cases, such as log pre-
diction [81], binary function recognition [79], and function type recovery [80].
Nevertheless, despite the proven success of stacked RNNs, one complication
incurred by such strategy is the lack of generalization to new data, e.g., stack-
ing mechanisms chosen and tuned for current training data require vigorous
evaluation and may not adapt well to the new data at run time [163]. There-
fore, rather than stacking multiple layers of RNNs, it would be ideal to build
more complex memory structures inside a RNN cell to retain temporal mem-
ories while keeping a single layer RNN network to maintain computational
efficiency when training. To achieve both goals, we propose to leverage the
recurrent memory array by Rocki [164]; this is doable by modifying LSTM
architectures, while it is not available on GRU architectures.
Following the notation in Rocki [164], we can formally define the recurrent
memory array as follows in Eq. 4.3.
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f tk = σ(Wf kx
t +U f kht−1+b f k)
itk = σ(Wikx
t +Uikht−1+bik)
otk = σ(Wokx
t +Uokht−1+bok)
c˜tk = tanh(Wckx
t +Uckht−1+bck)
ctk = f
t
k ct−1k + itk c˜tk
ht = ∑
k
otk tanh(ctk) (4.3)
where f denotes forget gates, i denotes inputs, o denotes outputs, c denotes
cell states, and h denotes the hidden states. Here,  represents element-wise
multiplication. It is straightforward to notice that parameter k directly con-
trols the number of cell memory vectors, which enables the recurrent memory
array to build an array-like structure similar to the structure of the cerebellar
cortex [164].
To deal with noisy sequential input data (Section 4.3) as observed in the
real world, we follow the stochastic design outlined in [164] by treating initial
output gate activations as inputs to a so f tmax output distribution, sampling
from this distribution, and selecting the most likely memory cell to activate
(see Eq. 4.4).
p(i= k) =
eo
t
k
∑k otk
ht = oti tanh(cti) (4.4)
Eq. 4.4 identifies the probability of a memory cell i to be activated and
update ht accordingly using this cell while the rest of memory cells are deacti-
vated. Hence, instead of summarizing all cell memory (see Eq. 4.3), only one
output is used in this stochastic design that is resilient to noisy input. We refer
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Figure 4.3: Summary of the security event datasets used in this paper.
interested readers to the work from rocki [164] for theoretical proofs and em-
pirical comparison studies with the other state-of-the-art RNN architectures.
4.3 Employed Dataset
Tiresias is a generic system that can be used to predict security events on
different protection systems. To evaluate its performance in this paper, we
focus specifically on security event data collected from Symantec’s intrusion
prevention product. Symantec offers end users to explicitly opt in to its data
sharing program to help improving its detection capabilities. To preserve the
anonymity of users, client identifiers are anonymized and it is not possible to
link the collected data back to the users that originated it. Meta-information
associated with a security event is recorded when the product detects network-
level or system-level activity that matches a pre-defined signature. From this
data we extract the following information: anonymized machine ID, times-
tamp, security event ID, event description, system actions, and other informa-
tion (e.g., file SHA2) if any. Note that we use the anonymized machine ID to
reconstruct a series of security events detected in a given machine and discard
it after the reconstruction process is done.
To thoroughly investigate the effectiveness, stability and reusability of
Tiresias, we collected 27 days of data, summarized in Figure 4.3. We compile
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two separate datasets. The first one, which we call D1, spans a period of 17
days in November 2017 (1 November – 17 November), and is composed of
over 2.2 billion security events. We use the first five days (1 November – 5
November) of D1 to validate our approach and for a comparison study against
three baseline methods (see Section 4.4). We later use the first seven days (1
November – 7 November) of D1 to build models with varied length of training
period, and study the stability of our approach by evaluating the prediction
accuracy for the rest of the 10 days of data (8 November – 17 November)
from D1. We also compile another dataset, which we call D2. This dataset is
composed of 1.2 billion security events collected on the 8th and 23rd day of
each month between November 2017 and February 2018, and the first three
days in January 2018. D2 is used to understand whether the system retains
its accuracy even in a longer term scale: training sets based on D1 are months
older than part of the data in D2. We use the first three days in January 2018
to build new models and compare them to the models built with data from
D1 (1 November - 7 November) and study their prediction performance with
a focus on Tiresias’ reusability (see Section 4.4.5). On average, we collect
131 million security events from 740k machines per day, roughly 176 security
events per machine per day. In total, the monitored machines generated 4,495
unique security events over the 27 day observation period.
Data Limitations. It is important to note that the security event data is
collected passively. That is, these security events are recorded only when cor-
responding signatures are triggered. Any events preemptively blocked by other
security products cannot be observed. Additionally, any events that did not
match the predefined signatures are also not observed. Hence the prediction
model used in this paper can only predict the events observed by Symantec’s
intrusion prevention product. We discuss more details on the limitations un-
derlying the data used by Tiresias in Section 4.6.
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4.4 Evaluation
In this section we describe the experiments operated to evaluate Tiresias.
We designed a number of experiments that allow us to answer the following
research questions:
• What is Tiresias performance in identifying the upcoming security
event (Section 4.4.2) and how does its performance compare to the base-
line and state-of-the-art methods (Section 4.4.3)?
• How do variations in the model’s training period affect the performance
(Section 4.4.4)?
• Can we reuse a trained Tiresias model for a given period of time and
when do we need to retrain the model (Section 4.4.5)?
• What is the influence of the long-term memory of Recurrent Neural
Network models to achieve security event prediction (Section 4.4.6)?
4.4.1 Experimental Setup
Implementation. We implemented Tiresias in Python 2.7 and TensorFlow
1.4.1. Experimentally, we set the number of unrolling w to 20, the training
batch size to 128, the number of memory array k (see Section 4.2.2) to 4 and the
number of hidden LSTMMemory Array units to 128. We find these parameters
offering the best prediction performance given our dataset. All experiments
were conducted on a server with 4 TITAN X (Pascal) 12GB 1.5G GPUs with
the CUDA 8.0 toolkit installed. All baseline methods are implemented in
Python 2.7 and experimented on a server with a 2.67GHz Xeon CPU X5650
and 128GB of memory.
Evaluation setup. To form a concrete evaluation setup, for both Tiresias
and other baseline methods experiments, we split the input data and use 80%
for training, 10% for validation, and 10% for test. We strictly require that
training, validation and test data to come from different machines so as to ver-
ify Tiresias’ general prediction capability in the endpoints that are not part
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Figure 4.4: Experimental setup for Tiresias’ prediction evaluation (Section 4.4.2)
and comparison study with baseline methods (Section 4.4.3). The grey
bars indicate data derived from machines used for training while the
dotted bars indicate the data used for testing and coming from different
machines with respect to the training data.
of the training data. Specifically, we train Tiresias for 100 epochs, validate
model performance after every epoch and select the model that provides the
best performance on validation data.
Evaluation metrics. We use the precision, recall, and F1 metrics to evaluate
prediction results from the models. In our experimental setup, we calculate
these metrics globally by counting the total true positives, false negatives and
false positives. It is important to note that Tiresias accepts variable-length
security event sequences. We specially hold out the last event as the prediction
target etgt for evaluation purposes. Section 4.5 showcases how Tiresias can
be leveraged to accomplish step-by-step prediction with a single event as the
initial input.
4.4.2 Overall Prediction Results
In this section we evaluate the performance of our security event forecast model
in predicting the exact upcoming event. This is a challenging task that a
predictive system for security events aims at resolving due to the fact that there
are 4,495 security events as possible candidates in our dataset (see Section 4.3)
and an exact event should be correctly predicted.
Experiment setup. We use the experimental setup as illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.4 for Tiresias’ performance evaluation. From D1, we train our predic-
tive model using one day of data and evaluate Tiresias on both the same day
4.4. Evaluation 117
01/11 02/11 03/11 04/11 05/11
Test Date
01/11
02/11
03/11
04/11
05/11
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 D
at
e
0.795
0.810
0.825
0.840
0.855
0.870
(a) Precision
01/11 02/11 03/11 04/11 05/11
Test Date
01/11
02/11
03/11
04/11
05/11
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 D
at
e
0.795
0.810
0.825
0.840
0.855
0.870
(b) Recall
01/11 02/11 03/11 04/11 05/11
Test Date
01/11
02/11
03/11
04/11
05/11
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 D
at
e
0.795
0.810
0.825
0.840
0.855
0.870
(c) F1-Measure
Figure 4.5: Precision, Recall, and F1-Measure of overall Tiresias’s performance.
Tiresias is trained using one day of data and evaluated on both the
same day and the following days until 5 November 2017.
and the following days until 5 November 2017. For example, we train Tiresias
using data from 2 November and evaluate its prediction performance from 2
November to 5 November.
Experiment results. Following our general experimental evaluation setup,
we randomly select 14,396 machines from the first days of November that
are not part of the data used in the training set of the initial model. We
focus on predicting the last event occurring on a machine given the sequence
of previously-observed events. As shown in Figure 4.5, Tiresias is able to
achieve over 80% precision, recall, and F1-measure in predicting the exact
upcoming security event when evaluating on the same day test data. Figure 4.5
shows that, when training on one day, and testing on the same day and the
following ones, the values of the Precision, Recall and F1 do not decrease
dramatically. When it does, it decreases, in the worse case, of less than 0.05.
The Figure also shows that Precision (Figure 4.5a) and Recall (Figure 4.5b) are
well balanced and have very similar values and exactly the same scale (from
0.87 to 0.795). This result shows that Tiresias can offer good prediction
results. There is no security event dominating in our dataset, which may lead
to biased but better prediction performance. The top 3 events in our training
data are: (i) Microsoft SMB MS17-010 Disclosure Attempt (19.8%), (ii) SMB
Double Pulsar Ping (16.4%), and (iii) Unimplemented Trans2 Subcommand
(16.1%). The top 3 events in our test data are ranked as follows: (i) Microsoft
SMB MS17-010 Disclosure Attempt (9.85%), (ii) HTTP PE Download (6.3%),
and (iii) DNS Lookup Failures (3.5%). Interestingly, the dominant events in
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Test Date (Evaluation Metric - Precision)
Method 01/Nov 02/Nov 03/Nov 04/Nov 05/Nov
Spectral 0.05 0.031 0.023 0.013 0.02
Markov Chain 0.62 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.52
3-gram 0.67 0.54 0.61 0.592 0.601
Tiresias 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.81
Table 4.1: Prediction precision comparison study: Tiresias vs. baseline ap-
proaches.
training and test are different, which makes Tiresias’ prediction results even
stronger.
Over the days, we observe a trend that the prediction performance of
Tiresias drops slightly in terms of all three evaluation metrics. Take the
model trained on 2 November for example, its prediction precision drops by
4% from 0.83 to 0.79. In Section 4.4.4 we study if variations (e.g., a longer
training period) in the model’s training data would offer better performance
and how stable the trained Tiresias performs over consecutive days. Note
that ‘micro’-averaging in a multi-class setting produces equal Precision, Recall
and F1-Measure. For the rest of the evaluation process, we therefore use
precision as the main evaluation metric.
4.4.3 Comparison Study
In this section we aim at studying whether the higher complexity of Recur-
rent Neural Networks is required for the task of predicting security events,
or whether simpler baseline methods would be enough for the task at hand.
For comparison purposes, we implemented first-order Markov Chain [165] and
3-gram model [166] (equivalent to the second order Markov Chain model) in
Python 2.7.1. Note that it is natural to consider a higher order (e.g., n-order
where n> 2) Markov Chain model for security event prediction, however, due
to the exponential states issue associated with high order Markov Chain mod-
els, it is computationally costly to build such a high order model for 4,495
events. Finally we use the sp2learning [167] package to build a spectral learn-
ing model [168] for sequence prediction as the third baseline prediction model.
These three methods are often used to model sequences of elements in several
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fields and, being simpler than our RNN models and widely used in sequence
prediction, they are relevantly good baselines to compare Tiresias with.
Experiment setup. The comparison study uses daily data (1 November - 5
November) from D1. To evaluateTiresias in this case, all training, validation,
and test data come from the same day.
Comparison study results. Table 4.1 shows the precision of Tiresias
compared to simpler systems. Table 4.1 shows that Tiresias outperforms the
baseline methods but also that 3-grams perform better than Markov Chains,
and Markov Chains perform better than the spectral learning method. This
particular order shows the importance of sequence memory as the system that
performs best among the baselines is the 3-grams. However, 3-grams are less
effective than Tiresias. This is due to two of the main characteristics of
neural networks: the capacity of filtering noise and the longer term memory.
As Table 4.1 shows, Tiresias has precision values higher than 0.8 in all the
five days of tests showing a very good level of reliability. In Section 4.4.6 we
show that the long-term memory that is an important feature of RNNs plays
a key role in correctly predicting security events. Note that we didn’t report a
comparison of the computation time among the methods due to the fact that
Tiresias leverages GPUs to train RNN models and the baseline methods rely
on traditional CPUs, and therefore Tiresias is in general much quicker to
run. For example, our 3-gram implementation took over 10 days for training,
yet Tiresias requires only ∼10 minutes per epoch using GPUs.
4.4.4 Influence of Training Period Length
In this section we look at whether training Tiresias on longer periods of time
achieves better prediction performance.
Experiment setup. We use the experimental setup as illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.6 forTiresias’ performance evaluation. From D1, we train our predictive
model using one day of data and evaluate on the test data from 8 November
to 17 November. For example, we train Tiresias using data from 2 Novem-
ber and evaluate its prediction performance on test data from 8 November
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Figure 4.6: Experimental setup for multiple day evaluation of Tiresias (Sec-
tion 4.4.4).
to 17 November. To evaluate if a longer training period can offer better pre-
diction performance, we also train our predictive model using one week of
data (from 1 November to 7 November) and evaluate its performance in the
aforementioned period.
Experiment results. In this experiment we evaluate the performance of our
security event forecast model in predicting the exact upcoming event several
days after the initial model was trained. The goal is to determine how well
our predictive model ages in the short term and to make sure that it remains
effective in predicting security events without the need to re-tune it after this
period of time.
The question that this experiment is trying to answer is whether there
is a difference in training the models over longer periods of time, such as one
week, rather than one day. Table 4.2 provides some insights into this question.
First, we used the first five days of November on their own to build five
models. Second, we built one single model from the first seven days of the
same month. We then tested the six different models (five based on one day of
data and one based on one week of data) on ten days of data from 8 November
to 17 November. Overall, the training over one week of data produces similar
results as those obtained using training over only one day of data. On average,
Tiresias trained with one week data can achieve a precision score of 0.819,
which is 0.3% higher than that of the models trained with one day data.
These results demonstrate that Tiresias can offer good accuracy with
stable performance over time since the standard deviation of precision scores
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over the measurement period of 10 days is small (∼0.02). However, on 8
November and on 16 November the results are slightly different, exhibiting a
higher accuracy for the week-long trained model. While in the first case (8
November) it is probably due to the proximity of the test day to the training
week, the second case (16 November) appears to be an outlier. We further
observe that the time proximity of the training and test data appears to have
a positive impact on the prediction accuracy. Indeed, we can see that the model
trained over one day of data is as efficient as the one trained over one week of
data when tested on alerts generated only a few days later, probably due to
the similarity among attack behaviors observed within a few days. The week-
long trained model appears to be more efficient in the presence of deviating,
or outlying attack behaviors in the test phase. This can easily be explained
by the fact that the more data is used to build a model the more complete
the model is. Hence it can better deal with rare events or deviating attack
behaviors.
One of the reasons why Tiresias’ prediction precision might suddenly
decrease is if the set of alerts significantly changes from a day to another,
for example because a new vulnerability starts being exploited in the wild, a
system patch fixes an existing one, or a major version of a popular software
gets released. For this reason, in our architecture discussed in Section 4.2 we
included a component that monitors the performance of Tiresias and can
trigger a re-training of the system if it is deemed necessary. In the experiment
discussed in Table 4.2, for example, the precision performance on 16 November
drops by 6.9% on average from 8 November. This could indicate to the op-
erator that something significant changed in the monitored systems and that
Tiresias needs to be retrained. As we will show in Section 4.4.7, this can be
done in batch and it takes well less than a day to complete.
4.4.5 Stability Over Time
In this Section we evaluate Tiresias’ prediction accuracy when the training
data is several months older than the test data. Our goal is to evaluate the
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Test Date (Evaluation Metric: Precision)
Model
Training Date
08/Nov 09/Nov 10/Nov 11/Nov 12/Nov 13/Nov 14/Nov 15/Nov 16/Nov 17/Nov
01/Nov 0.815 0.823 0.822 0.794 0.789 0.814 0.817 0.816 0.746 0.774
02/Nov 0.821 0.827 0.826 0.801 0.792 0.82 0.819 0.82 0.76 0.79
03/Nov 0.822 0.827 0.826 0.80 0.794 0.82 0.82 0.817 0.742 0.769
04/Nov 0.820 0.828 0.827 0.797 0.797 0.822 0.823 0.82 0.75 0.77
05/Nov 0.817 0.825 0.823 0.791 0.791 0.818 0.815 0.815 0.747 0.775
01/Nov - 07/Nov 0.836 0.83 0.823 0.82 0.801 0.815 0.816 0.812 0.783 0.773
Table 4.2: Evaluation ofTiresias’ prediction precision between 8th November and
17th November.
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Figure 4.7: Experimental setup for Tiresias reliability evaluation (Section 4.4.5).
reliability of the model in case there is no retraining for several months. As we
discussed, Tiresias is able to detect when it needs to be retrained, however
this operation does not come for free and therefore it is desirable to minimize
it as much as possible.
Experiment setup. The experimental setup is illustrated in Figure 4.7. We
train our predictive model using both one day of data (from 1 November
to 5 November respectively) and one week of data (from 1 November to 7
November) from D1. Additionally for comparison purposes, we train three
more predictive models using one day of data (from 1 January to 3 January
respectively) from D2. The test data consists of two days per month (on the
8th and the 23rd) so as to obtain a representative dataset from November 2017
until February 2018.
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Experiment results. Table 4.3 shows the results obtained using the same
training sets as in the previous Section augmented with three days in January,
i.e., one day-long model for each of the first five days of November 2017,
one week-long model for the first seven days of the same month and one day-
long model for each of the first three days of January 2018. The prediction
precision results presented in Table 4.3 show consistency through the different
training sets and a good level of stability, as the performance does not decrease
dramatically over time. Moreover, the week-long training set does not show
increased accuracy compared to the day-long ones. These new results thus
confirm those from Section 4.4.2 and show that (i) the model quickly converges
towards high accuracy with only one or a few days of training data, and (ii)
the model ages very well even months after it was built.
December discontinuity. Table 4.3 shows a particular behavior between 8 De-
cember and 23 December: Tiresias’ precision increases. We would normally
expect the system’s precision to slightly decrease over time, possibly follow-
ing a pattern, while in this case the precision increases. To investigate this
phenomenon, we looked for potential differences in the raw data and noticed
that the test data collected after 8 December exhibits a significant deviation
with respect to one specific security event ID: the presence of one of the top
three recorded alarms decreased by an order of magnitude, having a compara-
ble number of occurrences to alerts occupying the 4th to 10th position. The
alarm is related to DoublePulsar, a vulnerability disclosed in the first half of
2017. Such change may be due to different reasons. The most probable reason,
however, could be the installation of patches: Microsoft releases monthly up-
dates for Windows every 2nd Tuesday of the month (e.g., 12 December 2017)
and many software- and hardware-related companies release patches immedi-
ately following Microsoft’s. Finally, a small change to the IPS signatures or to
the attack modus operandi can heavily impact the hit rate of a given alarm.
Comparison study. To further investigate this December discontinuity phe-
nomenon we decided to assess the impact of the training data on the model
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Model
Training Date(s)
Test Date (Evaluation Metric: Precision)
2017 2018
08/Nov 23/Nov 08/Dec 23/Dec 08/Jan 23/Jan 08/Feb 23/Feb
01/Nov 0.815 0.785 0.832 0.899 0.899 0.921 0.93 0.921
02/Nov 0.821 0.8 0.835 0.895 0.896 0.921 0.931 0.918
03/Nov 0.822 0.782 0.835 0.898 0.899 0.923 0.93 0.922
04/Nov 0.820 0.793 0.834 0.901 0.898 0.922 0.929 0.921
05/Nov 0.817 0.79 0.833 0.9 0.898 0.921 0.929 0.92
01/Nov-07/Nov 0.836 0.788 0.829 0.895 0.892 0.917 0.925 0.915
01/Jan - - - - 0.905 0.927 0.931 0.926
02/Jan - - - - 0.908 0.926 0.930 0.924
03/Jan - - - - 0.914 0.933 0.935 0.929
Table 4.3: Evaluation of Tiresias’s prediction precision on every 8th and 23rd of
each month.
accuracy. To this end, we considered the training sets from data collected on
the first three days of January and tested on the January and February dates
(bottom part of Table 4.3). We can see that Tiresias trained in January
performs slightly better than when trained in November. These results show
that the results by Tiresias remain reliable even months after the system
was trained. Nevertheless, in the case of a sudden decrease in precision due
to an adverse change in the data (e.g., the emergence of a new attack), Tire-
sias would be able to detect this and prompt a retraining, as discussed in
Section 4.2.
4.4.6 Sequence Length Evaluation
In Section 4.4.3 we showed that Tiresias outperforms simpler systems that
do not take advantage of long-term memory in the same way as the RNN
model used by our approach. In general, understanding how Deep Learning
models work is challenging, and they are often treated as black boxes. To make
matters more complex, RNNs do not only rely on long-term memory, but also
on short-term memory, in particular to filter out noise.
In this section we aim at understanding whether long-term memory is
more influential in making decision than short-term memory or vice versa.
With relying on short-term memory we mean a system that relies on a few
elements of the sequence to make its decision, that is, the ones closest to the
element that the system is trying to guess. With relying on long-term memory
we mean when the system uses the whole sequence or a large part of it to take
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its decision on what the next security event could be. Intuitively, if short-term
memory was predominant, we would not expect the performance of Tiresias
to increase with the number of observed events.
As looking into the Neural Network weights may be a complicated way
to understand which type of memory is more important for the model, we
decided to focus on the occurrences of successfully and unsuccessfully guessed
events. Every event guessed by Tiresias has a probability (confidence score)
associated to it. First, we look at the distribution of the confidence scores
among successfully guessed events (Figure 4.8a) and unsuccessfully guessed
ones (Figure 4.8b). As it can be seen, both types of events present a very
skewed distribution in their confidence scores, with a negligible number of
events being predicted with a probability of less than 0.5.
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Figure 4.8: Quantity of successfully and unsuccessfully guessed events. The Y axis
on the left of each graph is the occurrence of successes/failures with at
least the probability indicated on the X axis according to the system.
The Y axis on the right is the ratio between the value on the other Y
axis and the total of successes/failures.
To better understand if Tiresias’ results are mainly due to the use of
long-term rather than short-term memory, we checked how unique the se-
quences on which Tiresias makes its decisions are. These quantitative re-
sults can hint at which kind of approach is used by the algorithm. We try to
evaluate the occurrences of the sequence in which the system tried to guess
the last event compared to all those that differ from it for the last event (the
one that Tiresias tried to guess). This analysis is carried out for sequences
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Figure 4.9: The plots show the percentage of the sequences correctly guessed (a)
or failed to guess (b) with respect to sequences that share all the events
but the last. On the X axis, as for Figures 4.8a and 4.8b there is the
confidence level of the sequences used by the system. Figures show
that sequences of at least 5 events (sl >=5) are quite unique, therefore
long term memory is a crucial factor in the system accuracy.
of length i+1,(i= 2, ...,9) where i represents the number of events before the
last we take into consideration. For all the successful/unsuccessful sequences
we calculate the ratio between the times in which we had those i events and
Tiresias predicted the last event correctly and the times in which we had the
same i events followed by any event (included the right one). According to the
probability value of the guessed event, we calculate the average probability.
Figure 4.9a shows the data for all the sequences for which the last event
has been correctly guessed by Tiresias. Note that the X axis starts at 0.5
because, as Figures 4.8a and 4.8b showed, the number of predictions with a
lower confidence is very low. The values for i (sequence length) less than 5
show that the system’s prediction is not very confident. Longer sequences (i
greater than 5), instead, are more unique and often correctly predict the last
event. The opposite happens when we evaluate the sequences involving events
not guessed correctly by our system (Figure 4.9b). In fact, the left part of the
graph presents sequences where the wrongly guessed event was rarely the one
following the i previous events. This may mean that in those cases there are
sequences that differ only for the last event and a few events are quite frequent.
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Takeaways. Long sequences including the guessed event are more frequent
when we analyze the successful guesses. This situation is more common than
the unsuccessful guesses as the system reaches high accuracy. Therefore, ac-
cording to the graphs the system seem to rely more on long-term memory than
short-term memory.
4.4.7 Tiresias Runtime Performance
We now discuss the specific characteristics of the system and its runtime per-
formance.
The training phase is the longest one: building a Tiresias model is a
long process that can be performed offline. Tiresias takes around 10 hours
to retrain the model. Considered the stability of the model, which as shown
in Section 4.4.5 can be effective for long periods of time, rebuilding the model
does not have to be done every day. We also showed that it is possible to
identify when the system needs retraining because of a discontinuity in the
distribution of events (see Section 4.4.4). Once trained, Tiresias takes 25ms
to 80ms to predict the upcoming event using the variable-length security events
in a given system.
Tiresias’ predictive model trained using one day of data is about 31MB.
It can be easily pushed to the endpoints with limited network footprint. Note
that with the advance of deep learning libraries, especially the recent devel-
opment of TensorFlow, it is feasible for Tiresias to be deployed not only in
traditional endpoints (e.g., PCs) but in mobile and embedded devices as well.
This is another aspect that exemplifies the general applicability of Tiresias.
4.5 Case Studies
In this section we describe a set of case studies showcasing the capabilities
of Tiresias in different real-world scenarios. We first show how Tiresias
can be used to detect a coordinated multi-step attack against a Web server
(Section 4.5.1). We then provide a number of real-world settings in which
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Tiresias’ prediction labels can be modified to achieve specific goals, for ex-
ample predicting entire classes of attacks (Section 4.5.2).
4.5.1 Predicting Events in a Multi-Step Attack
The first scenario where Tiresias’ prediction capability can be leveraged is
when facing multi-step, coordinated attacks, i.e., a single attack involving
multiple steps performed sequentially or in parallel by an attacker and resulting
in multiple alerts being raised by the IPS. The difficulty of identifying such
attacks originates from the fact that some of the intermediate steps of a multi-
step attack can be considered benign when seen individually by an IPS engine.
Moreover, most attacks observed in the wild are the result of automated scripts,
which are essentially programmed to check for some precondition on the victim
systems and subsequently trigger the adequate exploit(s). For instance, an
attack might consists of the following steps: (i) run reconnaissance tasks if
port 80/tcp (HTTP) is open, (ii) trigger a list of exploits against the Web
application framework, e.g., Apache and (iii) execute a list of exploits against
other possible applications running on top of it. Therefore, we may not observe
all steps of an attack on every victim system, depending on which branches
of the attack scripts were executed. This variability of observed events across
systems hinders the identification of the global multi-step attack.
To identify candidate multi-step attacks in our dataset of IPS events we
used the following approach. For each event ei observed on any of the mon-
itored machines we compute its frequency of occurrence across all machines.
We then consider a candidate multi-step attack any sequence of events ei oc-
curring at the same frequency with an error margin of 10% to capture the
variability in attacks as explained above. We also set a support threshold on
the number of machines exhibiting that sequence so as to avoid a biased fre-
quency obtained from too few samples. To uncover the case study presented
here we empirically set this threshold to 1000 machines. For network-sourced
attack steps, we also extract the source IP address to determine the likelihood
of the global event sequence to be generated by a single attacker.
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Figure 4.10: Step by step visualization of Tiresias prediction process in two real
systems. Tiresias starts with event e10 and e31 respectively as the
initial feed and predicts the upcoming security event step by step.
The predictions are colored by their probabilistic scores, where green
indicates Tiresias returns a correct prediction with probabilistic
score greater than 0.5, orange indicates Tiresias returns a correct
event prediction with probabilistic score less than 0.5 (but remains
the largest probabilistic score), and red indicates a wrong prediction
(the actual events are shown in parentheses in this case).
We present the case of a multi-step attack captured by the IPS and which
was successfully learned by the prediction tool. The attack consists of multiple
attempts to exploit a Web server and the Web application running on top of it.
First, the attacker checks the Web server software for several vulnerabilities. In
this case, it quickly identifies the server as running Apache and then attempts
to exploit several vulnerabilities, such as Struts-related vulnerabilities. It then
switches to checking the presence of a Web application running on top and
then fingerprinting it. In this step, the attacker triggers different exploits
against known vulnerabilities in various Content Management Systems, such
as Wordpress, Drupal, Joomla. Eventually, the attack appears to fail as the
various steps are individually blocked by the IPS.
To be able to visualize the decision process and explain how Tiresias
operates given the aforementioned multi-step attack, we feed Tiresias a list
of security events from a machine that was under the coordinated attack. By
putting Tiresias in this real-world environment, we are able to visualize how
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Tiresias predicts the upcoming events as illustrated in Figure 4.10. Note
that events {e0, ..., e13} belong to the coordinated attack.
The process operates as follows. Take machine1 in Figure 4.10a for ex-
ample, Tiresias takes event e10 as the initial feed and predicts the upcoming
event e12. It then verifies with the actual event to check if e12 is the correct
prediction. In our case, e12 is the correct prediction with a confidence score
higher than 0.5 (therefore e12 in a green box in Figure 4.10a). Tiresias auto-
matically leverages both e10 and e12 as “contextual information” to enable its
internal memory array cells to better predict the next event. The same step is
repeated: e8 is correctly predicted, Tiresias uses e10,e12, and e8 to prepare
its internal cells. In the case that Tiresias makes a wrong prediction, e.g.,
it predicts e10 instead of the actual observed event e5 (e10 is enclosed in a red
box in Figure 4.10a), Tiresias uses the actual event e5 together with previous
historical events. This enables Tiresias to stay on track with the observed
events and predict events that are closely relating to those of the coordinated
attack. This may lead Tiresias to incorrectly predict some random attacks
the system experienced. For example, e55 is a ‘PHP shell command execution’
attack which was observed in the security event sequences, but not part of this
particular coordinated attack. It is important to notice that Tiresias is able
to correctly predict e13 (an attack relating to CVE-2017-9805) that was not
presented in the previous events, even thought its predecessors, such as e12, e3,
e10, appeared multiple times. We consider this a good example of Tiresias
using long-term memory to carry out the correct prediction as detailed in Sec-
tion 4.4.6. It is also interesting to see how Tiresias adapts itself during its
operation as shown in Figure 4.10b (multiple e7 and e6 in dashed line rectan-
gles). We can observe that Tiresias did not correctly predict e6 twice when
given e7 (see ¶ and ·). Nevertheless, Tiresias is capable of leveraging the
contextual information (i.e., the actual observed events) to rectify its behav-
ior. As we can observe in ¸, Tiresias is able to make a borderline prediction
and in ¹ Tiresias makes a confident and correct prediction of e6.
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To further exemplify Tiresias’ sequential prediction capability in the
above setup, we run it on 8 February (2018) test data using the model trained
on 3 January (2018) and predict all upcoming events of 200 randomly selected
machines (this effectively generates 32,391 sequences due to the step-by-step
setup) with a precision of 94%, and against 8 December (2017) test data using
a model trained on 4 November (2017) and obtain a precision of 80.89%.
These experimental results provide additional evidence ofTiresias’ prediction
capability in a real-world environment.
4.5.2 Adjusting the Prediction Granularity
The goal of Tiresias is primarily to accurately determine the next event that
is going to occur on a given monitored system. In some cases multiple security
events might share some common traits. For example, multiple IPS events can
be used to describe different attacks against a particular software application,
network protocol, etc. These shared traits can then be used to categorize
such events. This categorization is specific to the security application that
generated these events. Also, the categorization process undoubtedly results
in a compressed and coarser-gained set of security events. In this section we
describe several cases where such a categorization can be leveraged when the
system fails to predict the exact security event but successfully predicts the
exact traits, or categories of the attacks, such as the targeted network protocol
and software application, or the attack type. To begin with, we extracted
categories from the IPS signature labels and descriptions. These categories
correspond to characteristics of attacks described by these signatures and are
defined as follows. Whenever possible, we identify the verdict of the signature,
the severity of the attack, the type of attack, e.g., remote command execution
(RCE), SQL injection, etc, the targeted application, if any, the targeted network
protocol, if any, and whether the attack exploits a particular CVE. There is
thus a one-to-many relationship between each signature and the categories it
belongs to. We then uncover machines for which the categories of a mistakenly
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predicted event matches exactly the categories of the correct prediction. About
3.5% of failed prediction results exhibit this pattern.
For our first example we consider a machine that was targeted by the
Shellshock exploits targeting the Unix shell BASH. Several vulnerabilities were
uncovered in the context of these infamous attacks, namely CVE-2014-6271,
CVE-2014-6277, CVE-2014-6278, CVE-2014-7169, CVE-2014-7186 and CVE-
2014-7187. These six vulnerabilities translate into six IPS signatures. These
signatures all belong to the same categories, which include (i) block, (ii) high,
(iii) RCE, (iv) bash and (v) CVE. These categories mean that the exploit attempt
is meant to be (i) blocked because its potential security impact on the targeted
machine is of (ii) high severity. This verdict is explained by the fact that,
if successful, the exploit would enable the attacker to perform a remote code
execution (or RCE) by exploiting a known vulnerability (with an assigned
CVE identifier) against the Unix shell BASH. In this case study, a machine
was targeted by several of the Shellshock exploits. After observing an attempt
to exploit CVE-2014-6271, the system predicted another attempt to exploit
the same vulnerability, instead of the correct prediction for CVE-2014-6278.
While the event-level prediction result is wrong, the category-level prediction
successfully identify an attempt to exploit a Shellshock vulnerability.
The second example is related to a machine that has apparently visited
or have been triggered to visit a website distributing fake anti-virus software.
Several IPS signatures have been defined to capture different aspects of these
malicious websites, for instance, regular expressions matching specific HTML
content, suspicious JavaScript code, etc. In this example, the system predicted
that the machine would be redirected to a fake AV website containing a partic-
ular piece of malicious HTML code while in reality, the machine was redirected
to a fake AV website containing a malicious piece of JavaScript code.
Additionally, we evaluate the performance of our security event forecast
model in predicting if the upcoming event should be blocked or allowed, a
relaxation as the aim is not to determine the exact event that will happen,
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but if it is a low-priority alarm (that is still allowed by the product we receive
the data from) or if it is a high-priority one (that is blocked immediately).
This is one of the essential tasks that a predictive intrusion prevention system
needs to resolve. Our experiment shows that the proposed predictive model
is able to achieve 88.9% precision in predicting if the upcoming event should
be blocked or allowed. This represents a 8% precision increase comparing to
the exact event prediction on the same day. Nevertheless, The added value of
adjusting the prediction granularity obviously depends on the accuracy of the
categorization and the expected level of granularity of the prediction.
4.6 Discussion
Limitations of Tiresias. A recurrent neural network, broadly speaking, is a
statistical model. The more the model “sees” (i.e., the more training data) the
better the prediction performance is. For rare events, since the model does not
have enough training samples, Tiresias may not correctly predict these rare
intrusion attempts. Existing statistical and machine learning methods are yet
to offer a satisfactory solution to this problem [169, 170, 171]. It would also be
interesting to understand whether the recent work by Kaiser et al. [172] that
makes deep models learn to remember rare words can be applied to predict rare
intrusion attempts. DeepLog, a previously proposed system [81], focused on
anomaly detection in regulated environments, such as Hadoop and OpenStack,
with limited variety of events. In such a specific log environment, DeepLog
is able to use a small fraction of normal log entries to train and achieves
good detection results. Nevertheless, DeepLog still requires a small fraction of
normal log entries would generate enough representative events and patterns.
Another limitation following rare events prediction is model retraining when
new security events (e.g., new signatures) are created. This retraining is
inevitable because machine learning models can only recognize events they
have been trained upon. Our experimental results (Section 4.4.3) show that
Tiresias takes around 10 hours to retrain and can be redeployed in a timely
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fashion in a real-world scenario. As mentioned in Section 4.4.6 the nodes
that are activated in an LSTM are not easy to examine. For this reason we
cannot guarantee that the system does not take into consideration spurious
correlations. At the same time we tried to limit this issue by extensively
evaluate Tiresias over a large amount of data and in different settings.
Data limitations. For its operation, Tiresias relies on a dataset of pre-
labeled security events. An inherent limitation of this type of data is that
an event can be labeled only if it belongs to a known attack class. If, for
example, a new zero-day vulnerability started being exploited in the wild, this
would not be reflected in the data until a signature is created for it. To reduce
the window between when an attack is being run and when it starts being
detected by an intrusion prevention system security companies typically use
threat intelligence systems and employ human specialists to analyze unlabeled
data looking for new attack trends.
Tiresias performance. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 show the effectiveness of the
system. The prediction of a security event in such a complicated environment
is an important challenge. Tiresias shows the ability of effectively tackling
this challenge, showing stability, even when the training set is months older
than the test set, and robustness to noise while detecting multistage attacks.
We evaluated Tiresias over different time periods to thoroughly prove its
qualities; as we discussed, the system may need retraining only in case the
data presents radical changes, while its precision does not decrease quickly if
the training set is older than the test set. The system can support different
dimensions of the training set as it has been tested using one day or one week
of data. The differences are minimal: performance is extremely similar, but
weekly training seems slightly more robust to anomalies on a specific day of
data. However, weekly training sets require more time to build the model.
Sections 4.4.6 and 4.5 show how long-term memory and noise filtering are
both important factors in the precision of the neural networks, explaining why
the baseline methods used in Section 4.4.3 are less precise than Tiresias.
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Deployment. The architecture of Tiresias enables it to be reasonably flex-
ible in terms of real-world deployment. Tiresias can be deployed for each
endpoint to proactively defend against attacks as we can see in Section 4.5.
At the same time, Tiresias can be tailored to protect an enterprise by train-
ing with the data coming from that enterprise only and thus better deal with
the attacks targeting that enterprise. Note that Tiresias’ predictive model
trained using one day of data is about 31MB. It can be easily pushed to the end-
points with limited network footprint. Together with the mobile TensorFlow
library, it is practically feasible for Tiresias to protect mobile/embedded de-
vices by training with security event data coming from those devices only. For
example, Tiresias can be trained using the data collected by smart routers
with an IPS installed and deployed in these routers to protect smart home
environments.
Evasion. Tiresias may be subject to evasion techniques from malicious
agents. A vulnerability of deep learning systems is that while the system
is classifying samples, it adapts its rules. Therefore, it may be subject to
poisoning attacks from a criminal who influences the decision rules using fake
actions before attacking the victim. However, to achieve such evasion, the
attackers must apply such fake actions at a massive scale and target thousands
of machines. A technique that could be used by adversaries is mimicry attacks,
i.e., evading security systems by injecting many irrelevant events to cover the
alerts generated by a real attack. We argue that Tiresias has the potential
to be resistant to these attacks. Indeed, we have seen in the case studies that
Tiresias is able to filter out the noise from the sequences of events observed
on the machines, and detect the important events correctly. An interesting
future work would be to be able to quantify the amount of events necessary
to evade systems like Tiresias. Zero day attacks may be difficult to detect:
a zero day attack may replicate known sequences of actions to exploit new
vulnerabilities, but that would still be detected; when the zero day is applying
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a new kind of multi-step attack that has a different sequence of events, it may
not be detected.
Chapter 5
Detecting Malware by Using
Markov Chains as Behavioral
Models
This section is describing the third phase on which we operated in this work:
detection. It is describing how we developed a new approach to Android
malware detection using API calls. As explained in Section 2.7 there has been
a research gap in how to model sequences of API calls to identify malicious
apps and distinguish them from benign ones. In fact, our attempt of modeling
the sequences of API calls through Markov Chains is novel and aims to take
into account the fact that different apps may use different kind of API calls,
and may use API calls in different orders.
Detecting malware on mobile devices presents additional challenges com-
pared to desktop/laptop computers: smartphones have limited battery life,
making it infeasible to use traditional approaches requiring constant scan-
ning and complex computation [173]. Therefore, Android malware detection
is typically performed by Google in a centralized fashion, i.e., by analyzing
apps submitted to the Play Store using a tool called Bouncer [174]. However,
many malicious apps manage to avoid detection [175], and anyway Android’s
openness enables manufacturers and users to install apps that come from third-
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party market places, which might not perform any malware checks at all, or
anyway not as accurately [99].
As a result, the research community has devoted significant attention to
malware detection on Android (Section 2.7). Previous work has often relied on
the permissions requested by apps [89, 176], using models built from malware
samples. This strategy, however, is prone to false positives, since there are
often legitimate reasons for benign apps to request permissions classified as
dangerous [89]. Another approach, used by DroidAPIMiner [4], is to per-
form classification based on API calls frequently used by malware. However,
relying on the most common calls observed during training prompts the need
for constant retraining, due to the evolution of malware and the Android API
alike. For instance, “old” calls are often deprecated with new API releases, so
malware developers may switch to different calls to perform similar actions,
which affects DroidAPIMiner’s effectiveness due to its use of specific calls.
5.1 MaMaDroid: Using Static Analysis to De-
tect Malware
5.1.1 Overview
We now introduce MaMaDroid, a novel system for Android malware detec-
tion. MaMaDroid characterizes the transitions between different API calls
performed by Android apps – i.e., the sequence of API calls. It then models
these transitions as Markov chains, which are in turn used to extract features
for machine learning algorithms to classify apps as benign or malicious. Ma-
MaDroid does not actually use the sequence of raw API calls, but abstracts
each call to either its package or its family. For instance, the API call getMes-
sage() is parsed as:
package︷ ︸︸ ︷
java︸︷︷︸
family
.lang.Throwable: String getMessage()
︸ ︷︷ ︸
API call
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Call Graph 
Extraction (1)
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Extraction (2)
Markov Chain 
Modeling (3)
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(4)?
Figure 5.1: Overview ofMaMaDroid operation. In (1), it extracts the call graph
from an Android app, next, it builds the sequences of (abstracted)
API calls from the call graph (2). In (3), the sequences of calls are
used to build a Markov chain and a feature vector for that app. Fi-
nally, classification is performed in (4), labeling the app as benign or
malicious.
Given these two different types of abstractions, we have two modes of
operation for MaMaDroid, each using one of the types of abstraction. We
test both, highlighting their advantages and disadvantages — in a nutshell,
the abstraction to family is more lightweight, while that to package is more
fine-grained.
MaMaDroid’s operation goes through four phases, as depicted in Fig-
ure 5.1. First, we extract the call graph from each app by using static analysis
(1), next we obtain the sequences of API calls for the app using all unique
nodes in the call graph and associating, to each node, all its child nodes (2).
As mentioned, we abstract a call to either its package or family. Finally, by
building on the sequences, MaMaDroid constructs a Markov chain model
(3), with the transition probabilities used as the feature vector to classify the
app as either benign or malware using a machine learning classifier (4). In the
rest of this section, we discuss each of these steps in detail.
5.1.2 Call Graph Extraction
The first step in MaMaDroid is to extract the app’s call graph. We do so
by performing static analysis on the app’s apk.1 Specifically, we use a Java
1The standard Android archive file format containing all files, including the Java byte-
code, making up the app.
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optimization and analysis framework, Soot [177], to extract call graphs and
FlowDroid [92] to ensure contexts and flows are preserved.
To better clarify the different steps involved in our system, we employ a
“running example,” using a real-world malware sample. Specifically, Figure 5.2
lists a class extracted from the decompiled apk of malware disguised as a
memory booster app (with package name com.g.o.speed.memboost), which
executes commands (rm, chmod, etc.) as root [178]. To ease presentation,
we focus on the portion of the code executed in the try/catch block. The
resulting call graph of the try/catch block is shown in Figure 5.3. Note that, for
simplicity, we omit calls for object initialization, return types and parameters,
as well as implicit calls in a method. Additional calls that are invoked when
getShell(true) is called are not shown, except for the add() method that is
directly called by the program code, as shown in Figure 5.2.
5.1.3 Sequence Extraction
Next, we extract the sequences of API calls from the call graph. Since Ma-
MaDroid uses static analysis, the graph obtained from Soot represents the
sequence of functions that are potentially called by the program. However,
each execution of the app could take a specific branch of the graph and only
execute a subset of the calls. For instance, when running the code in Figure 5.2
multiple times, the Execute method could be followed by different calls, e.g.,
getShell() in the try block only or getShell() and then getMessage() in the
catch block.
In this phase,MaMaDroid operates as follows. First, it identifies a set of
entry nodes in the call graph, i.e., nodes with no incoming edges (for example,
the Execute method in the snippet from Fig. 5.2 is the entry node if there is
no incoming edge from any other call in the app). Then, it enumerates the
paths reachable from each entry node. The sets of all paths identified during
this phase constitutes the sequences of API calls which will be used to build a
Markov chain behavioral model and to extract features (see Section 5.1.4).
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package com.fa.c;
import android.content.Context;
import android.os.Environment;
import android.util.Log;
import com.stericson.RootShell.execution.Command;
import com.stericson.RootShell.execution.Shell;
import com.stericson.RootTools.RootTools;
import java.io.File;
public class RootCommandExecutor {
public static boolean Execute(Context paramContext) {
paramContext = new Command(0, new String[] { "cat " + Environment.
getExternalStorageDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + File.separator + Utilities.
GetWatchDogName(paramContext) + " > /data/" + Utilities.GetWatchDogName(paramContext)
, "cat " + Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + File.
separator + Utilities.GetExecName(paramContext) + " > /data/" + Utilities.GetExecName
(paramContext), "rm " + Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory().getAbsolutePath() +
File.separator + Utilities.GetWatchDogName(paramContext), "rm " + Environment.
getExternalStorageDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + File.separator + Utilities.
GetExecName(paramContext), "chmod 777 /data/" + Utilities.GetWatchDogName(
paramContext), "chmod 777 /data/" + Utilities.GetExecName(paramContext), "/data/" +
Utilities.GetWatchDogName(paramContext) + " " + Utilities.
GetDeviceInfoCommandLineArgs(paramContext) + " /data/" + Utilities.GetExecName(
paramContext) + " " + Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory().getAbsolutePath() +
File.separator + Utilities.GetExchangeFileName(paramContext) + " " + Environment.
getExternalStorageDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + File.separator + " " + Utilities.
GetPhoneNumber(paramContext) });
try {
RootTools.getShell(true).add(paramContext);
return true;
}
catch (Exception paramContext) {
Log.d("CPS", paramContext.getMessage());
}
return false;
}
}
Figure 5.2: Code snippet from a malicious app (com.g.o.speed.memboost) execut-
ing commands as root.
Abstracting Calls to Families/Packages. Rather than analyzing raw API
calls, we build MaMaDroid to work at a higher level, and operate in one of
two modes by abstracting each call to either its package or family. This allows
the system to be resilient to API changes and achieve scalability. In fact,
our experiments, presented in Section 5.2, show that, from a dataset of 44K
apps, we extract more than 10 million unique API calls, which would result
in a very large number of nodes, with the corresponding graphs (and feature
vectors) being quite sparse. Since as we will see the number of features used
by MaMaDroid is the square of the number of nodes, having more than 10
million nodes would result in an impractical computational cost.
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com.fa.c.RootCommandExecutor:
Execute()
android.util.Log:
d()
com.stericson.RootTools.RootTools:
getShell()
java.lang.Throwable:
getMessage()
com.stericson.RootShell.execution.Shell:
add()
Figure 5.3: Call graph of the API calls in the try/catch block of Figure 5.2. (Re-
turn types and parameters are omitted to ease presentation).
When operating in package mode, we abstract an API call to its pack-
age name using the list of Android packages2, which as of API level 24 (the
current version as of September 2016) includes 243 packages, as well as 95
from the Google API.3 Moreover, we abstract developer-defined packages (e.g.,
com.stericson.roottools) as well as obfuscated ones (e.g. com.fa.a.b.d), respec-
tively, as self-defined and obfuscated. Note that we label an API call’s
package as obfuscated if we cannot tell what its class implements, extends,
or inherits, due to identifier mangling [179]. When operating in family mode,
we abstract to nine possible families, i.e., android, google, java, javax, xml,
apache, junit, json, dom, which correspond to the android.*, com.google.*,
java.*, javax.*, org.xml.*, org.apache.*, junit.*, org.json, and org.w3c.dom.*
packages. Again, API calls from developer-defined and obfuscated packages
are abstracted to families labeled as self-defined and obfuscated, respec-
tively. Overall, there are 340 (243+95+2) possible packages and 11 (9+2)
families.
5.1.3.1 Abstraction to Classes
Families and Packages abstractions give two different levels of granularity and,
even though the packages abstraction is differentiating among API calls with
2https://developer.android.com/reference/packages.html
3https://developers.google.com/android/reference/packages
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com.fa.c.RootComman-
dExecutor: Execute()
[self-defined, self-
defined, self-defined]
com.fa.c.RootCom-
mandExecutor:
Execute()
[self-defined, self-
defined, self-defined]
com.fa.c.RootCom-
mandExecutor:
Execute()
[self-defined, self-
defined, self-defined]
com.stericson.Root-
Tools.RootTools: getShell()
[self-defined, self-
defined, self-defined]
com.stericson.RootShell.
execution.Shell: add()
[self-defined, self-
defined, self-defined]
android.util.Log:
d()
[android.util.Log,
android.util, android]
java.lang.Throwable:
getMessage()
[java.lang.Throwable,
java.lang, java]
Figure 5.4: Sequence of API calls extracted from the call graphs in Figure 5.3, with
the corresponding package/family abstraction in square brackets.
more than an order of magnitude, the information loss about each API is still
high. For this reason we designed the class abstraction, aiming to limit the
information loss and increase the granularity.
In class mode, we abstract each call to its class name using a whitelist of
all class names in the Android and Google APIs, which consists respectively,
4,855 and 1,116 classes.4
In Figure 5.4, we show the sequence of API calls obtained from the call
graph in Figure 5.3. We also report, in square brackets, the family, the package,
and the class to which the call is abstracted.
5.1.4 Markov Chain Based Modeling
Next, MaMaDroid builds feature vectors, used for classification, based on
the Markov chains representing the sequences of extracted API calls for an
app. Before discussing this in detail, we review the basic concepts of Markov
chains.
Markov chains are memoryless models where the probability of transition-
ing from a state to another only depends on the current state [165]. Markov
chains are often represented as a set of nodes, each corresponding to a different
state, and a set of edges connecting one node to another labeled with the prob-
4https://developer.android.com/reference/classes.html
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Figure 5.5: Markov chains originating from the call sequence example in Sec-
tion 5.1.3 when using packages (a) or families (b).
ability of that transition. The sum of all probabilities associated to all edges
from any node (including, if present, an edge going back to the node itself) is
exactly 1.The set of possible states of the Markov chain is denoted as S . If S j
and Sk are two connected states, Pjk denotes the probability of transition from
S j to Sk. Pjk is given by the number of occurrences (O jk) of state Sk after state
S j, divided by O ji for all states i in the chain, i.e., Pjk =
O jk
∑i∈S O ji
.
Building the model. MaMaDroid uses Markov chains to model app be-
havior, by evaluating every transition between calls. More specifically, for each
app,MaMaDroid takes as input the sequence of abstracted API calls of that
app – i.e., packages or families, depending on the selected mode of operation
– and builds a Markov chain where each package/family is a state and the
transitions represent the probability of moving from one state to another. For
each Markov chain, state S0 is the entry point from which other calls are made
in a sequence. As an example, Figure 5.5 illustrates the two Markov chains
built using packages and families, respectively, from the sequences reported in
Figure 5.4.
We argue that considering single transitions is more robust against at-
tempts to evade detection by inserting useless API calls in order to deceive
signature-based systems (see Section 2). In fact, MaMaDroid considers all
possible calls – i.e., all the branches originating from a node – in the Markov
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chain, so adding calls would not significantly change the probabilities of tran-
sitions between nodes (specifically, families or packages, depending on the
operational mode) for each app.
Feature Extraction. Next, we use the probabilities of transitioning from one
state (abstracted call) to another in the Markov chain as the feature vector
of each app. States that are not present in a chain are represented as 0 in
the feature vector. Also note that the vector derived from the Markov chain
depends on the operational mode of MaMaDroid. With families, there are
11 possible states, thus 121 possible transitions in each chain, while, when ab-
stracting to packages, there are 340 states and 115,600 possible transitions and
with classes, there are 5,973 states therefore, 35,676,729 possible transitions.
We also apply Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [180], which performs
feature selection by transforming the feature space into a new space made of
components that are a linear combination of the original features. The first
components contain as much variance (i.e., amount of information) as possible.
The variance is given as percentage of the total amount of information of the
original feature space. We apply PCA to the feature set in order to select
the principal components, as PCA transforms the feature space into a smaller
one where the variance is represented with as few components as possible,
thus considerably reducing computation/memory complexity. Furthermore,
the use of PCA could also improve the accuracy of the classification, by taking
misleading features out of the feature space, i.e., those that make the classifier
perform worse.
5.1.5 Classification
The last step is to perform classification, i.e., labeling apps as either benign
or malware. To this end, we test MaMaDroid using different classification
algorithms: Random Forests [39], 1-Nearest Neighbor (1-NN) [1], 3-Nearest
Neighbor (3-NN) [1], and Support Vector Machines (SVM) [181]. Each model
is trained using the feature vector obtained from the apps in a training sample.
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Category Name Date Range #Samples #Samples #Samples
(API Calls) (Call Graph)
Benign
oldbenign Apr 2013 – Nov 2013 5,879 5,837 5,572
newbenign Mar 2016 – Mar 2016 2,568 2,565 2,465
Total Benign: 8,447 8,402 8,037
Malware
drebin Oct 2010 – Aug 2012 5,560 5,546 5,512
2013 Jan 2013 – Jun 2013 6,228 6,146 6,091
2014 Jun 2013 – Mar 2014 15,417 14,866 13,804
2015 Jan 2015 – Jun 2015 5,314 5,161 4,451
2016 Jan 2016 – May 2016 2,974 2,802 2,555
Total Malware: 35,493 34,521 32,413
Table 5.1: Overview of the datasets used in our experiments.
Results are presented and discussed in Section 5.3, and have been validated
by using 10-fold cross validation.
Also note that, due to the different number of features used in family/-
package modes, we use two distinct configurations for the Random Forests
algorithm. Specifically, when abstracting to families, we use 51 trees with
maximum depth 8, while, with packages, we use 101 trees of maximum depth
64. To tune Random Forests we followed the methodology applied in Bernard
et al. [182].
5.2 Datasets
5.2.1 Employed Dataset
In this section, we introduce the datasets used in the evaluation of Ma-
MaDroid, which include 43,940 apk files – 8,447 benign and 35,493 malware
samples. We include a mix of older and newer apps, ranging from October
2010 to May 2016, as we aim to verify thatMaMaDroid is robust to changes
in Android malware samples as well as APIs. To the best of our knowledge, we
are leveraging the largest dataset of malware samples ever used in a research
paper on Android malware detection.
Benign Samples. Our benign datasets consist of two sets of samples: (1) one,
which we denote as oldbenign, includes 5,879 apps collected by PlayDrone [183]
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between April and November 2013, and published on the Internet Archive5 on
August 7, 2014; and (2) another, newbenign, obtained by downloading the
top 100 apps in each of the 29 categories on the Google Play store6 as of
March 7, 2016, using the googleplay-api tool.7 Due to errors encountered
while downloading some apps, we have actually obtained 2,843 out of 2,900
apps. Note that 275 of these belong to more than one category, therefore, the
newbenign dataset ultimately includes 2,568 unique apps.
Android Malware Samples. The set of malware samples includes apps that
were used to test Drebin [127], dating back to October 2010 – August 2012
(5,560), which we denote as drebin, as well as more recent ones that have been
uploaded on the VirusShare8 site over the years. Specifically, we gather from
VirusShare, respectively, 6,228, 15,417, 5,314, and 2,974 samples from 2013,
2014, 2015, and 2016. We consider each of these datasets separately for our
analysis.
API Calls and Call Graphs. For each app in our datasets, we extract the
list of API calls, using Androguard [184], since, as explained in Section 5.3.5,
these constitute the features used by DroidAPIMiner [4], against which we
compare our system. Due to Androguard failing to decompress some of the
apks, bad CRC-32 redundancy checks, and errors during unpacking, we are
not able to extract the API calls for all the samples, but only for 40,923 (8,402
benign, 34,521 malware) out of the 43,940 apps (8,447 benign, 35,493 malware)
in our datasets.
Also, to extract the call graph of each apk, we use Soot. Note that for
some of the larger apks, Soot requires a non-negligible amount of memory to
extract the call graph, so we allocate 16GB of RAM to the Java VM heap space.
2,472 (364 benign + 2,108 malware) samples, Soot is not able to complete the
extraction due to it failing to apply the jb phase as well as reporting an error
5https://archive.org/details/playdrone-apk-e8
6https://play.google.com/store
7https://github.com/egirault/googleplay-api
8https://virusshare.com/
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Figure 5.6: CDF of the number of API calls in different apps in each dataset.
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Figure 5.7: CDFs of the percentage of android and google family calls in different
apps in each dataset.
in opening some zip files (i.e., the apk). The jb phase is used by Soot to
transform Java bytecode into jimple intermediate representation (the primary
IR of Soot) for optimization purposes. Therefore, we exclude these apps in our
evaluation and discuss this limitation further in Section 5.4.3.
In Table 5.1, we provide a summary of our seven datasets, reporting the
total number of samples per dataset, as well as those for which we are able to
extract the API calls (second-to-last column) and the call graphs (last column).
Characterization of the Datasets. Aiming to shed light on the evolution
of API calls in Android apps, we also performed some measurements over our
datasets. In Figure 5.6, we plot the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
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Figure 5.8: Positions of benign vs malware samples in the feature space of the first
two components of the PCA (family mode).
of the number of unique API calls in the apps in different datasets, highlighting
that newer apps, both benign and malicious, are using more API calls overall
than older apps. This indicates that as time goes by, Android apps become
more complex. When looking at the fraction of API calls belonging to specific
families, we discover some interesting aspects of Android apps developed in
different years. In particular, we notice that API calls to the android fam-
ily become less prominent as time passes (Figure 5.7a), both in benign and
malicious datasets, while google calls become more common in newer apps
(Figure 5.7b).
In general, we conclude that benign and malicious apps show the same
evolutionary trends over the years. Malware, however, appears to reach the
same characteristics (in terms of level of complexity and fraction of API calls
from certain families) as legitimate apps with a few years of delay.
Principal Component Analysis. Finally, we apply PCA to select the two
most important PCA components. We plot and compare the positions of the
two components for benign (Figure 5.8a) and malicious samples (Figure 5.8b).
As PCA combines the features into components, it maximizes the variance of
the distribution of samples in these components, thus, plotting the positions
of the samples in the components shows that benign apps tend to be located
in different areas of the components space, depending on the dataset, while
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malware samples occupy similar areas but with different densities. These dif-
ferences highlight a different behavior between benign and malicious samples,
and these differences should also be found by the machine learning algorithms
used for classification.
5.3 MaMaDroid Evaluation
We now present a detailed experimental evaluation of MaMaDroid. Using
the datasets summarized in Table 5.1, we perform four sets of experiments:
(1) we analyze the accuracy of MaMaDroid’s classification on benign and
malicious samples developed around the same time; (2) we evaluate its robust-
ness to the evolution of malware as well as of the Android framework by using
older datasets for training and newer ones for testing (and vice-versa); (3) we
measure MaMaDroid’s runtime performance to assess its scalability; and,
finally, (4) we compare against DroidAPIMiner [4], a malware detection
system that relies on the frequency of API calls.
5.3.1 Preliminaries
When implementing MaMaDroid in family mode, we exclude the json and
dom families because they are almost never used across all our datasets, and
junit, which is primarily used for testing. In package mode, to avoid mis-
labeling when self-defined APIs have “android” in the name, we split the
android package into its two classes, i.e., android.R and android.Manifest.
Therefore, in family mode, there are 8 possible states, thus 64 features,
whereas, in package mode, we have 341 states and 116,281 features (cf. Sec-
tion 5.1.4).
As discussed in Section 5.1.5, we use four different machine learning al-
gorithms for classification – namely, Random Forests, 1-NN, 3-NN, and SVM.
Since both accuracy and speed are worse with SVM than with the other three
algorithms, we omit results obtained with SVM. To assess the accuracy of the
classification, we use the F-measure metric.
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Figure 5.9: F-measure ofMaMaDroid classification with datasets from the same
year (family mode).
PPPPPPPPMode
Dataset [Precision, Recall, F-measure]
drebin & oldbenign 2013 & oldbenign 2014 & oldbenign 2014 & newbenign 2015 & newbenign 2016 & newbenign
Family 0.82 0.95 0.88 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.88 0.96 0.92 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.89 0.93 0.91 0.87 0.91 0.89
Package 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.93 0.97 0.95 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.98 0.95 0.92 0.92 0.92
Family (PCA) 0.84 0.92 0.88 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.87 0.94 0.90 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.87 0.93 0.90 0.86 0.88 0.87
Package (PCA) 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.92 0.96 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.91 0.97 0.94 0.88 0.89 0.89
Table 5.2: F-measure, precision, and recall obtained byMaMaDroid, using Ran-
dom Forests, on various dataset combinations with different modes of
operation, with and without PCA.
Finally, note that all our experiments perform 10-fold cross validation
using at least one malicious and one benign dataset from Table 5.1. In other
words, after merging the datasets, the resulting set is shuffled and divided into
ten equal-size random subsets. Classification is then performed ten times using
nine subsets for training and one for testing, and results are averaged out over
the ten experiments.
5.3.2 Detection Performance
We start our evaluation by measuring how wellMaMaDroid detects malware
by training and testing using samples that are developed around the same time.
To this end, we perform 10-fold cross validations on the combined dataset
composed of a benign set and a malicious one. Table 5.2 provides an overview
of the detection results achieved by MaMaDroid on each combined dataset,
in the two modes of operation, both with PCA features and without. The
reported F-measure, precision, and recall scores are the ones obtained with
Random Forest, which generally performs better than 1-NN and 3-NN.
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Family mode. In Figure 5.9, we report the F-measure when operating in
family mode for Random Forests, 1-NN and 3-NN. The F-measure is always
at least 88% with Random Forests, and, when tested on the 2014 (malicious)
dataset, it reaches 98%. With some datasets, MaMaDroid performs slightly
better than with others. For instance, with the 2014 malware dataset, we
obtain an F-measure of 92% when using the oldbenign dataset and 98% with
newbenign. In general, lower F-measures are due to increased false positives
since recall is always above 91%, while precision might be lower, also due to
the fact that malware datasets are larger than the benign sets. We believe
that this follows the evolutionary trend discussed in Section 5.2.1: while both
benign and malicious apps become more complex as time passes, when a new
benign app is developed, it is still possible to use old classes or re-use code from
previous versions and this might cause them to be more similar to old malware
samples. This would result in false positives by MaMaDroid. In general,
MaMaDroid performs better when the different characteristics of malicious
and benign training and test sets are more predominant, which corresponds to
datasets occupying different positions of the feature space.
Package mode. When MaMaDroid runs in package mode, the classifi-
cation performance improves, ranging from 92% F-measure with 2016 and
newbenign to 99% with 2014 and newbenign, using Random Forests. Fig-
ure 5.10 reports the F-measure of the 10-fold cross validation experiments
using Random Forests, 1-NN, and 3-NN (in package mode). The former gen-
erally provide better results also in this case.
With some datasets, the difference in performance between the two modes
of operation is more noticeable: with drebin and oldbenign, and using Ran-
dom Forests, we get 96% F-measure in package mode compared to 88% in
family mode. These differences are caused by a lower number of false positives
in package mode. Recall remains high, resulting in a more balanced system
overall. In general, abstracting to packages rather than families provides bet-
ter results as the increased granularity enables identifying more differences
5.3. MaMaDroid Evaluation 153
Drebin &
OldBenign
2013 &
OldBenign
2014 &
OldBenign
2014 &
Newbenign
2015 &
Newbenign
2016 &
Newbenign
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
F-
m
ea
su
re
RF
1-NN
3-NN
Figure 5.10: F-measure of MaMaDroid classification with datasets from the
same year (package mode).
between benign and malicious apps. On the other hand, however, this likely
reduces the efficiency of the system, as many of the states deriving from the
abstraction are used a only few times. The differences in time performance
between the two modes are analyzed in details in Section 5.3.6.
Using PCA. As discussed in Section 5.1.4, PCA transforms large feature
spaces into smaller ones, thus it can be useful to significantly reduce compu-
tation and, above all, memory complexities of the classification task. When
operating in package mode, PCA is particularly beneficial, sinceMaMaDroid
originally has to operate over 116,281 features. Therefore, we compare results
obtained using PCA by fixing the number of components to 10 and checking
the quantity of variance included in them. In package mode, we observe that
only 67% of the variance is taken into account by the 10 most important PCA
components, whereas, in family mode, at least 91% of the variance is included
by the 10 PCA Components.
As shown in Table 5.2, the F-measure obtained using Random Forests and
the PCA components sets derived from the family and package features is only
slightly lower (up to 3%) than using the full feature set. We note that lower
F-measures are caused by a uniform decrease in both precision and recall.
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5.3.3 Detection Over Time
As Android evolves over the years, so do the characteristics of both benign and
malicious apps. Such evolution must be taken into account when evaluating
Android malware detection systems, since their accuracy might significantly
be affected as newer APIs are released and/or as malicious developers modify
their strategies in order to avoid detection. Evaluating this aspect constitutes
one of our research questions, and one of the reasons why our datasets span
across multiple years (2010–2016).
As discussed in Section 5.1.2, MaMaDroid relies on the sequence of
API calls extracted from the call graphs and abstracted at either the package
or the family level. Therefore, it is less susceptible to changes in the An-
droid API than other classification systems such as DroidAPIMiner [4] and
Drebin [127]. Since these rely on the use, or the frequency, of certain API
calls to classify malware vs benign samples, they need to be retrained following
new API releases. On the contrary, retraining is not needed as often withMa-
MaDroid, since families and packages represent more abstract functionalities
that change less over time. Consider, for instance, the android.os.health
package: released with API level 24, it contains a set of classes helping devel-
opers track and monitor system resources.9 Classification systems built before
this release – as in the case of DroidAPIMiner [4] (released in 2013, when
Android API was up to level 20) – need to be retrained if this package is more
frequently used by malicious apps than benign apps, whileMaMaDroid only
needs to add a new state to its Markov chain when operating in package mode,
while no additional state is required when operating in family mode.
To verify this hypothesis, we test MaMaDroid using older samples as
training sets and newer ones as test sets. Figure 5.11a reports the F-measure
of the classification in this setting, with MaMaDroid operating in family
mode. The x-axis reports the difference in years between training and test
9https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/health/
package-summary.html
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Figure 5.11: F-measure values in the different test settings.
data. We obtain 86% F-measure when we classify apps one year older than
the samples on which we train. Classification is still relatively accurate, at 75%,
even after two years. Then, from Figure 5.11b, we observe that the F-measure
does not significantly change when operating in package mode. Both modes
of operations are affected by one particular condition, already discussed in
Section 5.2.1: in our models, benign datasets seem to “anticipate” malicious
ones by 1–2 years in the way they use certain API calls. As a result, we
notice a drop in accuracy when classifying future samples and using drebin
(with samples from 2010 to 2012) or 2013 as the malicious training set and
oldbenign (late 2013/early 2014) as the benign training set. More specifically,
we observe that MaMaDroid correctly detects benign apps, while it starts
missing true positives and increasing false negatives — i.e., achieving lower
recall.
We also set to verify whether older malware samples can still be detected
by the system—if not, this would obviously become vulnerable to older (and
possibly popular) attacks. Therefore, we also perform the “opposite” experi-
ment, i.e., training MaMaDroid with newer datasets, and checking whether
it is able to detect malware developed years before. Specifically, Figure 5.12a
and 5.12b report results when training MaMaDroid with samples from a
156 Chapter 5. Malware detection
0 1 2 3 4
Years
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
F-
m
e
a
su
re
RF
1-NN
3-NN
(a) F-measure of MaMaDroid
classification using newer samples
for training and older for testing
(family mode).
0 1 2 3 4
Years
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
F-
m
e
a
su
re
RF
1-NN
3-NN
(b) F-measure of MaMaDroid
classification using newer samples
for training and older for testing
(package mode).
Figure 5.12: F-measure values in the different test settings.
given year, and testing it with others that are up to 4 years older: Ma-
MaDroid retains similar F-measure scores over the years. Specifically, in
family mode, it varies from 93% to 96%, whereas, in package mode, from 95%
to 97% with the oldest samples.
5.3.4 Case Studies of False Positives and Negatives
The experiment analysis presented above show that MaMaDroid Android
malware with high accuracy. As in any detection system, however, the system
makes a small number of incorrect classifications, incurring some false positives
and false negatives. Next, we discuss a few case studies aiming to better
understand these misclassifications. We focus on the experiments with newer
datasets, i.e., 2016 and newbenign.
False Positives. We analyze the manifest of the 164 apps mistakenly detected
as malware by MaMaDroid, finding that most of them use “dangerous”
permissions [185]. In particular, 67% of the apps write to external storage, 32%
read the phone state, and 21% access the device’s fine location. We further
analyzed apps (5%) that use the READ_SMS and SEND_SMS permissions,
i.e., even though they are not SMS-related apps, they can read and send SMSs
as part of the services they provide to users. In particular, a “in case of
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Testing Sets
drebin & oldbenign 2013 & oldbenign 2014 & oldbenign 2015 & oldbenign 2016 & oldbenign
Training Sets [4] Our Work [4] Our Work [4] Our Work [4] Our Work [4] Our Work
drebin & oldbenign 0.32 0.96 0.35 0.95 0.34 0.72 0.30 0.39 0.33 0.42
2013 & oldbenign 0.33 0.94 0.36 0.97 0.35 0.73 0.31 0.37 0.33 0.28
2014 & oldbenign 0.36 0.92 0.39 0.93 0.62 0.95 0.33 0.78 0.37 0.75
drebin & newbenign 2013 & newbenign 2014 & newbenign 2015 & newbenign 2016 & newbenign
Training Sets [4] Our Work [4] Our Work [4] Our Work [4] Our Work [4] Our Work
2014 & newbenign 0.76 0.98 0.75 0.98 0.92 0.99 0.67 0.85 0.65 0.81
2015 & newbenign 0.68 0.97 0.68 0.97 0.69 0.99 0.77 0.95 0.65 0.88
2016 & newbenign 0.33 0.96 0.35 0.98 0.36 0.98 0.34 0.92 0.36 0.92
Table 5.3: Classification performance of DroidAPIMiner [4] vs MaMaDroid
(our work).
emergency” app is able to send messages to several contacts from its database
(possibly added by the user), which is a typical behavior of Android malware
in our dataset, ultimately leading MaMaDroid to flag it as malicious.
False Negatives. We also check the 114 malware samples missed by Ma-
MaDroid when operating in family mode, using VirusTotal.10 We find that
18% of the false negatives are actually not classified as malware by any of
the antivirus engines used by VirusTotal, suggesting that these are actually
legitimate apps mistakenly included in the VirusShare dataset. 45% of Ma-
MaDroid’s false negatives are adware, typically, repackaged apps in which
the advertisement library has been substituted with a third-party one, which
creates a monetary profit for the developers. Since they are not performing
any clearly malicious activity, MaMaDroid is unable to identify them as
malware. Finally, we find that 16% of the false negatives reported by Ma-
MaDroid are samples sending text messages or starting calls to premium
services. We also do a similar analysis of false negatives when abstracting to
packages (74 samples), with similar results: there a few more adware samples
(53%), but similar percentages for potentially benign apps (15%) and samples
sending SMSs or placing calls (11%).
In conclusion, we find that MaMaDroid’s sporadic misclassifications
are typically due to benign apps behaving similarly to malware, malware that
do not perform clearly-malicious activities, or mistakes in the ground truth
labeling.
10https://www.virustotal.com
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5.3.5 MaMaDroid vs DroidAPIMiner
We also compare the performance of MaMaDroid to previous work using
API features for Android malware classification. Specifically, we compare to
DroidAPIMiner [4], because: (i) it uses API calls and its parameters to
perform classification; (ii) it reports high true positive rate (up to 97.8%) on
almost 4K malware samples obtained from McAfee and Genome [186], and
16K benign samples; and (iii) its source code has been made available to us
by the authors.
In DroidAPIMiner, permissions that are requested more frequently by
malware samples than by benign apps are used to perform a baseline classifi-
cation. Since there are legitimate situations where a non-malicious app needs
permissions tagged as dangerous, DroidAPIMiner also applies frequency
analysis on the list of API calls, specifically, using the 169 most frequent API
calls in the malware samples (occurring at least 6% more in malware than
benign samples) —leading to a reported 83% precision. Finally, data flow
analysis is applied on the API calls that are frequent in both benign and ma-
licious samples, but do not occur by at least, 6% more in the malware set.
Using the top 60 parameters, the 169 most frequent calls change, and authors
report a precision of 97.8%.
After obtaining DroidAPIMiner’s source code, as well as a list of
packages used for feature refinement, we re-implement the system by mod-
ifying the code in order to reflect recent changes in Androguard (used by
DroidAPIMiner for API call extraction), extract the API calls for all apps
in the datasets listed in Table 5.1, and perform a frequency analysis on the
calls. Androguard fails to extract calls for about 2% (1,017) of apps in our
datasets as a result of bad CRC-32 redundancy checks and error in unpack-
ing, thus DroidAPIMiner is evaluated over the samples in the second-to-last
column of Table 5.1. We also implement classification, which is missing from
the code provided by the authors, using k-NN (with k=3) since it achieves the
best results according to the paper. We use 2/3 of the dataset for training and
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1/3 for testing as implemented by Aafer et al. [4]. A summary of the result-
ing F-measures obtained using different training and test sets is presented in
Table 5.3.
We set up a number of experiments to thoroughly compareDroidAPIMiner
to MaMaDroid. First, we set up three experiments in which we train
DroidAPIMiner using a dataset composed of oldbenign combined with
one of the three oldest malware datasets each (drebin, 2013, and 2014), and
testing on all malware datasets. With this configuration, the best result (with
2014 and oldbenign as training sets) amounts to 62% F-measure when tested
on the same dataset. The F-measure drops to 33% and 39%, respectively,
when tested on samples one year into the future and past. If we use the
same configurations in MaMaDroid, in package mode, we obtain up to 97%
F-measure (using 2013 and oldbenign as training sets), dropping to 73% and
94%, respectively, one year into the future and into the past. For the datasets
where DroidAPIMiner achieves its best result (i.e., 2014 and oldbenign),
MaMaDroid achieves an F-measure of 95%, which drops to respectively,
78% and 93% one year into the future and the past. The F-measure is stable
even two years into the future and the past at 75% and 92%, respectively.
As a second set of experiments, we train DroidAPIMiner using a
dataset composed of newbenign combined with one of the three most re-
cent malware datasets each (2014, 2015, and 2016). Again, we test
DroidAPIMiner on all malware datasets. The best result is obtained with
the dataset (2014 and newbenign) used for both testing and training, yielding
a F-measure of 92%, which drops to 67% and 75% one year into the future
and past respectively. Likewise, we use the same datasets for MaMaDroid,
with the best results achieved on the same dataset as DroidAPIMiner. In
package mode, MaMaDroid achieves an F-measure of 99%, which is main-
tained more than two years into the past, but drops to respectively, 85% and
81% one and two years into the future.
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As summarized in Table 5.3, MaMaDroid achieves significantly higher
performance than DroidAPIMiner in all but one experiment, with the F-
measure being at least 75% even after two years into the future or the past
when datasets from 2014 or later are used for training. Note that there is
only one setting in which DroidAPIMiner performs slightly better than
MaMaDroid: this occurs when the malicious training set is much older than
the malicious test set. Specifically, MaMaDroid presents low recall in this
case: as discussed, MaMaDroid’s classification performs much better when
the training set is not more than two years older than the test set.
5.3.6 Runtime Performance
We envision MaMaDroid to be integrated in offline detection systems, e.g.,
run by Google Play. Recall that MaMaDroid consists of different phases,
so in the following, we review the computational overhead incurred by each of
them, aiming to assess the feasibility of real-world deployment. We run our
experiments on a desktop equipped with an 40-core 2.30GHz CPU and 128GB
of RAM, but only use one core and allocate 16GB of RAM for evaluation.
MaMaDroid’s first step involves extracting the call graph from an apk
and the complexity of this task varies significantly across apps. On average, it
takes 9.2s±14 (min 0.02s, max 13m) to complete for samples in our malware
sets. Benign apps usually yield larger call graphs, and the average time to
extract them is 25.4s±63 (min 0.06s, max 18m) per app. Note that we do not
include in our evaluation apps for which we could not successfully extract the
call graph.
Next, we measure the time needed to extract call sequences while abstract-
ing to families or packages, depending on MaMaDroid’s mode of operation.
In family mode, this phase completes in about 1.3s on average (and at most
11.0s) with both benign and malicious samples. Abstracting to packages takes
slightly longer, due to the use of 341 packages in MaMaDroid. On average,
this extraction takes 1.67s±3.1 for malicious apps and 1.73s±3.2 for benign
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samples. As it can be seen, the call sequence extraction in package mode does
not take significantly more than in family mode.
MaMaDroid’s third step includes Markov chain modeling and feature
vector extraction. This phase is fast regardless of the mode of operation
and datasets used. Specifically, with malicious samples, it takes on average
0.2s±0.3 and 2.5s±3.2 (and at most 2.4s and 22.1s), respectively, with families
and packages, whereas, with benign samples, averages rise to 0.6s±0.3 and
6.7s±3.8 (at most 1.7s and 18.4s).
Finally, the last step involves classification, and performance depends on
both the machine learning algorithm employed and the mode of operation.
More specifically, running times are affected by the number of features for
the app to be classified, and not by the initial dimension of the call graph,
or by whether the app is benign or malicious. Regardless, in family mode,
Random Forests, 1-NN, and 3-NN all take less than 0.01s. With packages, it
takes, respectively, 0.65s, 1.05s, and 0.007s per app with 1-NN, 3-NN, Random
Forests.
Overall, when operating in family mode, malware and benign samples
take on average, 10.7s and 27.3s respectively to complete the entire process,
from call graph extraction to classification. Whereas, in package mode, the
average completion times for malware and benign samples are 13.37s and 33.83s
respectively. In both modes of operation, time is mostly (> 80%) spent on call
graph extraction.
We also evaluate the runtime performance of DroidAPIMiner [4]. Its
first step, i.e., extracting API calls, takes 0.7s±1.5 (min 0.01s, max 28.4s) per
app in our malware datasets. Whereas, it takes on average 13.2s±22.2 (min
0.01s, max 222s) per benign app. In the second phase, i.e., frequency and data
flow analysis, it takes, on average, 4.2s per app. Finally, classification using
3-NN is very fast: 0.002s on average. Therefore, in total, DroidAPIMiner
takes respectively, 17.4s and 4.9s for a complete execution on one app from our
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benign and malware datasets, which while faster thanMaMaDroid, achieves
significantly lower accuracy.
In conclusion, our experiments show that our prototype implementation of
MaMaDroid is scalable enough to be deployed. Assuming that, everyday, a
number of apps in the order of 10,000 are submitted to Google Play, and using
the average execution time of benign samples in family (27.3s) and package
(33.83s) modes, we estimate that it would take less than an hour and a half
to complete execution of all apps submitted daily in both modes, with just 64
cores. Note that we could not find accurate statistics reporting the number
of apps submitted everyday, but only the total number of apps on Google
Play [187]. On average, this number increases of a couple of thousands per
day, and although we do not know how many apps are removed, we believe
10,000 apps submitted every day is likely an upper bound.
5.3.7 Finer-Grained Abstraction
In Section 5.3, we have showed that building models from abstracted API calls
allows MaMaDroid to obtain high accuracy, as well as to retain it over the
years, which is crucial due to the continuous evolution of the Android ecosys-
tem. Our experiments have focused on operatingMaMaDroid in family and
package mode (i.e., abstracting calls to family or package).
In this section, we investigate whether a finer-grained abstraction –
namely, to classes – performs better in terms of detection accuracy. Recall
that our system performs better in package mode than in family mode due to
the system using in the former, finer and more features to distinguish between
malware and benign samples, so we set to verify whether one can trade-off
higher computational and memory complexities for better accuracy. To this
end, as discussed in Section 5.1.3, we abstract each API call to its correspond-
ing class name using a whitelist of all classes in the Android API, which consists
of 4,855 classes (as of API level 24), and in the Google API, with 1,116 classes,
plus self-defined and obfuscated.
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XXXXXXXXXXDataset
Mode [Precision, Recall, F-measure]
Class Package
drebin, oldbenign 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.96
2013, oldbenign 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.97
2014, oldbenign 0.93 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.97 0.95
2014, newbenign 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.99
2015, newbenign 0.93 0.98 0.95 0.93 0.98 0.95
2016, newbenign 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Table 5.4: MaMaDroid’s Precision, Recall, and F-measure when trained and
tested on dataset from the same year in class and package modes.
5.3.8 Reducing the Size of the Problem
Since there are 5,973 classes, processing the Markov chain transitions that
results in this mode increases the memory requirements. Therefore, to reduce
the complexity, we cluster classes based on their similarity. To this end, we
build a co-occurrence matrix that counts the number of times a class is used
with other classes in the same sequence in all datasets. More specifically, we
build a co-occurrence matrix C, of size (5,973·5,973)/2, where Ci, j denotes the
number of times the i-th and the j-th class appear in the same sequence, for all
apps in all datasets. From the co-occurrence matrix, we compute the cosine
similarity (i.e., cos(x,y) = x·y||x||·||y||), and use k-means to cluster the classes based
on their similarity into 400 clusters and use each cluster as the label for all the
classes it contains. Since we do not cluster classes abstracted to self-defined
and obfuscated, we have a total of 402 labels.
5.3.9 Class Mode Results
In Table 5.4, we report the resulting F-measure in class mode using the above
clustering approach when the classifier is trained and tested on samples from
the same year. Once again, we also report the corresponding results from
package mode for comparison. Overall, we find that class abstraction does
not provide significantly higher accuracy. In fact, compared to package mode,
abstraction to classes only yields an average increase in F-measure of 0.0012.
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Figure 5.13: F-measure values in the different test settings.
5.3.10 Detection Over Time
We also report in Figures 5.13a and 5.13b (The x-axis shows the difference in
years between the training and test data.), the accuracy when MaMaDroid
is trained and tested on dataset from different years. We find that, when
MaMaDroid operates in class mode, it achieves an F-measure of 0.95 and
0.99, respectively, when trained with datasets one and two years newer than
the test sets, as reported in Figure 5.13a). Likewise, when trained on datasets
one and two years older than the test set, F-measure reaches 0.84 and 0.59,
respectively (see Figure 5.13b).
Overall, comparing results from Figure 5.11b to Figure 5.13b, we find
that finer-grained abstraction actually performs worse with time when older
samples are used for training and newer for testing. We note that this is due
to a possible number of reasons: 1) newer classes or packages in recent API
releases cannot be captured in the behavioral model of older tools whereas,
families are; and 2) evolution of malware either as a result of changes in the
API or patching of vulnerabilities or presence of newer vulnerabilities that
allows for stealthier malicious activities.
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On the contrary, Figure 5.12b and 5.13a show that finer-grained abstrac-
tion performs better when the training samples are more recent than the test
samples. This is because from recent samples, we are able to capture the
full behavioral model of older samples. However, our results indicate there
is a threshold for the level of abstraction which when exceeded, finer-grained
abstraction will not yield any significant improvement in detection accuracy.
This is because API calls in older releases are subsets of subsequent releases.
For instance, when the training samples are two years newer, MaMaDroid
achieves an F-measure of 0.99, 0.97, and 0.95 respectively, in class, package,
and family modes. Whereas, when they are three years newer, the F-measure
is respectively, 0.97, 0.97, and 0.96 in class, package, and family modes.
5.4 Discussion
We now discuss the implications of our results with respect to the feasibility
of modeling app behavior using static analysis and Markov chains, discuss
possible evasion techniques, and highlight some limitations of our approach.
5.4.1 Lessons Learned
Our work yields important insights around the use of API calls in malicious
apps, showing that, by modeling the sequence of API calls made by an app
as a Markov chain, we can successfully capture the behavioral model of that
app. This allows MaMaDroid to obtain high accuracy overall, as well as to
retain it over the years, which is crucial due to the continuous evolution of the
Android ecosystem.
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, the use of API calls changes over time,
and in different ways across malicious and benign samples. From our newer
datasets, which include samples up to Spring 2016 (API level 23), we observe
that newer APIs introduce more packages, classes, and methods, while also
deprecating some. Figure 5.6, 5.7a, and 5.7b show that benign apps are using
more calls than malicious ones developed around the same time. We also
notice an interesting trend in the use of Android and Google APIs: malicious
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apps follow the same trend as benign apps in the way they adopt certain
APIs, but with a delay of some years. This might be a side effect of Android
malware authors’ tendency to repackage benign apps, adding their malicious
functionalities onto them.
Given the frequent changes in the Android framework and the continuous
evolution of malware, systems like DroidAPIMiner [4] – being dependent on
the presence or the use of certain API calls – become increasingly less effective
with time. As shown in Table 5.3, malware that uses API calls released after
those used by samples in the training set cannot be identified by these systems.
On the contrary, as shown in Figure 5.11a and 5.11b, MaMaDroid detects
malware samples that are 1 year newer than the training set obtaining an 86%
F-measure (as opposed to 46% with DroidAPIMiner). After 2 years, the
value is still at 75% (42% with DroidAPIMiner), dropping to 51% after 4
years.
We argue that the effectiveness of MaMaDroid’s classification remains
relatively high “over the years” owing to Markov models capturing app be-
havior. These models tend to be more robust to malware evolution because
abstracting to families or packages makes the system less susceptible to the
introduction of new API calls. Abstraction allows MaMaDroid to capture
newer classes/methods added to the API, since these are abstracted to already-
known families or packages. In case newer packages are added to the API,
and these packages start being used by malware, MaMaDroid only requires
adding a new state to the Markov chains, and probabilities of a transition from
a state to this new state in old apps would be 0. Adding only a few nodes does
not likely alter the probabilities of the other 341 nodes, thus, two apps created
with the same purpose will not strongly differ in API calls usage if they are
developed using almost consecutive API levels.
We also observe that abstracting to packages provides a slightly better
tradeoff than families. In family mode, the system is lighter and faster, and
actually performs better when there are more than two years between training
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and test set samples However, even though both modes of operation effectively
detect malware, abstracting to packages yields better results overall. Nonethe-
less, this does not imply that less abstraction is always better: in fact, a system
that is too granular, besides incurring untenable complexity, would likely cre-
ate Markov models with low-probability transitions, ultimately resulting in
less accurate classification. We also highlight that applying PCA is a good
strategy to preserve high accuracy and at the same time reducing complexity.
5.4.2 Evasion
Next, we discuss possible evasion techniques and how they can be addressed.
One straightforward evasion approach could be to repackage a benign app with
small snippets of malicious code added to a few classes. However, it is difficult
to embed malicious code in such a way that, at the same time, the resulting
Markov chain looks similar to a benign one. For instance, our running example
from Section 5.1 (malware posing as a memory booster app and executing
unwanted commands as root) is correctly classified byMaMaDroid; although
most functionalities in this malware are the same as the original app, injected
API calls generate some transitions in the Markov chain that are not typical
of benign samples.
The opposite procedure – i.e., embedding portions of benign code into
a malicious app – is also likely ineffective against MaMaDroid, since, for
each app, we derive the feature vector from the transition probability between
calls over the entire app. In other words, a malware developer would have to
embed benign code inside the malware in such a way that the overall sequence
of calls yields similar transition probabilities as those in a benign app, but
this is difficult to achieve because if the sequences of calls have to be different
(otherwise there would be no attack), then the models will also be different.
An attacker could also try to create an app from scratch with a similar
Markov chain to that of a benign app. Because this is derived from the se-
quence of abstracted API calls in the app, it is actually very difficult to create
sequences resulting in Markov chains similar to benign apps while, at the same
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time, actually engaging in malicious behavior. Nonetheless, in future work, we
plan to systematically analyze the feasibility of this strategy.
Moreover, attackers could try using reflection, dynamic code loading, or
native code [188]. BecauseMaMaDroid uses static analysis, it fails to detect
malicious code when it is loaded or determined at runtime. However, Ma-
MaDroid can detect reflection when a method from the reflection package
(java.lang.reflect) is executed. Therefore, we obtain the correct sequence
of calls up to the invocation of the reflection call, which may be sufficient to
distinguish between malware and benign apps. Similarly, MaMaDroid can
detect the usage of class loaders and package contexts that can be used to load
arbitrary code, but it is not able to model the code loaded; likewise, native
code that is part of the app cannot be modeled, as it is not Java and is not
processed by Soot. These limitations are not specific of MaMaDroid, but
are a problem of static analysis in general, which can be mitigated by using
MaMaDroid alongside dynamic analysis techniques.
Malware developers might also attempt to evade MaMaDroid by nam-
ing their self-defined packages in such a way that they look similar to that of
the android, java, or google APIs, e.g., creating packages like java.lang.re-
flect.malware and java.lang.malware, aiming to confuseMaMaDroid into ab-
stracting them to respectively, java.lang.reflect and java.lang. However,
this is easily prevented by whitelisting the list of packages from android, java,
or google APIs.
Another approach could be using dynamic dispatch so that a class X in
package A is created to extend class Y in package B with static analysis re-
porting a call to root() defined in Y as X.root(), whereas, at runtime Y.root()
is executed. This can be addressed, however, with a small increase in Ma-
MaDroid’s computational cost, by keeping track of self-defined classes that
extend or implement classes in the recognized APIs, and abstract polymorphic
functions of this self-defined class to the corresponding recognized package,
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while, at the same time, abstracting as self-defined overridden functions in the
class.
Finally, identifier mangling and other forms of obfuscation could be used
aiming to obfuscate code and hide malicious actions. However, since classes in
the Android framework cannot be obfuscated by obfuscation tools, malware
developers can only do so for self-defined classes. MaMaDroid labels ob-
fuscated calls as obfuscated so, ultimately, these would be captured in the
behavioral model (and the Markov chain) for the app. In our sample, we ob-
serve that benign apps use significantly less obfuscation than malicious apps,
indicating that obfuscating a significant number of classes is not a good eva-
sion strategy since this would likely make the sample more easily identifiable
as malicious.
5.4.3 Limitations
MaMaDroid requires a sizable amount of memory in order to perform clas-
sification, when operating in package mode, working on more than 100,000
features per sample. The quantity of features, however, can be further re-
duced using feature selection algorithms such as PCA. As explained in Section
5.3 when we use 10 components from the PCA the system performs almost as
well as the one using all the features; however, using PCA comes with a much
lower memory complexity in order to run the machine learning algorithms,
because the number of dimensions of the features space where the classifier
operates is remarkably reduced.
Soot [177], which we use to extract call graphs, fails to analyze some
apks. In fact, we were not able to extract call graphs for a fraction (4.6%) of
the apps in the original datasets due to scripts either failing to apply the jb
phase, which is used to transform Java bytecode to the primary intermediate
representation (i.e., jimple) of Soot or not able to open the apk. Even though
this does not really affect the results of our evaluation, one could avoid it by
using a different/custom intermediate representation for the analysis or use
different tools to extract the call graphs.
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In general, static analysis methodologies for malware detection on Android
could fail to capture the runtime environment context, code that is executed
more frequently, or other effects stemming from user input [127]. These limi-
tations can be addressed using dynamic analysis, or by recording function calls
on a device. Dynamic analysis observes the live performance of the samples,
recording what activity is actually performed at runtime. Through dynamic
analysis, it is also possible to provide inputs to the app and then analyze the
reaction of the app to these inputs, going beyond static analysis limits. To
this end, we plan to integrate dynamic analysis to build the models used by
MaMaDroid as part of future work.
Chapter 6
Discussion
This chapter will discuss the different aspects of the technical chapters of this
work. Although each of the chapters has its own related discussion sections,
the aim of this section is to show how all these contributions have common
points and what they highlight.
We presented three phases of study, prediction, and detection of malicious
activities on the Internet. In Chapter 3 we presented a framework to study
the kind of malware that could be attacking your PC by feeding it simulated
user triggers and recording its reactions. Chapter 4 shows Tiresias, a system
that predicts multi-step attacks phases, in order to prepare system administra-
tors to counter these actions by knowing in advance what is going to happen.
Next, we present MaMaDroid (Chapter 5), a system for Android malware
detection. These three phases are crucial in the fight against cybercriminals
and our goal is to tackle adversaries strategies over these different levels. The
idea of working on different phases that have the common goal of making cy-
bercriminal operations harder, is based on an holistic approach: it is necessary
to improve on several aspects and contemporary operate on different angles to
be efficient.
All the techniques of this work have another concept in common: under-
standing and extracting malicious behavior. We evaluate the fact that mali-
cious behavior has to follow certain paths that can differ from benign ones; for
instance, information stealing malware will always have to send these informa-
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tion to the C&C servers. Being able to extrapolate the behavior can be the
key for more appropriate countering actions. The concept of behavior in this
context is seen as the actions defining the malicious events and it can involve
some of the actions taken into account that are not necessarily malicious any-
time, independently from what operates them (sending personal information
on the Internet may be done automatically also by benign software). External
actions, such as user triggers, have to be taken into account, as mentioned in
Section 2.4 when talking about Zhang et al. [134], context makes the difference
in understanding these phenomena.
The techniques, statistical frameworks, and systems created are built on
and aiming to reinforce existing techniques and system security research areas.
In different terms, we did not reinvent the wheel, we did not invent a new car,
but modified the existing ones to make them better. We are not the first ones
using a sandbox, but we operate the sandbox to induce the malicious samples
to operate different actions, rather than just wait and record. We are not
the first ones using deep learning for prediction purposes, but we use it for a
specific purpose where, properly tuned, can release its potential. We are not
the first ones focusing on API calls and using ML on the information extracted
on their usage, but with the use of abstraction and Markov Chains, we relate
them into sequences, lose detailed information to gain on the gross idea of
what is happening when apps are running.
Causality in malware behavior. In Chapter 3 we extract behavior as
the ability to react to certain user triggers. The causality framework based
on counterfactual analysis has been proven effective both in an application
presenting minor quantities of noise (the extensions leaking browser history in
Section 3.3) and in one presenting challenges that caused noise in the results
(the malware samples network traffic analysis in Section 3.2). For the second
one it has been necessary to apply the whole statistical framework that allowed
to rule out the noise and extract the causality relationships. At the beginning,
we present the methodology itself and the chapter shows how the methodology
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is not efficient because tailored and limited to a specific application, but can
be extended as it is general and applicable to different challenges.
As mentioned earlier, this chapter is showing that sandboxes/honeypots
can be more than passive tools that record everything done by the pieces of
code we analyze. When we passively analyze such code we may have only a few
operations made by the analyzed sample, or we may have a stream of actions
that do not look coherent. When analyzing this information we might not
extract nor analyze what we needed. The simulation of user triggers may help
to select the actions we seek, unveil the pieces of information that can lead to
the results the defense system is looking for. Our approach to sandboxes is not
avoiding the limitations of such tool (Section 3.2.4), it is trying to build on the
qualities of the tool. Malware may detect simulated environments, therefore
we changed settings that might be checked by malicious samples. However,
the simulation of user triggers makes such virtual environments more real to
the malicious samples.
The application to network traffic (Section 3.2) is not including any kind
of detection systems. When we worked on this project we thought about how to
implement such system: given the distribution of how many times samples from
each family reacted to the triggers, it is possible to see whether the distribution
of triggered experiments for an unknown sample is closer to a family rather
than the other ones. When working on this phase, our goal was to investigate
whether the counterfactual analysis model and the statistical framework were
efficient or not, but, considered how general the model can be, it is possible to
add an interesting evolution into a possibly reliable detection system. In such
development, it would be important to add triggers and malware families.
Section 3.3 is already showing a possible implementation of a detection
system based on unsupervised classification using linear regression. As this
application has shown less noise affecting the measurements, we have been able
to develop a classification system even though we had a few points available
for regression. The causality framework is part of a more complicated system,
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it is not stand alone in this case. However, it is the starting point, having the
rest of the system building on the results of this step.
Prediction through deep learning. The second phase analyzed in this
work is explained in Chapter 4. We successfully aimed to building a classifier
based on deep learning and able to predict the exact event that is going to
happen next out of 4495 possible options. The results are showing Tiresias’
ability of efficiently identifying the steps of multi-step attacks to prevent the
attacker from doing them.
Behavior is defined as the signatures triggered by the adversary’s actions
because we applied Tiresias to a database of Intrusion Prevention Systems
events. In this case, as well as the previous ones, the behavior is given by
actions that are essential to the adversary final goal. The key of this phase
is foreseeing what an adversary could do, act preemptively to disrupt the
adversary’s actions. Such approach allows system administrators to prepare
the defenses where there weren’t and the system could have been hit. The use
of an advanced statistical tool as deep learning is carefully evaluated against
less complicated structures showing that the potential of this tool is higher
than the one of, for instance, Markov Chains as we have to rely on particular
mechanisms that are involving long term memory for this specific problem.
Detection of Android malware using Markov Chains. The third phase,
following the prediction one, is detection. Prediction is a rather new research
trend where we act by anticipating the adversary’s moves. However, as this
approach cannot be implemented on all the aspects of the malware and ma-
licious behavior world, it is necessary to focus on the detection of malicious
samples as well. In the specific case of this work,MaMaDroid (Section 5) is a
tool focused on the detection of Android malware. In this case MaMaDroid
models the sequences of API calls of the analyzed apps. The API calls are
nothing more than the single actions that the apps can do and the sequences
are the apps behavior.
175
The system is efficient, presenting high F1 scores because there actu-
ally is a clear difference between the behavior of benign and malicious apps.
Moreover, it fits requirements for the implementation on infrastructures such
as markets. MaMaDroid is designed to act as a security check before the
malicious apps get on the market. Even though the families abstraction is
lightweight and could be implemented on a mobile phone, the packages one is
slightly more efficient; the finer resolution of this abstraction results in higher
F1 scores at the cost of an heavier model that can be managed more easily by
central markets rather than personal devices. MaMaDroid is not immune
to evasion techniques, at the same time it is an approach that tackles the
Android malware detection field from a different angle with satisfying results.
We discuss the possible evasion techniques in Section 5.4.3, but the techniques
are not related to how MaMaDroid itself works: they are more related to
which techniques have to be used (e.g., static analysis) and the stealthiness
of malicious samples.

Chapter 7
Ethical Discussion of this Work
In the previous sections of this work we discussed the technical contributions
and how they have been filling open gaps and opening new questions in studies
on malicious behavior. In this Section, we are going to analyze what are the
ethical implications of these works. We will analyze all the technical sections
one by one and then the ethical implications of possible implementations into
the wild.
7.1 Research Analysis and Ethics
Doing research in security and cybercrime has several ethical implications.
Starting from the most obvious ones, like involving humans, to less obvious
ones, like the possible attacks that can be done by malicious samples running
in a monitored environment.Every project has ethical implications that have
to be evaluated. When doing research, we are interested in the results of every
project, but it is important that the work follows guidelines. Moreover, the
results we are able to reach are subject to deductions and interpretations. A
researcher may come to incorrect conclusions that may affect the decisions of
practitioners in the field.
Causality in Malware Activities. When it comes to the research related
to the first phase, there are many implications related to the experimental
environment to be taken into account: we run malware samples that are active
and functioning to study their reactions. It implies that no real information
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of any kind should be used during the experiments as malicious samples may
otherwise use this information for their own purposes.
Samples may also use the virtual environment for attacks to third ma-
chines; these attacks may be different one from the other and it is important
to implement security measures: limiting bandwidth to avoid DoS attacks,
redirecting SMTP packages to avoid spamming campaigns or targeted black-
mailing messages, limited lifetime of the virtual environment to limit the pos-
sible advanced exploits that may be run against other machines. All these
restrictions are needed to avoid that research becomes an harm to someone
else’s life.
We already talked about how hard it is to establish causal relationships
and how a causal relationship is an extremely strong link between variables,
but it is also important to think about what it means to declare such a strong
link. Some of the findings related to this phase are intuitive and researchers
and practitioners can easily see them by using logic. However, other aspects
may be less straightforward; for instance, establishing the linear relationship
between amount of history in the browser and aggregate size of the packets sent
to leak the history. The rationale behind this result is intuitive, but the reality
of telecommunications may affect these results: there can be packets sent more
than once or payloads that have been limited in sizes, creating overhead. It
is important that findings are valid and that events that may affect them are
not undermining the validity of the results.
Predicting Security Alarms due to Malicious Activities Using Deep
Learning Algorithms. The second phase is related to the use of advanced
tools such as Deep Learning. We often evaluate Deep Learning as a black box
from which we take into account only the results. However, in some cases this
may lead to having biases being unnoticed. When we do not notice the biases
that are affecting the dataset or the decisions we pose important threats of
validity of the results. In our field of research this may lead to several issues,
(a) the paper is presenting results that are not reliable nor valid, (b) the results
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presented raise the bar of acceptance for other research projects in the field
without being as good as they are presented, (c) the system may be used for
future work that will base itself on invalid constructions or tools.
These reasons may be seen as common to all the research fields that
are presenting any kind of result, however, the use of Deep Learning can
be even more prone to these issues. Deep Learning (and more in general
Machine Learning) is often seen as black magic that solves the problems for
the researcher. For this reason it is often used without full knowledge of its
rules, protocols, and mechanisms. By applying Deep Learning in this way,
researchers cannot notice if something is affecting the validity of their own
results.
This work has other ethical implications related to research: Tiresias is
one of the few works on prediction of events and preemptive behavior. This
fairly new trend may become one of the most explored themes in the system
security field and the oldest works a reference for the newest ones. The validity
of Tiresias’s methodology, its datasets and evaluation are even more crucial
under this light.
Detecting Malware by Using Markov Chains as Behavioral Models.
The last phase we worked on is the detection one. The detection phase is
one of those that is continuously raising interest over the years. As for our
system, MaMaDroid is a system applying Machine Learning algorithms in
a relatively new field, android malware. While the considerations thought
for Deep Learning systems in the previous paragraphs are valid for Machine
Learning systems, the works on detection present another important ethical
concern: full disclosure and complete reproducibility. This is an ethical concern
that affects all the aspects of research; however, Tiresias has been created
using datasets from a private company and may be implemented by them;
the amount of information that can be shared is, therefore, limited. In such
cases the work has to have detailed descriptions to allow the community to
thoroughly understand it, but cannot be fully disclosed as there is company
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related information. MaMaDroid, on the other hand, is using public data
on a topic that has been widely explored. When we claim MaMaDroid
performances are better than the ones of DroidAPIMiner, we have to be
able to prove it. For this reason we preferred using only DroidAPIMiner
(of which the authors sent the original source code), rather than other systems
(e.g. DREBIN) of which the sourcecode is not available. For the same reason,
MaMaDroid source code is publicly available for researchers to try it and
compare its efficiency with the one of their systems.
7.2 Systems Ethics and Implementation in the
Wild
The area of information security that this work is part of, is system security.
Practitioners all over the world are constantly developing systems for their
own companies and monitoring the systems produced by researchers in their
work. This means that research is influencing the world around us and the
implementation of systems that are inspired by researcher’s work is not un-
common. In this section we are going to understand what are the implications
of the systems developed in this work.
Causality in the wild. In the first part of this thesis we talked about a
statistical framework. We already described how the use of triggers may posi-
tively affect the sandboxing techniques and how effective this can be, however
we also mentioned how important it is to study the validity of the results
(Section 7.1). When we foresee this framework implementations into the wild,
we think about howits results can be significant. This system could be imple-
mented to analyze new software characteristics in environments where crucial
information and operations are, e.g., a bank subnetwork where stock exchange
operations are handled. This kind of networks are limited in the amount of
operations and the traffic that can be exchanged, therefore it is possible to find
out which behaviors are suspicious. Moreover, Ex-Ray is already an effective
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application of such framework that could be implemented as security check by
those markets that are selling browser extensions.
Prediction of Security Alarms in the wild. The second area of work
we talked about is the prediction of alarms. Tiresias has shown reliability,
however, as expected, it does not have 100% Accuracy. When implemented
in the wild, such system has to give indication on whether the prediction is
reliable or not and on which could be the risk of an incorrect prediction in case
there are two possible events with similar probability. Handling these issues
is crucial because a system like Tiresias can be a valuable help for system
administrators, however, a wrong prediction cannot turn into a disaster for the
company. Systems adminitrators rely on the suggestions given by automated
systems every day; they rely on wrong suggestions as well, in their decisions.
When we talk about prediction of events, a wrong suggestion may be hinting
that a specific attack is about to happen instead of another one. We may
consider a wrong prediction like not having any prediction at all about the
attack, however this is not correct as the reactions of the administrator may
affect how the attack develops or, even worse, may delay the application of
the correct countermeasures. It is therefore crucial that systems like Tiresias
give a detailed feedback on which could be the kind of attack but also whether
other (completely different) attacks could be misinterpreted and being the ones
taking place.
Android Malware Detection in the wild. The evaluation of system errors
is crucial also in detection systems like MaMaDroid. We have explained
in Section 2.2 that systems security is not about having one system able to
detect everything. MaMaDroid is an extremely effective system, however it
may miss malicious apps that without other controls could be injected into
the market. As for Tiresias, MaMaDroid must be carefully evaluated to
understand which decision could be borderline or which one could be wrong
because the app presents characteristics that are leading to wrong evaluations.
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By being able to evaluate all these things it is possible to determine whether
it is necessary to further check the specific app or not.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Final Remarks
This thesis is the final product of three years of research work. We presented
the successful research aiming to help in the continuous arms race between
cybercriminals and the security community. This work can be an inspirational
starting point for new research work as well as being used by practitioners as
part of their tools. They have been milestones for the teams working on them
and they have been proven to be efficient elements respecting high standards
of research.
We worked on tools for measuring, predicting and detecting malicious
behavior on the Internet. We decided to operate on these three phases as part
of the most crucial ones to apply advanced statistical methods in this field.
In the first phase we have presented a statistical framework to study
causality relationships between user and malicious behavior. We have pre-
sented and thoroughly evaluated two practical applications of this tool, the
study of malicious samples from different malware families in a sandboxing
environment and the study of browser extensions leaking browser history.
In the prediction phase we have worked on Tiresias, a system able to pre-
dict multi-step attacks. We have evaluated the system over different datasets,
analyzed it over different timescales, and evaluated case studies to have better
insights on the work.
In the detection phase we have created MaMaDroid, a system that
is applying Markov Chains on sequences of API calls to distinguish between
184 Chapter 8. Conclusions and Final Remarks
benign and malicious apps. We analyzed MaMaDroid’s performance using
different malware datasets, studying the evolution of the malware samples and
how the system is able to adapt through the years.
This thesis tackled the issues related to malicious behavior on the Internet
from different points of view, focusing on the concept of behavior, how to
recognise patterns in Internet behavior (whether benign or malicious) and the
use of ML and other advanced statistical methods for this scope. The systems
created as part of this work have in common a very important aspect: their
versatility. In fact, the causality framework is applicable to several different
issues, MaMaDroid can be easily integrated in security systems used by
Android markets and the adaptation to different versions of the Android OS
(or different OSs using the same kind of API architecture and functionalities)
is immediate. Tiresias can be implemented on several devices and we have
shown that its detection sub-system is usable by devices with limited power
as well.
The versatility of the systems is not the only takeaway from this work.
The results are showing, without any doubt, that statistical systems are able
to extrapolate and evaluate patterns from different issues in a very efficient
way. However, as explained in Section 2.3.2.1for ML systems, the work of
the statistical methods would not be that effective without an effective rep-
resentation. Among the different settings in which we have used statistical
evaluation, a particular mention goes to the abstraction invented and imple-
mented in MaMaDroid: this technique is an important contribution to the
features extraction for these systems. Abstraction has removed detailed in-
formation about API calls by keeping only the general name, representing its
very rough behavior (classes and packages) or even just an indication of what
is involved (families). The use of abstraction allowed to use a much more
lightweight system, but increased the robustness as well. In fact, while the
evaluation metrics highlighted great performances even when abstracting at
the highest level of granularity, we were able to extract information readable
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by users as well on how the classifier was working. Abstraction is a technique
that should definitely be evaluated by the community in other problems as it
probably is the most promising idea that can be listed as contribution of this
thesis.
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